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I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereign investing has become an important element in emerging
patterns of governance in this century. 1 It represents efforts by states
to manage and project their authority in accordance with changing
1. See, e.g., Gordon L. Clark et al., Symposium: Sovereign Fund Capitalism,
42 ENV’T & PLAN. A 2271, 2272 (2010), available at http://www.envplan.com/epa/
fulltext/a42/a43313.pdf; Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth
Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New
Mercantilism,
60
STAN. L. REV.
1345
(2008),
available
at
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/articles/GilsonMilhaupt.pdf.
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realities of power and governance forms in a world defined by the
logic of economic globalization. Sovereign Wealth Funds (“SWFs”)
also provide host states with an important source of revenue for
undertaking projects these states may no longer be able to afford,
“[c]reditors are also beginning to govern outright.” 2 Sovereign
investing takes a number of forms. Two of the most innovative and
dynamic are those of the People’s Republic of China 3 and the
Kingdom of Norway. 4 Both have changed fundamental assumptions
about the ways states regulate internally and project power
externally. 5 Each seeks to use the logic of globalization, and its
markets, as a means of extending its authority beyond its borders and
engaging in development of international normative standards for
public and private conduct under hard and soft law frameworks. Of
the two, the Chinese approach is more creative in its use of marketoriented transformation, which focuses on state participation in
2. Matt Stoller, The Housing Crash and the End of American Citizenship, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1207–17 (2012) (observing the encouragement from the
White House and leaders from both parties for foreign SWFs to invest in a variety
of U.S. industries); see also, Mark E. Plotkin, Foreign Direct Investment by
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Using the Market and the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States Together to Make the United States More Secure,
118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 88 (2008) (explaining how sovereign investing can be
used as a political weapon because some countries invest for geostrategic goals
instead of political gains); Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest
in the United States?, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (2009), available at
http://weblaw.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/lawreview/documents/KnollforWebsite.p
df (noting that SWFs benefit host states by decreasing their domestic cost of
capital and giving them the primary right to tax investors).
3. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis:
Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the
Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (2010) [hereinafter
Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis] (explaining how China integrates
important aspects of sovereign investing to achieve both commercial and political
aims to maximize the welfare of the Chinese state).
4. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory
Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global
Governance Through Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425 (2010)
[hereinafter Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons].
5. See Steve Schifferes, Lifting the Lid on Sovereign Wealth Funds, BBC
NEWS, June 13, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7430641.stm (noting
that China is a more passive investor, seeking only good financial returns, while
Norway has followed a more political course for private market interventions by
embracing a responsibility to avoid human rights violations).
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private market activities. 6 In contrast, the Norwegian approach is
more aggressive and political in its blending of national and
international governance as well as public and private governance
mechanisms through interventions in private markets. 7 Sovereign
investing thus points to a form of cooperative governance that has
been emerging in the global regulation of markets and finance
primarily over the last half-decade. 8 But it remains a controversial
practice, even as its allure remains powerful. 9 Recent work on the
emerging “law” of SWFs 10 increasingly describes the way that these
instruments “replicate the collisions between two tectonic forces that
are grinding their way to a new normative framework of governance
and power.” 11 SWFs constitute a new form of private organization
operating in global space beyond the state while simultaneously
involved in activities within the territories of several states. At the
same time, SWFs remain very much instruments of the state and
tightly bound up in the formal structures of the state and legal
6. See, e.g., Willy Kraus, Political Power and the Power of Market-Dynamics
in China, in THE STUDY OF MODERN CHINA 93 (Eberhard Sandschneider ed.,
Tobia Schumacher & Petra Dreiser trans., 1999) (discussing the importance of
legal regulatory framework in China’s state-participation-focused market
transformation).
7. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment from
Multinational Corporations for Human Rights Violations—The Case of Norway’s
Sovereign Wealth Fund, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 577, 594–605 (2008); Gordon L.
Clark & Ashby H. B. Monk, The Legitimacy and Governance of Norway’s
Sovereign Wealth Fund: The Ethics of Global Investment, 42 ENV’T & PLANNING
A 1723, 1735–37 (2010), available at http://www.envplan.com/epa/fulltext/a42/
a42441.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance
Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board,
and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 755
(2011), available at http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&
context=fac_works [hereinafter Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance].
9. See, e.g., Vivienne Bath, Foreign Investment, the National Interest and
National Security – Foreign Direct Investment in Australia and China, 34 SYDNEY
L. REV. 5 (2012), available at http://sydney.edu.au/law/slr/slr_34/slr34_1/
SLRv34no1Bath.pdf (explaining how Australian public perception recently
influenced the rejection of a proposed corporate takeover that would have
increased Australia’s governance in the foreign entity).
10. See, e.g., FABIO BASSAN, THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 55
(2011).
11. See Larry Catá Backer, Review Essay: Taking a Step Toward a Law for
Sovereign Wealth Funds 101, 103 (Consortium for Peace and Ethics, Working
Paper No. 2012-9/1, 2012).
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systems grounded in respect for territorial borders. 12
This collision is possible only as a result of the structural changes
resulting from globalization, and specifically, its role in producing
porous national borders. 13 The most important consequence of this
collision is governance fracture and, as a result, the diffusion of
regulatory authority between public and private bodies within and
between states. 14 The more these forces work toward harmonization,
the more relentlessly they illuminate the resulting fracture of
governance. Yet they also point to the possibility of creating a
framework for understanding the way in which SWFs are governed
and can be managed through regulation. 15
This study, then, does not consider the way in which SWFs ought
to be governed; 16 rather it focuses on the emergence of governance
systems through which SWFs can themselves govern. For that
purpose, it considers in some detail a critical aspect of the
organization of the sovereign investing project of Norway. 17
Undertaken through its SWF, the Government Pension Fund-Global
(for the purposes of this study the “NSWF”), 18 Norway seeks not
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions:
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 999, 1005–06 (2004), available at http://www.jura.unifrankfurt.de/42852885/regimecollisions.pdf.
14. Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the
21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L.
REV. 177, 182–84 (2012), available at http://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/TILR_017_02_Backer_art05.pdf [hereinafter Backer, The
Structural Characteristics of Global Law].
15. BASSAN, supra note 10, at 39–40.
16. For a discussion of this topic, see id.; see also Yvonne C.L. Lee, The
Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 197
(2010); Efraim Chalamish, Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Wealth
Funds, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 645 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Quest
for Sustainability: Insights from Norway and New Zealand, NORDIC J. COM. L. 1
(2011), available at http://www.njcl.utu.fi/2_2011/benjamin_j_richardson.pdf
(explaining how the Norwegian SWF has been imitated by others, despite the fact
that it is not an “industry leader”); see also, Milken Institute, Structuring Israel’s
Sovereign Investment Fund, 17 (Dec. 2011), https://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/
FILIsraelSWF.pdf (acknowledging the success and effectiveness of Norway’s
SWF structure and legal framework and noting that the Israeli investment fund
may borrow some structures from the NSWF).
18. See The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2011,
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merely to project public wealth into private global markets, but
attempts to construct a complex rule-of-law-centered framework that
blends the imperatives of a state-based public policy with a rulebased governance system that incorporates both domestic and
international norms. To this framework, Norway adds a policyoriented use of traditional shareholder power to affect the behavior
and governance of companies in which the NSWF has invested. The
object is not merely to maximize the welfare of the fund’s ultimate
investors, the people of Norway, but also to use the fund to advance
Norwegian public policy in both the international sphere and the
domestic legal systems of other states to achieve a measure of
horizontal harmonization of corporate governance. 19
Norway has developed a toolbox to effectuate its policy-centered
investment strategy, which consists of both the traditional forms of
regulatory governance and a policy-centered invocation of
shareholder power. The shareholder power operates both within the
corporation and, for a large investor, as an advocate for change
within those foreign states where those companies are domiciled. In
effect, Norway acknowledges three intertwined but autonomous
governance realms. 20 The first is the traditional territory-based state.
The second is the governance sphere of the corporation—affecting
not only relationships within the corporation’s operations but also the
rules that reflect the choices it makes when interacting with others.
The third is the international governance sphere, where common
traditions are developed that have a direct and indirect effect on both
domestic legal orders and corporate behavior choices. Norway has
sought to operate within and between these three governance realms,
and to some extent affect their content, through the investment
strategies of the NSWF. This intertwining suggests a unique intersystemic governance project. 21
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. 9 (2012), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/
pages/37868600/PDFS/STM201120120017000EN_PDFS.pdf (explaining the
composition of the Government Pension Fund, which encompasses the
Government Pension Fund Global and Government Pension Fund Norway, which
are managed by the Norges Bank under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance).
19. See discussion infra Part II.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. Larry Catá Backer, Inter-Systemic Harmonization and Its Challenges for
the Legal-State, in THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF THE LAW 427,
428–31 (Sam Muller et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Backer, Inter-Systemic
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Understood generally within the rubric of “responsible
investing,” 22 the NSWF takes part in global financial markets as both
a participant and as a regulatory stakeholder. First, as a regulatory
stakeholder, the NSWF determines the range of enterprises in which
it may invest: its investment universe. That determination is based on
the NSWF’s governing documents. The most important of these is a
set of Ethical Guidelines, in which the NSWF investment program is
grounded. 23 These Ethical Guidelines, adopted by the Norwegian
legislature and enforced through an Ethics Council, 24 reflect
Norwegian public policy that itself blends domestic and international
law as interpreted by the Norwegian state. The Ethics Council is then
charged with determining whether a company should be excluded
from investment by the NSWF through the “active ownership”
strategy25 utilized by the Fund Manager in harmony with responsible
investment principles. These principles are also grounded in
Norwegian domestic law, international law, and norms selected by
the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. 26 Second, the NSWF’s “active
Harmonization].
22. Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2011, supra note 18, at
98; New Guidelines for Responsible Investment Practices in the Government
Pension Fund Global (GPFG), NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/press-releases/2010/Newguidelines-for-responsible-investment-practices-in-the-Government-Pension-FundGlobal-GPFG.html?id=594246 [hereinafter New Guidelines].
23. Guidelines for the Observation and Exclusion of Companies from the
Government Pension Fund Global’s Investment Universe, (adopted by the Ministry
of Finance on Mar. 1, 2010 pursuant to Act no. 123 of Dec. 21, 2005), STYRER,
RÅD OG UTVALG [Norwegian Boards, Councils, and Committees], available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics_council/ethicalguidelines.html?id=425277 [hereinafter Ethics Guidelines].
24. Id.
25. See The State Will Be an Active Owner, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF TRADE
AND INDUS. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/nhd/presscentre/Press-releases/2011/the-state-will-be-an-active-owner.html?id=637657;
Active Ownership—Norwegian State Ownership in a Global Economy,
NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY
OF
TRADE
AND
INDUS.
(2011),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/36076278/PDFS/STM201020110013000EN_PD
FS.pdf.
26. On the Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2008,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. 109 (2008–2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/
pages/2185603/PDFS/STM200820090020000EN_PDFS.pdf (explaining that fund
management must take into account national norms “precluding the Fund from
having investments that conflict with Norway’s obligations under international
law”).
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shareholding” or “active ownership” policy27 also has a private
regulatory dimension. Active ownership commits the NSWF to
attempt to use its position as a shareholder to change individual
corporate behavior to conform to Norwegian policy touching on
corporate governance and conduct. 28 Active ownership obligations
can be applied by the Fund manager but may also be invoked
through application of the Ethics Guidelines observation powers.
Investment activity with legislative effect, undertaken through the
framework of responsible investing, provides the foundation for the
thesis of this study: SWFs embody a new and important form of
cooperative governance, one that (1) bridges public and private
government spheres, (2) blends law, custom, contract, and non-state
governance regimes, and (3) mediates between the national and
international systems. The functionally-directed governance
activities of the NSWF do not serve as a convergence of law project
undertaken by Norway. Rather, its objective is to position Norway as
a nexus for the mediation of governance polycentricity inherent in
globalization. As a consequence, the state assumes the role of a
chameleon, 29 adopting actions and objectives in line with the role it
plays in each governance system.
This two-fold set of techniques for state intervention in private
markets, with the purpose of securing both economic and regulatory
return on investment, represents the most innovative part of the
NSWF framework. 30 Norway’s SWF project may provide a window
into governance frameworks for the coming century. It embraces a
set of governing parameters incompatible with traditional
assumptions of the operation of the law-state system from the last
century; 31 here, neither the state nor the law occupies the central
27. Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2011, supra note 18, at
95–98.
28. Id. (asserting that active ownership then becomes a method of ensuring the
compliance with the NSWF’s ethics guidelines).
29. Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis, supra note 3.
30. See generally GRALF-PATER CALLIESS & PEWER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH
CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW
(2010) (theorizing the way in which regulation through state intervention in private
markets has become a variant on the emerging mechanics of law).
31. See Larry Catá Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview
and Application of Interactions Between Law-State and Governance-Corporate
Systems, in BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN
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position. The NSWF governance regime acknowledges three
simultaneously operating governance regimes: the law-state system,
the social-norm system of private actors, and the international lawcustom system of the community of states (and their partnerconstructs). It seeks to both navigate between these governance
systems and to actively participate within and impact them. The
NSWF is created and operated as an instrumentality of the state, a
fund controlled through the Norse Ministry of Finance. As a state
instrumentality, it is used to generate income for Norway; yet its
income production also produces governance effects through the use
of shareholder power to effectuate Norwegian public policy in the
enterprises in which the NSWF owns shares. The public policy that
is reflected in the NSWF investment activity as a shareholder and
investor in turn reflects the internalization of international law and
governance within the Norwegian domestic legal order. These ideas
contribute to the development of international law and custom that
are then applied to the law or social-norm systems of the other two
governance regimes.
The distinctions between law and norm, between public and
private spheres, between hierarchy and polycentricity, thus collapse
within the operational universe of the NSWF. I am reminded of the
vision of the future of governance suggested by Michel Foucault
nearly a generation ago: “A right of sovereignty and a mechanics of
discipline. It is, I think, between these two limits that power is
exercised. The two limits are, however, of such a kind and so
heterogeneous that we can never reduce one to the other.” 32 The
Norwegian experiment, like that of its Chinese counterpart,
represents contemporary efforts to institutionalize a sustainable

AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Günther Handl, Joachim Zekoll, Peer Zumbansen, eds.,
2012) [hereinafter Backer, Governance Without Government] (discussing the lawstate system, and noting that “law-state” refers to the conventional early twentyfirst century understanding of the state as a territorial unit with its own domestic
legal order regulated by a constitution; the constitution is in turn constrained by an
international system created by consensus among the community of states and in
which there is a strict divide between public law, legitimated by democratic and
rule of law principles and the social norms of non-state actors in markets and other
communities).
32. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1975–1976, 37 (Mauro Bertani et al. eds., David Macey
trans., 2003).
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‘normalizing society’ that is compatible with emerging global power
systems. It is in this sense that the NSWF can be understood as a
regulatory chameleon, balancing conventional economic profit
maximization with long-term strategic political and policy goals. 33
Part II will briefly examine the legal and regulatory framework
within which the NSWF is organized, introducing the principal
institutional actors and the regulatory framework within which they
operate. Parts III and IV then turn to consider responsible investing.
Part III considers the private market interventions of the NSWF
through its active ownership framework. Part IV then turns to the
more public aspects of NSWF governance by considering the
structures and operation of NSWF investment universe rules. The
NSWF governance framework tends to frame the rules for
companies’ access to capital and is grounded in the application of the
Ethics Guidelines as the gateway to that portion of the capital
markets in which the NSWF will participate. These access rules,
though only applicable to NSWF investment decisions, are expected
to pressure companies into conforming to access NSWF investment.
This Part first examines the substantive provisions framing
investment exclusion, centering on the NSWF Ethical Guidelines,
and the structure and operations of the Ethics Council itself. 34 Part V
then turns to the decisions of the Ethics Council, organized around
substantive issues, the purpose of which is to discuss the way
juridification of exclusion decisions has brought a very public
element into economic investment decisions of the NSWF. Part VI
suggests a generalizable analytical framework for setting up the
market as both a space for regulatory interventions and as an
economic transaction space. This article will explore this framework
and its consequences, especially for its implications for emerging
inter-systemicity of governance, principally in the context of
financial regulation of markets.
The article concludes that the state has returned as a center of
33. Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons, supra note 4,
494–500 (2010); accord Richardson, supra note 17, at 22–23 (asserting the
Norwegian and New Zealand SWFs resemble institutional chameleons because
they are similar to private investment instruments in that they maximize
shareholder value, but are also tasked with the public responsibility to realize their
states’ ethical policies).
34. See infra Part IV.
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transnational regulation, but it is doing so in part through global
private markets. That return to the market is transforming both the
market as a center of lawmaking and the state as a stakeholder in
regulatory governance beyond its borders. Market power now
substitutes for public legislative power, and the techniques of market
behavior now serve as the vehicle for the implementation of law and
norms. The distinctions between public and private—i.e. between
public regulation and market behavior—distinctions that are
grounded in a well developed formal system of state and market,
give way to the rise of a system best characterized as functional and
hybrid. This hybrid system will substantially impact international
regulations, the regulatory context of SWFs, the development of
transnational standards for corporate social responsibility, and the
emergence of substantive standards for corporate behavior consonant
with emerging human rights standards.

II. THE OPERATION OF THE NORWEGIAN
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND: PRIVATE ACTOR,
INTERNATIONAL ACTOR, AND SOVEREIGN
The NSWF is a peculiar commercial creature of the state. Its
principal objective is to protect the income generated from Norway’s
exploitation of its petroleum reserves. 35 Norway meets this objective
by seeking to maximize the wealth-generating potential of the fund
in ways that reflect the law and public policy of the Norwegian
kingdom. It accomplishes that objective, in turn, by participating in
private markets for real estate and securities. Norway undertakes that
participation in a manner similar to that undertaken by private
investment firms but constrained by the need to conform to its public
policy. That public policy is codified in statute and regulation and
implemented by the NSWF’s fund managers and those governmental
entities charged with the management of the NSWF.
This section introduces the formal organization of the NSWF. Part
A examines the legal and organizational structures of the NSWF and
35. See, e.g., Investment Strategy of the GPFG, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pensionfund/government-pension-fund-global-gpfg/investment-strategy.html?id=696849
(last visited Sept. 2, 2013) (describing the investment strategy of the GPFG, or
NSWF, as being centered on achieving the highest possible return over time).
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its investment management, focusing on the Ministry of Finance, the
Norges Bank, and the Norges Bank Investment Management
(“NBIM”). Parts B and C then focus on the framework within which
the operating universe of NSWF investment is constrained, focusing
on the Ethics Guidelines and the structure and operation of the Ethics
Council.

A. ORGANIZATION OF THE NSWF: FINANCE MINISTRY, THE
NORGES BANK, AND NBIM
The fund that is now the NSWF was established in 1990 as the
Petroleum Fund. 36 It was established “as a fiscal policy tool to
support a long-term management of the petroleum revenues.” 37 The
NSWF was established in its present form in 2006 as one of two
investment funds operated by the Norwegian state. 38 The object of
this study is formally known as the Government Pension Fund
Global, which is a continuation of the Petroleum Fund. The other is
the more domestically focused Government Pension Fund Norway.
Both domestic and international parts of the Pension Fund have two
principal objectives. The first is to support programs of government
savings directed to the financing of the Norwegian National
Insurance Scheme’s pension expenditures. The second, and more
interesting from the perspective of transnational governance, is to
“support . . . long-term considerations in the application of petroleum
revenues.” 39
The Petroleum Fund began investing in equities in 1998. In 2000,
it enlarged its investment pool to include securities from five
identified emerging markets. Bonds were added in 2002 and ethical
36. Norway Government Pension Fund Global, SWF INSTITUTE,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/norway-government-pension-fund-global/ (last
visited July 5, 2013).
37. Government Pension Fund Global, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Mar.
2010), www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/PFG_summary_
march2010.pdf.
38. See The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2012,
NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY
OF
FIN.
74
(2012–2013),
available
at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/38359835/PDFS/STM201220130027000EN_PD
FS.pdf.
39. Provisions on the Management of the Government Pension Fund – Global,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. § 1 (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.regjeringen.no/
upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/Management_of_the_government_pension_f
und.pdf [hereinafter Provisions on the Management].
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investment principles were introduced in 2004. 40 By 2009 the
successor NSWF was reported to own about 1% of global stocks 41
and 2.25% of every listed European company. 42 The NSWF reached
a milestone of three trillion kroner (over $500 billion) in assets in
October 2010. 43 Beyond its revenues and market power, the NSWF
has become influential in regulating markets and establishing norms
in investment and corporate governance. The NSWF has not been
shy about projecting its power to affect governance issues within
private markets outside the territory of the Norwegian State. In 2009,
for instance, it “launched an initiative aimed at fostering dialogue on
environmental issues with firms in its portfolio, a blueprint for green
activism by often passive institutional investors.” 44 Neither the
Petroleum Fund nor the current NSWF was organized as a
conventional separate juridical corporate entity, either under the
Norwegian corporations law or under special legislation. Rather, the
Fund is structured as a governmental entity operating autonomously
but not incorporated as either a private or public corporate entity. 45
As a technical matter, the NSWF exists only in the form of a record
of deposits and investments deposited in and invested through the
Norges Bank, 46 but “[t]he investment portfolio of the [NSWF]
accounts for most of Norges Bank’s assets under management.” 47
The managers of the NSWF are either autonomous state
40. Government Pension Fund Global, supra note 37.
41. Norway Oil Fund Surges, Owns 1 Pct Global Stocks, REUTERS, Aug. 14,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/14/norway-oilfundidUSLE34057520090814 [hereinafter Norway Oil Fund Surges].
42. Richard Milne, Investment: Norway’s Nest Egg, FIN. TIMES ANALYSIS,
Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b6e0e756-e87c-11e1-839700144feab49a.html.
43. SWFs Finally Reach $4 Trillion in Assets, Extra Boost from Norway
GPFG, SWF INSTITUTE, http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf-news/swfs-finally-reach4-trillion-in-assets-extra-boost-from-norway-gpfg/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
44. Norway Oil Fund Surges, supra note 41.
45. See id. “The Government Pension Fund Global is deposited in an account
at the Norges Bank. The countervalue is managed under rules laid down by the
Ministry, see section 7.” The Government Pension Fund Act of 2005, no. 123
(Dec. 21, 2005) § 2, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1719656/
governmentPensionFundact.pdf.
46. See About Norges Bank, NORGES BANK, http://www.norgesbank.no/en/about/ (last visited June 13, 2013) (discussing how the Norges Bank
manages Norway’s foreign exchange reserves and the GPFG).
47. Annual Report of the Executive Board 2011, NORGES BANK 11 (2011),
http://www.norges-bank.no/pages/88282/en/executive_board.pdf.
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instrumentalities or other separately constituted entities. This
structure is similar to the organization of some SWFs, but is also in
distinct contrast to the organization of other important SWFs; for
example, China’s SWF is organized under Chinese corporate law
principles. 48 Indeed, the law establishing the management of the
NSWF makes quite clear that the NSWF is to be treated as an
instrumentality of state, with “no rights or obligations vis-a-vis
private sector entities or public authorities and [with no right to]
institute legal proceedings or be subjected to legal proceedings.” 49
Those limitations are effective, at least in Norway under Norwegian
law.
As an instrumentality of the state, the NSWF falls under the
control of the Ministry of Finance. 50 The Ministry of Finance
manages the funds deposited under its promulgated regulations and
is empowered to adopt supplementary regulations to implement the
Act that established the NSWF. 51 NSWF funds are deposited with
and managed from the Norges Bank (domestic funds are managed
through the domestic SWF, the Folketrygdfondet). 52 The Storting,
Norway’s Parliament, allocates funds for the NSWF from the net
cash flow from petroleum activities whenever such funds may be
transferred from the central government’s budget. The term “net cash
flow from petroleum activities” is derived from several listed sources
of gross revenue less listed categories of expenses. 53 These include
(1) tax revenues 54 (2) revenues from taxes relating to environmental
emissions 55 and (3) income from Norway’s interest in petroleum and
petroleum-related activities. 56 These revenues are taken net of certain
48. See Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis, supra note 3, at 107–
16.
49. Provisions on the Management, supra note 39, § 6.
50. Id. § 2.
51. Id. § 7.
52. Id. § 2.
53. See id. § 3.
54. Id. (including total tax revenues and royalties deriving from petroleum
activities collected pursuant to the Petroleum Taxation Act (no. 35 of June 13,
1975) and the Petroleum Activities Act (no. 72 of Nov. 29, 1996)).
55. Id.
56. Id. (indicating that operating income and other revenues deriving from the
State’s direct financial interest in petroleum activities include state revenues from
net surplus agreements associated with certain production licenses, dividends from
Statoil ASA, government revenues deriving from the removal or alternative use of
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expenses. 57
The NSWF may also fund its operations from “the net results of
financial transactions associated with petroleum activities,” 58 which
takes the following definition: gross revenues from government sale
of shares in Statoil ASA less government purchase of shares in
Statoil ASA, defined as the market price paid by the government for
the shares, and less government capital contributions to Statoil ASA
and companies attending to government interests in petroleum
activities, as well as financial transactions connected to companies in
the petroleum sector in which the government has ownership. 59
Beyond that, the establishing provisions define NSWF income as the
return of capital under management and vest the Storting with the
power, by resolution, to transfer the NSWF’s capital. 60
The Ministry of Finance regulates but does not actively manage
the NSWF. Until recently, the regulatory matrix that defined the
relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the Norges Bank
was complex. In 2010, after a period of regulatory review, the
Ministry of Finance announced a substantially revised framework. 61
Part of the objective of the revision was to reframe the division of
authority between the Finance Ministry and the Norges Bank.
Another was to change risk management parameters. The changes
also broadened the mandate, with the Minister of Finance
emphasizing that “the regulation of the GPFG should continue to be
framework-based, so that Norges Bank must fill out the general
framework and principles with more detailed internal regulations for
the operational management . . . . Micromanagement by the Ministry

installations on the continental shelf, and any government sale of stakes
representing the State’s direct financial interest in petroleum activities).
57. See id. These expenses include Norway’s direct investment in petroleum
activities, operating costs relating to those activities, the cost to Norway of certain
continental shelf activities and Norway’s purchase of stakes “as part of the State’s
direct financial interest in petroleum activities.” Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.; infra Part III.
60. Provisions on the Management, supra note 39, §§ 4–5.
61. New Mandate for Management of Government Pension Fund Global,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/
fin/press-center/press-releases/2010/new-mandate-for-management-ofgovernment.html?id=623478.
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is neither possible nor desirable.” 62
The current regulatory framework came into force January 1,
2011. 63 It replaced and refined the original set of regulatory
documents and state contracts under which the Fund operated. 64 The
new framework includes two sets of regulations, 65 two sets of
guidelines, 66 and a management agreement. 67 It also vests both
physical custody of the Fund and management of the
assets represented by the Fund in the Norges Bank. 68 The Norges
Bank is charged not merely with the management of the Fund, but
with a specific set of obligations that define its relationship with the
Finance Ministry. These include a duty to inform the Finance
Ministry of its strategic plan, significant changes in the value of the
Fund or in the management of the Fund by the Bank, or any incidents
that trigger a duty to inform. 69 The Norges Bank is also obligated to
provide the Ministry of Finance with “any information the Ministry
requests.” 70 The Norges Bank is required to meet with the Ministry
formally at least once per quarter to discuss agendas set by the
Ministry. Additionally, like other governmental instrumentalities, the
Bank is required to produce a series of public reports on its
management of the Fund, the contents of which are specified by

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Provisions on the Management, supra note 39 (highlighting the
structure and characteristics of the regulatory framework in place prior to January
1, 2011).
65. See Management Mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., 25–26 (Nov. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/mandat_spu_eng.
pdf [hereinafter Management Mandate] (including regulation no. 1725 of
December 22, 2005 on the management of the Government Pension Fund Global
and regulations of February 24, 2010 concerning management of the real estate
portfolio in the Government Pension Fund Global).
66. Id. at 4 (explaining that the two guidelines are: (1) the guidelines for
management of the Government Pension Fund Global (supplementary provisions
pursuant to the Government Pension Fund Act and the regulations on the
management of the Government Pension Fund Global), and (2) the guidelines of
March 1, 2010 for the Norges Bank’s work on responsible management and active
ownership of Government Pension Fund Global).
67. Id. at 25–26.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 24.
70. Id.
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regulation with some specificity. 71 Other information is also made
public, including regulatory and governance rules developed by the
Norges Bank. 72
The Norges Bank manages the NSWF through its asset
management unit, the Norges Bank Investment Management
(“NBIM”). 73 A seven-member Executive Board appointed by the
King in Council oversees the work of NBIM. 74 NBIM’s governance
model differs from other parts of the Norges Bank. NBIM’s
Executive Director has the responsibility and authority of CEO. “He
reports directly to the Executive Board and is subject to continuous
oversight by the Governor on behalf of the board.” 75 NBIM uses
external managers to handle parts of the Government Pension Fund
Global and vests oversight of NBIM in a supervisory council. 76 The
object, in part, is to generate value added to the NSWF through
“active management” of the NSWF, 77 an investment strategy for
maximizing returns quite distinct from the policy strategy of active
ownership, which governs the relationship between the NSWF as
shareholder and the companies in which it has invested. A 2009
study concluded that NBIM provides two services to “the people and
future generations of Norway. First, it offers ‘passive’ returns based
on the benchmark from the Ministry of Finance.” 78 Second, “NBIM
offers active management that seeks to add positive, risk-adjusted
return over the benchmark net of active fee. NBIM pursues this goal
through a combination of internal and external management, and a
71. Id. at 22–23.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Id.
74. Executive Board, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/
About-us/governance-model/Executive-Board/ (last visited June 13, 2013) (noting
that NBIM, established in 1998, is an integrated global organization with about
340 employees from twenty-seven nations, with English as its working language,
and with offices in Oslo, London, New York, Shanghai, and Singapore).
75. Id.
76. Id. (discussing the composition and purpose of the Supervisory Council:
fifteen members appointed by parliament who supervise the Norges Bank’s
operations and compliance).
77. See Andrew Ang et al., Evaluation of Active Management of the Norwegian
Government Pension Fund – Global, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. 13 (Dec. 14,
2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/rapporter/
AGS%20Report.pdf (distinguishing active management from responsible
investment and the control of the NSWF’s investment universe).
78. Id. at 70.
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philosophy of outsourcing many aspects of its back-office
operations.” 79 But the report noted that active management has had
little effect on investment. 80 This is a view rejected by the
Norwegians. 81

B. THE NSWF ETHICAL GUIDELINES
Among the most important guidelines developed for the
operationalization of the responsible investment objectives of the
NSWF are the Fund’s Ethics Guidelines. 82 The Ethics Guidelines
came into effect on March 1, 2010 and replaced the Ethics
Guidelines for the Government Pension Fund Global, which had
been adopted in 2004. 83
The Guidelines were originally created as a separate enforcement
mechanism to supplement the work of the Norges Bank. 84 Since
then, they have undergone changes 85 and have been reviewed by a
number of experts, including an American consulting group. 86
79. Id. at 68.
80. See id. at 16 (recognizing that much of the Fund that includes active return
comes from certain “well-recognized systematic factors,” contributing in only a
very small way to the part of the return that is “genuinely idiosyncratic”).
81. See Milne, supra note 42 (explaining how the NBIM adamantly considers
itself to be an active investor).
82. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23.
83. Id.; Annual Report 2009, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT
PENSION FUND GLOBAL (2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957930/
Etikkradet_E2009.pdf.
84. See On the Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2008, supra
note 26, at 22–24 (explaining that an evaluation of the Ethics Guidelines revealed
that they could be expanded and altered to maintain the Government Pension Fund
as a responsible investor).
85. The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2012, supra note 38,
at 70 (“In 2008 and 2009, the Ministry evaluated the ethical guidelines for the
GPFG. The evaluation resulted in the introduction of new measures and tools to
strengthen the Fund.”).
86. Norway hired former U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright’s
consulting group “to help it review the ethical investment policy of the €250bn
($366bn) government pension fund.” The then-named Albright Group worked with
Simon Chesterman, of New York University School of Law’s Singapore program
“to examine issues including the effectiveness of the Norwegian fund’s highprofile divestment strategy and its engagement procedures with the 7000
companies it invests in.” Hugh Wheelen, Ex US Secretary of State Albright Hired
for Norway Fund Ethics Review, RESPONSIBLE INVESTOR (Jan. 17, 2008),
http://www.responsible-investor.com/home/article/ex_us_secretary_of_state_
albright_hired_by_norway_for_ethics_review/; cf. Simon Chesterman, Laws,
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Despite the fairly widespread concerns among legal academics about
the substitution for soft law or quasi-judicial systems for the
traditional positive law mechanics of the law-state, the Ethics
Guidelines have now become part of an integrated system of
responsible investing that is meant to serve as a set of legal
qualitative and policy standards governing the sorts of investments
that the Fund can make.
The Ethics Guidelines form an important component of the
responsible investing framework of NSWF operations, which is
grounded in the policy of the Ministry of Finance that links corporate
social responsibility to ethics and suggests that active ownership
principles and determinations about which companies should form
the investment universe of the NSWF are linked by a unified set of
principles derived from public law. 87 Those policies also suggest the
link between responsible investing, national law, and the
extraterritorial application of national law standards grounded in
international standards. “The ethical aspects of [corporate social
responsibility] have become more apparent as a result of
globalization . . . . The ethical basis for [corporate social
responsibility] derives from the inviolability of human dignity.” 88
The Ethics Guidelines also proceed from a set of political
considerations that are based on the premise that private actors have
public obligations and that the public obligations of public actors do
not diminish because these actors are engaged in private market
activities. It follows from these premises that the NSWF may
Standards or Voluntary Guidelines?, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/kampanjer/investing-for-the-future/lawsstandards-or-voluntary-guidelines.html?id=495027 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013)
(“The turn to ethics as a means of improving behaviour of multinational
corporations offers an opportunity but also an opportunity cost: ethics can be a
means of generating legal norms, through changing the reference points of the
market and providing a language for the articulation of rights; yet they can also be
a substitute for generating those norms.”).
87. The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2012, supra note 38,
at 10 (describing the Ministry’s view that the best and longest term returns depend
on “economic, environmental and social terms, and on well-functioning, efficient
and legitimate markets”).
88. Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
6
(2009),
available
at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2203320/PDFS/STM200820090010000EN_PDF
S.pdf [hereinafter Corporate Social Responsibility].
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legitimately extend public power through its participation in private
markets, that is, that the NSWF may only invest as a sovereign in
private markets. 89 The Committee on State Ownership concluded that
the state’s “legitimacy could be weakened, for example, as legislator
and on matters concerning foreign policy, if in its role as owner, it
failed to comply with high standards in this area.” 90 This sovereign
investing, grounded in notions of ethical investing, necessarily
conflates public and private activities in ways that privilege the state
and its choices and suggests that such choices should legitimately be
extended to the limits of the actual ability of the state to control
activity, either directly through legislation or indirectly through
ownership. “Just as politics is not an end in itself, but a means of
promoting social change for the benefit of the people and the
environment, a company’s profits or activities are not goals that can
be viewed in isolation from other considerations.” 91
The Ethical Guidelines are based on two premises. The first is that
the Fund must be managed to extract a “sound return in the long
term.” 92 The second premise is that the first objective is contingent
on a number of policy factors, including “sustainable development in
the economic, environmental and social sense.” 93 The policy nature
of these contingencies is clearly articulated as well. The Fund is to be
used not merely to protect and increase the value of the Fund itself,
but to influence behaviors among the pool of potential targets of
investment.
The Ethical Guidelines are implemented in three ways—through
the exercise of ownership rights, the negative screening of
companies, and the exclusion of companies from the investment
89. This notion extends ideas that were developed in the European Union about
the nature of state action under the EU treaties. See generally Larry Catá Backer,
The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden
Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of
Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801 (2007–2008) [hereinafter Backer, The Private Law of
Public Law].
90. Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 88, at 17.
91. See id. at 6 (arguing that companies have a social responsibility to aid the
countries in which they operate because of the impact their financial activities have
on development).
92. See On the Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2008, supra
note 26, at 203.
93. Id.
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pool. 94 First, the Ethics Guidelines bind the Ministry of Finance, the
Council on Ethics, and the Norges Bank to investments in the
NSWF’s equity and fixed income portfolio, as well as to instruments
in the Fund’s real estate portfolio issued by companies listed in a
regulated market. 95 Second, the Ethics Guidelines forbid investment
in companies that engage in certain economic activity, some of
which is legal where they are undertaken and some of which is not.
For example, the NSWF assets may not be invested (directly or
indirectly) in companies that produce weapons “that violate
fundamental humanitarian principles through their normal use” or in
companies that produce tobacco or sell weapons or other military
goods. 96
Finally, the Finance Ministry has discretionary power to exclude
another group of companies from the Fund’s investment universe. 97
The Ministry may not exercise this power unless there is an
authoritative determination that “there is an unacceptable risk that
the company contributes to or is responsible for any one of five
specified categories of human rights and corporate governance
norms. 98 In making this discretionary assessment, the Ministry of
Finance must consider the severity of the violation, the likelihood
that it may be repeated, the connection between the entity
committing the violation and the company in which the NSWF
invests, the extent of mitigation or remediation, the company’s
corporate social responsibility architecture, and the scope of the
company’s positive contribution to those affected by the company’s
activities. 99
The Ministry of Finance may not exercise discretionary power

94. Id.
95. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 1.
96. Id. § 2.1(a).
97. See Annual Report 2009, supra note 83.
98. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 2(3) (stating the five categories of
activities or conditions that would trigger this power include (a) serious or
systematic human rights violations such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty,
forced labor, the worst forms of child labor, and other child exploitation;
(b) serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict;
(c) severe environmental damage; (d) gross corruption; and (e) other particularly
serious violations of fundamental ethical norms).
99. Id. § 2(4).
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unless it determines that it has obtained sufficient information. 100 The
Ministry is required to consider whether other measures may be more
suitable for the purpose of reducing the risk of continued norm
violations. 101 Tying the active ownership principles of the
management guidelines to the exclusion power under the Ethics
Guidelines, the Ministry of Finance has authority to determine
whether it should seek to change the behavior of the offending
corporation through assertion of active ownership principles rather
than exclusion of the company from the investment universe. 102 The
Ministry may also put a corporation under observation, rather than
take more definitive action. 103 This is an important structural
principle that appears to provide the Ministry with an important
public policy tool even where a company may otherwise merit
exclusion.
Accordingly, the NSWF rule structures create a power in the
Ministry of Finance to coordinate its authority to regulate corporate
behavior in a way that effectively blends public and private
governance. 104 That coordination allows the Finance Ministry to
balance its investment universe exclusion rules, its active shareholder
principles, and its authority to seek information from companies to
determine particular forms of regulatory dialogue with specific
companies irrespective of the regulatory home of that enterprise.
This blends public and private power in new ways. Consider the way
that the Norwegian Parliament can, like any other state, issue
regulations that affect either corporations it licenses or the conduct of
corporations whose operations have effects within the national
territory of Norway. Simultaneously, through active ownership
principles, the state recognizes that it can project regulatory power
externally through the successful invocation of the authority of
shareholders to modify and direct corporate behavior. The effect is to
extend Norwegian public policy to enterprises over which Norway
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 3.
104. This is the essence of the operationalization of responsible investing. See
The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2012, supra note 38, at 60
(discussing the interaction between the responsible investment and active
ownership, including traditional international investment principals and the use of
shareholder rights to promote social and environmental considerations).
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has no legislative power. In effect, the state is using private power to
affect public governance objectives. By inverting its role, it can
regulate more effectively as a private shareholder than as a state.
This is especially potent when the state has no authority to regulate
directly—for example, where a state like Norway seeks to regulate
the behavior of corporations chartered and operating outside of
Norway. The power invoked is substantial and shows how
globalization has transformed both the power of states and the forms
by which state power is asserted across borders.
Alternatively, Norway may avoid seeking to use its private
shareholder power and instead invoke its power to manage its market
presence by excluding an enterprise from its investment universe
because the enterprise violated Norwegian law or policies on
appropriate conduct. But exclusion is an extreme action and
effectively makes it difficult for Norway to exert any influence over
an excluded enterprise. Exclusion does have a public purpose. It can
signal official disapproval of corporate activity on public policy
grounds, which can have an effect on other states and perhaps other
market actors; other states are potentially able to assert direct
regulatory authority, while other market actors are perhaps able to
decrease corporate access to capital markets. But excluding an
enterprise from the investment universe reduces Norway’s ability to
influence the company.
Rather than invoke the power to exclude a corporation, the
Ministry of Finance has the authority to “put a company under
observation.” 105 The Ministry may choose to put a corporation under
observation if there is doubt as to whether the conditions for
exclusion have been fulfilled, uncertainty about how the situation
will develop, or if observation is deemed appropriate for other
reasons. The Ministry usually combines the authority to observe with
a regime of monitoring. The Ministry is required to regularly assess
whether the company should remain under observation. 106 Those
assessments are fueled by information. Yet, this policy choice is left
intentionally opaque; decisions to put companies under observation
are not disclosed to the public. But for enterprises that Norway seeks
to influence, observation combined with monitoring provides a way
105. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 3.
106. Id.

24

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:1

of blending public policy goals (conformity to Norwegian corporate
governance standards) with private market activity (effectively a
conditional agreement to hold shares in a company).
Thus, the Ministry of Finance’s decisions on observation or
exclusion of companies from the investment universe are, in the final
analysis, political decisions. The Ethics Guidelines, however, specify
a legal framework regarding the process for determining eligibility of
exclusion and how such determinations are to be made. But a legal
framework requires a governmental institution to play a quasijudicial role in the application of Norwegian investment policy to
NSWF investment decisions and to the form and scope of active
shareholder obligations; this is a role reserved for the Ethics
Council. 107 We turn next to the form and powers of the Ethics
Council and its process for exclusion.

C. OPERATIONALIZING THE ETHICS GUIDELINES—THE STRUCTURE
AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NSWF COUNCIL ON ETHICS
We have seen how the Norwegian state has developed a legal
framework for sovereign investing, serving as a variant of moves
toward sovereign investing that other powerful sovereign participants
have attempted in private globalized capital markets. 108 The
grounding norm for state investment is the notion of responsible
investing, which serves as the critical filter through which the
economic objectives of the Fund, to achieve the highest possible
return, are understood. Responsible investing consists of several
inter-related parts: qualitative policy elements that must be
incorporated into considerations of investment under the highest
achievable return standard; incorporation of international standards
within domestic law structures for the governance of corporate
conduct; active participation in the development and implementation
of international standards by public and private actors; active
ownership principles; and ethical guidelines. 109 The substance of the
Ethics Guidelines were explored as a standard of normative conduct
and as a system of regulation connected to the structures of

107. Id. §§ 2(2), 4–5.
108. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
109. See The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2012, supra note
38, at 70–84.
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responsible investment. 110 While the Ministry of Finance and its
Fund manager, the Norges Bank—through its NBIM
establishment—are principally responsible for operationalizing the
active management and investment strategies portions of Fund
operations, the Ethics Guidelines themselves establish a separate and
autonomous apparatus for the operationalization of the guidelines,
the Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund Global (the
“Ethics Council”). Though the regulations create a structure for
coordination of operation and information sharing, 111 each operates
from a significantly different regulatory perspective within the
responsible investment standard. This section provides a brief
overview of the structure and operations of the Ethics Council.
The Ethics Guidelines give the Ministry of Finance the authority
to appoint the Ethics Council, which consists of five members,
mostly drawn from academia and related areas. 112 The Council is
provided its own secretariat financed by the Ministry to ensure
autonomy. 113 Both the size of the Ethics Council and the availability
of a well-staffed secretariat are instrumental to shaping both the
character and authority of the Ethics Council. 114 The Ethics Council
apparatus appears to be well funded, though its strain on both time
and finances is acknowledged. “It costs money to have us do the
work that we are doing, even though it is not a huge amount. And it
causes a lot of extra work for others as well, for the Central Bank, for
the Minister of Finance. It requires a big effort.” 115
The Ethics Council is vested with four principle functions
described in Sections 4(2)–(5) of the Ethics Guidelines. The Council
is to “monitor the Fund’s portfolio with the aim of identifying
110. Id.
111. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 6(1).
112. Id. § 4(1); Council on Ethics, STYRER, RÅD OG UTVALG [Norwegian
Boards, Councils, and Committees], http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-radutvalg/ethics_council.html?id=434879 (last visited Sept. 2, 2013) [hereinafter
Council on Ethics] (displaying a number of prominent people who have served on
the Ethics Council to date).
113. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 4(1).
114. Sibylle van der Walt, Bringing Human Rights into Pension Finance:
Interview with Gro Nystuen, Norway Govt Pension Fund, RESPONSIBLE INVESTOR
(Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.responsible-investor.com/home/article/gro_nystuen
_no/.
115. Id.
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companies that are contributing to or responsible for unethical
behaviour or production.” 116 The Council also advises the Finance
Ministry “on the extent to which an investment may be in violation
of Norway’s obligations under international law” 117 and on exclusion
from the Fund. 118 Lastly, the Ethics Council can invoke the Norges
Bank’s active shareholder function by giving advice on whether a
company should be put under observation. 119 Only one of the Ethics
Council’s functions is expressly mandatory: the obligation to monitor
companies in the Fund’s portfolio for compliance with the normative
ethics standards set out in Section 2 (products-based exclusion and
conduct-based exclusion). The rest of its obligations are, to some
extent, either triggered on request or discretionary. The Council must
give legal advice on the extent to which an investment may violate
international law at the request of the Ministry of Finance; however,
this obligation may be exercised upon a request from the Ministry of
Finance or on its own initiative. 120
In addition, a company can be put under observation at the
discretion of the Finance Ministry. Such a determination may be
made when the Ethics Council decides to exclude or observe a
company. 121 Observation avoids exclusion but subjects the company
to a periodic assessment by the Ethics Council. 122 A company can be
taken off the observation “watch-list” when the Ethics Council
makes a determination that is then approved by the Finance Ministry
that the risk of norm violations has been sufficiently reduced;
conversely, failure to make progress may move a company from
observation to exclusion. 123
One principal operational function of the Ethics Council is the
harvesting of information. The Council has broad, though
unspecified, authority to “obtain the information it deems necessary
and ensure that the case has been properly investigated before giving

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 4(2).
Id. § 4(3).
Id. § 4(4).
Id. § 4(5).
Id. § 5(1).
Annual Report 2009, supra note 83, at 14.
Id.
Id.
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advice on exclusion from the investment universe.” 124 The obligation
to harvest information extends not only through the process of
determining exclusion from the investment universe but continues
thereafter: “The Council shall routinely assess whether the basis for
exclusion still exists and may, in light of new information,
recommend that the Ministry of Finance reverse a ruling on
exclusion.” 125 The nature of the Ethics Council’s charge appears to
have affected its approach to its duties in a particular way:
The biggest difference between us and anybody else is the amount of
resources we use and the level of distrust we have when we screen
companies. We do not just rely on service providers who claim they can
make sure that our portfolio is ethical. We think that nobody actually can
do this better than ourselves. So although we use initial information from
screening companies, we always check the quality of the information
ourselves. 126

The Ethics Guidelines set out a rudimentary system of procedural
protection applicable to the process of determining the
appropriateness of an exclusion from the NSWF. The system
necessitates a determination of qualitative minimum protections of
the rights of those affected by Ethics Council determinations
balanced with the needs of the Ministry of Finance for efficiency in
the operation of the system. 127 Companies subject to Ethics Council
investigations are given a general opportunity to present information
and arguments to the Council “at an early stage of the process.” 128
The Council is also under an obligation to clarify the basis on which
it is proceeding with the exclusion investigation, including
presenting any exclusion recommendation to the affected company
for comment. 129
The Ethics Council’s standard for conduct-based exclusion under
the Ethics Guidelines is whether a company, by its conduct, could
expose the Fund to an unacceptable risk of contributing to grossly
124. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 5(2).
125. Id. § 5(5).
126. van der Walt, supra note 114.
127. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341–49 (1976) (establishing a
three-part balancing test to determine if a citizen has been afforded due process in
administrative proceedings).
128. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 5(3).
129. Id. § 5(3).
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unethical practices. 130 The Ethics Council has listed some of the
factors it weighs in reaching its decision under this standard, which
include the nature of the violation, its connection to the activities of
the company, the character of the violation (isolated or likely to be
repeated), the seriousness of the violation and the extent of the
damage it causes, the extent of evidence of the violation, and the
mitigation efforts of the company. 131
Once it has reached a decision, the Ethics Council is required to
produce a written opinion in which it describes the grounds for its
recommendations. 132 The specification for the assessment of the basis
for exclusion makes clear the quasi-juridical character of the process:
“The assessment of the specific basis for exclusion shall state
relevant factual and legal sources and the aspects that the Council
believes ought to be accorded weight.” 133 The Ethics Council has
some latitude in the character of the information used in its
proceedings; its only regulatory standard is the “verifiable” standard
of Ethics Guidelines Section 5(4).
The Ethics Council bases its decisions and recommendations on a
series of different sources. The main rule is that the information
taken into account must be verifiable. 134 Moreover, the Ethics
Council has chosen to limit the citation of its information sources

130. See id. § 2(3) (listing examples of proscribed conduct including human
rights violations, environmental disasters, and significant corruption).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 5(4). These grounds shall include a presentation of the case, the
Council’s assessment of the specific basis for exclusion and any comments on the
case from the company. The description of the actual circumstances of the case
shall, insofar as possible, be based on material that can be verified, and the sources
shall be stated in the recommendation unless special circumstances indicate
otherwise. Id.
133. Id. § 5(4).
134. Frequently Asked Questions, STYRER, RÅD OG UTVALG [Norwegian
Boards, Councils, and Committees], http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-radutvalg/ethics_council/frequently-asked-questions.html?id=605599 (last visited
June 26, 2013) (describing procedures used to verify information, including
maintaining contact “with special interest groups, local and national authorities,
international organizations, local and international experts and the company
itself”). The Council may look at “documentation such as research and scientific
reports, legal sources, environmental impact assessments, reports from nongovernmental organizations, the company’s own documents, etc.” Id. The Council
may also conduct field studies if necessary to document the violations. Id.
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under certain circumstances. 135 The internal routines for managing
proceedings to reverse exclusion, described as “cases” in the English
translation of the Ethical Guidelines, are to be available to the public
and the affected companies. 136 The Ministry of Finance is also
required to publish Ethics Council recommendations “after the
securities have been sold, or after the Ministry has made a final
decision not to follow the Council on Ethics’ recommendation.” 137
The transparency does have limits, however, to protect both the
companies and the state. 138
The Ethics Guidelines frame the structure of cooperation between
the Norges Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ethics Council on
the responsible investment norm. 139 The three entities meet regularly
to exchange information, focusing on the Norges Bank’s active
ownership functions and the Ethics Council’s portfolio monitoring
function. 140 Procedures for coordinating communication with
companies are required. 141 Both the Norges Bank and Ethics Council
must consult with each other about their respective obligations. 142
Upon the determination by the Ministry of Finance that a company
is to be excluded from the investment universe of the NSWF, the
Norges Bank receives a formal notification and has two calendar
months to divest its holdings. 143 The Norges Bank may notify the
excluded company, but only at the Finance Ministry’s request. 144 In
all cases, companies and others may view Finance Ministry actions
through a periodically updated list of excluded companies (or

135. Id. (allowing for omission “to protect personal safety”).
136. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 5(6).
137. Id. § 5(7).
138. van der Walt, supra note 114 (noting potential for problems that arise
through uncertainty of companies’ actions and inability to produce conclusive
documentation).
139. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 6.
140. Id. § 6(1).
141. Id. § 6(2).
142. Id. § 6(3) (commenting that in these consultations, the Council can ask the
Norges Bank for information about specific companies’ ownership or can ask the
Norges Bank to comment on other circumstances concerning these companies,
while the Norges Bank may ask the Council for its assessments of individual
companies).
143. Id. § 7(1).
144. Id. § 7(2).
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companies put under observation) published by the Ministry. 145
What emerges from this review is a body organized and operated
much like an administrative court with a broad political mandate. Its
members, some but not all of whom are lawyers, understand their
role as essentially political. Members are chosen for their
representative value (and to that extent, can be understood as the
embodiment of essentialist abstraction in the service of the state) and
their personal achievements and status. However, the forms used to
exercise authority are quasi-judicial, rather than administrative or
legislative, in character. The Ethics Council produces information—
principally of use to the Ministry of Finance and the Norges Bank.
But more importantly, the principal authoritative product of the
Ethics Council is its determinations of company compliance and
conduct-based exclusion rules specified in the Ethics Guidelines.
These determinations are not merely specific instances of the
application of the Ethics Guidelines, however. By suggesting and
developing a set of approaches to such determinations, standards for
applying the Ethics Guidelines, and rules for determining
conformity, the Ethics Council begins to develop a jurisprudence that
has significant value as a governance tool. In Part IV, this article will
consider the work of the Ethics Council, its character, nature,
meaning, and effect.

III. RESPONSIBLE INVESTING: THE STATE AS
SHAREHOLDER AND “ACTIVE OWNER”
The management charge from the Finance Ministry consists of
two parts: first, the obligation to achieve the highest possible
return and second, the requirement that investment decisions be
made independently of the Ministry. 146 The Norges Bank can
145. Id. § 8.
146. See Investment Strategy of the GPFG, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (June
13, 2013), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-governmentpension-fund/government-pension-fund-global-gpfg/investment-strategy.html?id=
696849 (explaining how the Ministry of Finance and the Norges Bank, in their
respective capacities as owner and manager of the Fund, have developed an
investment strategy with the following characteristics: harvesting risk premiums
over time; diversification of investments; exploitation of the Fund’s long-term
horizon; responsible investment practices; cost efficiency; a moderate degree of
active management; and a clear governance structure). The investment strategy is
based on the principle that taking risks gives a pay-off in the form of higher
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undertake both requirements directly or, to some extent,
through retained outside managers. 147 For example, the NBIM
investment strategy incorporates external service providers for
specialty investment. 148 Many of the external mandates are in market
segments where the potential to generate an excess return is
considerable. This particularly applies to small and medium-sized
companies and emerging markets. 149 The “highest possible return”
obligation is not left to the discretion of the Norges Bank but is
defined in the regulation as a net of management costs “measured in
the currency basket of the actual benchmark index.” 150 Management
costs are regulated as well. 151 The regulations specify the process for
determining management costs and require a substantiated
proposal for an upper limit on costs beneath which actual costs may
be reimbursed. 152 The Fund is to be maintained in a separate
account to be invested in the name of the Norges Bank. 153 The
Norges Bank is charged with developing, updating, and regularly
evaluating a strategic plan. 154 Though the Norges Bank is expected to
invest independently of the Finance Ministry, any decisions must be
made in conformity with an investment strategy, 155 approved by the
Ministry, and reflected in its “Management Mandate.” With respect
to the strategy, the Norges Bank may advise the Ministry on its or the
Finance Ministry’s initiative. 156
expected returns, or risk premium, over time. Id.
147. See Management Mandate, supra note 65, at 5; Specialised External
Mandates, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/Investments/
external-mandates/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Specialised External
Mandates] (describing how the Fund had 145 billion kroner in assets under
external management at the end of 2011, equaling 4.4% of the Fund’s total market
value). Forty-five different organizations managed a total of fifty-two external
mandates, fifty-one of which were equity mandates. NBIM has provided a list of
external service providers as of December 31, 2012. See External Service
Providers, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/About-us/externalservice-providers-/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) [hereinafter External Service
Providers].
148. See External Service Providers, supra note 147.
149. See Specialised External Mandates, supra note 147.
150. Management Mandate, supra note 65, at 4.
151. Id. at 21–22.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id. at 6.
156. Id. at 5–6.
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The Ministry of Finance’s macro investment strategy further
refines the instruction of the Norges Bank to achieve the “highest
possible return.” The principal macro strategy is described as
“responsible investing” grounded in “good corporate governance and
environmental and social issues in investment activities.” 157 By 2009,
the concept had begun to take its current form and was framed to
serve as a means of mediating between private and public interests as
expressed in national and international norms and rules.
“Responsible investment practice” soon grew into “a recognized and
applied concept in the global investment community.” 158 Responsible
investment is also understood as touching on the “core of investment
management: managing capital with the aim of achieving the highest
possible financial return within an acceptable risk, in line with
shareholders interests.” 159
Responsible investing acknowledges the principal goal of “highest
possible return” and then suggests that the term is embedded in the
notion of a “good return in the long term.” That, subsequently, is
“dependent upon sustainable development in economic,
environmental and social terms, as well as well-functioning,
legitimate and effective markets.” 160 The idea has sometimes been
theorized as welfare-maximizing behavior central to universal
ownership, which cannot sacrifice long-term market integrity and
welfare maximization for short-term strategic behavior. 161 For real
estate investment, investments that the NSWF has been allowed to
make since 2010, the Bank shall prioritize “energy efficiency, water

157. Id. at 6. The enactment of the Guidelines for the Norges Bank, which
modified the Management Mandate, emphasized the importance of responsible
management in the operation of the NSWF. Guidelines for Norges Bank’s Work on
Responsible Management and Active Ownership of the Government Pension Fund
Global (GPFG) (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected
-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-investments/Guidelines-forNorges-Banks-work-on-responsible-management-and-active-ownership-of-theGovernment-Pension-Fund-Global-GPFG.html?id=594253 [hereinafter Guidelines
for Norges Bank’s Work].
158. The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2012, supra note 38.
159. See id.
160. See Management Mandate, supra note 65, at 6.
161. See JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY
CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA
MORE DEMOCRATIC (2000).
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consumption and waste management.” 162 Responsible investing is
also affected by a legislated time horizon for evaluating investment
decisions that prioritizes long-term investments. 163 In effect, the
economic objective of highest return is made to depend on the
conformity of investment with the policy objectives of the
Norwegian state, now transformed into a set of investment criteria
suitable for application for intervention in private markets.
One particularly important mandate is one to incorporate
investment strategies grounded in advancing Norwegian principles of
good corporate governance in the objects of investment. For this
purpose, the Norges Bank is charged with the development of
internal guidelines for “integrating considerations of good corporate
governance and environmental and social issues in investment
activities.” 164 The effect is interesting—the Ministry of Finance has
created a regulatory environment in which the Norges Bank, as a
fund manager, is required to incorporate state policy in investment
decisions while achieving the highest possible return. But what rate
of return is possible turns on compliance requirements with state
policy, including the incorporation of international standards, not
merely in investment decisions, but in the state’s relationship to
enterprises in which it owns shares. The result converts hortatory
notions of responsible investment into regulatory commands that,
when effectuated in the form of market transactions, can affect
corporate governance behaviors of foreign corporations, irrespective
of the internally applicable law of the jurisdictions that have
chartered them. Here, state policy intrudes on markets in both
purchasing decisions and in the conduct of Norway as a shareholder
affecting corporate, social, and operational norms. Core notions of
responsible investing, as thus described, are to form the basis for the
Norges Bank’s investment strategy and its otherwise autonomous
investment decisions.
The “active ownership” rules of the Management Mandate
memorializes the last effect. 165 Subject to the Bank’s principal

162. Management Mandate, supra note 65, at 6.
163. Id.
164. Id. (specifying that the guidelines should be constructed
internationally recognized responsible investment principles in mind).
165. Id.

with

34

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:1

obligation—to safeguard the NSWF’s financial interests 166—the
Bank is required to incorporate a core set of international standards
as the basis for the exercise of its ownership rights. 167 This set of key
international soft law norms governing behavior expectations of
enterprises includes the U.N. Global Compact, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, and the OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance. 168 These standards are not to be applied passively. In its
application decision, the Bank must actively contribute to the
development of “good international standards in the area of
responsible investment and active ownership.” 169 It is also meant to
be a political process, grounded in Norwegian policy. 170 Together,
these provisions set parameters for domestic and international norms
serving as the basis of investment decisions and investor conduct.
These decisions are meant to contribute to the development of
domestic and international norms as well. The market is meant to
serve as the principal regulatory space for the application of domestic
policy and international “soft” governance norms.
Active ownership constitutes an important transnational
component of corporate governance. 171 Part of the objective of
corporate governance is to influence companies directly by changing
how they engage in economic activity to accord with Norwegian
public policy. 172 Where an accord is not possible, “a broader industry
166. Id.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. (discussing that procedures for amendment to the Norges Bank’s
priorities in active ownership require that the plan be published for public
comment and that the Ministry have priority of comment before the final decision
is made).
171. See Larry Catá Backer, Transnational Corporate Constitutionalism?, LAW
AT THE END OF THE DAY BLOG (June 13, 2013),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/transnational-corporate.html.
172. Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2009, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FIN. 135 (2010), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2500165/PDFS/
STM200920100010000EN_PDFS.pdf (“An example of successful ownership
work in this context is the GPFG’s initiative in India which contributed to a new
industry standard for combating child labour . . . . Work on climate change or
regulation of the financial markets so that risk-taking is more in line with longterm interests are good examples of issues where global solutions are most
appropriate.”).
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approach may be relevant.” 173 But the ultimate aim of these
shareholder engagements is regulatory, and the focus ultimately is on
reshaping the domestic legal order of foreign states. In this case, the
NSWF “will primarily be interested in influencing global authorities
in the direction of integrating the external effects with the economy,
either directly or in partnership with portfolio companies and other
investors.” 174 Active ownership is tied to the NSWF’s notions of
universal ownership.
This ultimately broader and conventionally political objective ties
active ownership to the NSWF’s engagement with the work of the
U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment on notions of universal
ownership. 175 Universal ownership points to collaboration among
investors to exercise ownership rights both with companies in which
they invest and with the political institutions of the jurisdictions in
which these companies are regulated. 176 Universal ownership
principles thus suggest the ways in which the state can access nonlaw based avenues of regulation through its shareholder power.
The Fund is a universal owner by definition and should therefore have a
concrete approach to what this means in practice. Such an approach
should look at the need and possibilities for reducing the short- and longterm welfare losses by lifting the quality of the investment universe. It
should also look at the dynamic need to adapt to the issues through

173. Id. at 136.
174. Id. at 135.
175. See Principles for Responsible Investment, Universal Ownership: Why
Environmental Externalities Matter to Institutional Investors 3 (2011), available at
http://d2m27378y09r06.cloudfront.net/viewer/?file=wpcontent/uploads/UniversalOwner-Finallongreport.pdf (arguing that “[l]arge
institutional investors are, in effect, ‘Universal Owners’, as they often have highlydiversified and long-term portfolios that are representative of global capital
markets”). The Finance Ministry has explained how these principles of universal
ownership are both applicable to the NSWF and help shape its responsible
ownership principles, supporting “the choice of climate and water management as
priority areas for Norges Bank’s exercise of ownership rights.” The Management
of the Government Pension Fund in 2010, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. 19
(2010–2011),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2500165/PDFS/STM200920100010000EN_PDF
S.pdf.
176. Principles for Responsible Investment, supra note 175, at 5 (emphasis
removed).
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changes in the investment strategy. 177

Active ownership is not meant to be applied only internally to the
constitution of corporations. It is also meant to have regulatory
effects. But the Guidelines are not merely the imposition of passive
transnational standards. “The Bank shall actively contribute to the
development of good international standards in the area of
responsible investment activities and active ownership.” 178 Thus for
example, the Finance Ministry has pointed to its collaboration with
the U.N. Global Compact, “where the goal is to develop a set of
guidelines that provide guidance for responsible corporate and
investment practice in conflict areas.” 179 The object is regulatory in a
societally constitutive way, to “raise awareness and clarity about
what is acceptable, responsible behaviour.” 180
Together, these incremental changes to the conventional
Norwegian position remind us of the importance of public policy in
the operation of the private investment activities of the NSWF. The
NSWF provides a sophisticated mechanism for regulating
extraterritorially—not through law, but through the governance
mechanics of investment. It also serves as a reminder of the
substantial irrelevance of international efforts to draw a strong
connection between public and private investment in private markets
through instruments like the Santiago Principles. 181
Investment decisions and shareholder conduct, then, are formally
177. Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2009, supra note 172, at
134–36.
178. See Guidelines for Norges Bank’s Work, supra note 157, § 3.
179. Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2009, supra note 172, §
10.3.
180. Id.
181. See Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and
Practices: “Santiago Principles”, INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS, 4–5 (Oct. 2008), http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf
[hereinafter Santiago Principles] (identifying the Santiago Principles as generally
accepted principles and practices reflecting “appropriate governance and
accountability arrangements as well as the conduct of investment practices by
SWFs on a prudent and sound basis”). The purpose of the Santiago Principles “is
to identify a framework of generally accepted principles and practices that properly
reflect appropriate governance and accountability arrangements as well as the
conduct of investment practices by SWFs on a prudent and sound basis.” Id. at 4.
The Santiago Principles are meant to be voluntary, the implementation of which is
subject to the legal and international context of the SWF home state. Id. at 5.

2013]

SOVEREIGN INVESTING

37

structured as active rather than passive, and active across the
boundaries of domestic and international public law space and
between law and private market activity for governance power
assertions. This is the tone that is set for the sort of ownership role
the Fund is to play as an economic stakeholder in foreign-chartered
corporations in which it has invested. “Voting is [NBIM’s] main tool
for influencing the boards of directors elected to supervise
companies on their shareholders’ behalf.” 182 Thus, the NSWF views
itself as vested with responsibility as a “major shareholder in many
companies to exercise our ownership rights appropriately.” 183 The
objective of this responsibility is the deepening of good corporate
governance, as it has been interpreted as a set of political and policy
choices in Norway, and is discharged through dialogue with
companies grounded in the NSWF’s knowledge of their operations
and management cultures. 184 “In given situations, active ownership
can help to bring the management of a company more into line with
our intentions and so realise [sic] underlying value in the company
which the fund can profit from through active management.” 185
Currently, the Norges Bank focuses broadly on issues of equal
treatment of shareholders, shareholder influence and board
accountability, standards for well functioning and efficient markets,
children’s rights, climate change, and water management. 186 The
Norges Bank has put in place an elaborate system meant to ensure
that the Bank can vote at all general shareholder meetings of
companies in which it owns stock and to do so to advance a set of

182. Vegard Torsnes, Active Ownership and Corporate Governance as
Means to Safeguarding Financial Wealth, NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MGMT.
(Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.nbim.no/en/press-and-publications/feature-articles/
2009/Active-ownership-and-corporate-governace-as-means-to-safeguardingfinacial-wealth/.
183. Letter from Svein Gjedrem, Former Cent. Bank Governor, Norges Bank to
Norwegian Ministry of Fin. (Dec. 22, 2009) (on file with Norges Bank), available
at http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/published/submissions/2009/submission23-12-2009/.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Government Pension Fund Global: Responsible Investment, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FIN. 24 (June 13, 2013), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/
upload/FIN/brosjyre/2010/spu/english_2010/SPU_hefte_eng_ebook.pdf
[hereinafter GPFG Report].
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specific governance goals. 187 One way that the Norges Bank aims to
influence issues such as equal treatment of shareholders, shareholder
influence and board accountability, standards for well-functioning
and efficient markets, children’s rights, climate change, and water
management is through voting at annual general meetings. 188 The
voting principles, organized as a set of “Voting Guidelines,” 189 have
produced a concerted and well-orchestrated strategy for voting Fund
shares at annual shareholder meetings. The voting guidelines require
voting against any proposal that fails to meet a minimum
transparency threshold. 190 The Fund will vote in favor of all
proposals that enhance transparency. 191 Additionally, the Fund
supports proposals that enhance shareholder democracy, such as the
principle of one share–one vote; 192 proposals to un-bundle agenda
items, especially with respect to the election of directors; 193 proposals
to require positive majority votes for director elections; 194 and
proposals to permit the introduction of binding shareholder
resolutions 195 that allow shareholders to call a special meeting 196 and
that give shareholders the right to nominate candidates for the
board. 197
The Voting Guidelines are particularly detailed with respect to
proposals touching on the powers of the board of directors. The Fund
187. Id. (“Norges Bank has developed publicly available principles for voting. It
is Norges Bank’s aim to vote at all annual general meetings. Each year, Norges
Bank votes at about 10,000 general meetings. The number of resolutions voted on
every year now exceeds 85,000. Norges Bank votes on all issues, including those
that fall outside the focus areas. The voting records are made public every year.”).
188. Id.
189. See NBIM’s Corporate Governance Principles and Voting Guidelines,
NORGES BANK INV. MGMT. 7, http://www.nbim.no/Global/Brochures/Principles
%20and%20Voting.pdf (last visited June 13, 2013) [hereinafter Voting Guidelines]
(discussing NIBM’s voting guidelines, which consider input from the board and
shareholders, aim for total voting coverage and voting consistency, and avoid
micromanagement).
190. Id. § 1.5.
191. See id. §§ 1.1–1.4 (describing the types of proposals supported by the
fund).
192. Id. § 2.8.
193. Id. §§ 2.2–2.3.
194. Id. § 2.4.
195. Id. § 2.5.
196. Id. § 2.6.
197. Id. § 2.7.
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uses its voting power to support proposals that ensure an independent
board of directors, 198 and especially a “sufficiently independent
chairman, 199 directors who respond to and treat all shareholder
classes equally, 200 and directors who own a meaningful number of
shares 201 and are not otherwise overcommitted 202 or working to
improve responsive governance. 203 The Fund discourages antitakeover measures as anti-competitive. 204 The Fund discourages
recapitalization and share issuances that dilute existing equity, 205 and
related party transactions that do not meet certain transparency
thresholds. 206 Consistent with its own philosophy of encouraging
long-term investing, the Fund will vote for proposals that align
management remuneration with long-term shareholder value
creation 207 and equity related incentives that further align
management and shareholder interests. 208 Lastly, the Fund will use its
shareholder power to privatize the incorporation of economic, social,
and environmental rights within the governance architecture of the
company. 209 These include proposals for greater transparency related
to the social and environmental impacts of corporate activity with
respect to general corporate policies, 210 corporate action on specific
projects, 211 and corporate interactions with policymakers and
regulators. 212 More importantly, and avoiding public lawmaking, the
Fund encourages the adoption of private codes of corporate social
198. Id. §§ 3.2, 3.5, 3.7.
199. Id. §§ 3.4, 3.10.
200. Id. §§ 3.3, 3.8.
201. Id. § 3.6.
202. Id. §§ 3.11, 3.12.
203. Id. §§ 3.1, 3.9.
204. Id. § 4.
205. Id. §§ 5.4, 5.5.
206. Id. §§ 5.6, 5.7. NBIM will assess whether all shareholders are treated
equally, there are unnecessary conflicts of interests, there is sufficient
representation of independent directors on the board, and there is sufficient
transparency of the transaction. Id. § 5.3.
207. Id. §§ 6.1, 6.2.
208. Id. §§ 6.3, 6.4.
209. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Privatization, the Role of Enterprises and
the Implementation of Social and Economic Rights: A Comparison Of RightsBased and Administrative Approaches in India and China (Consortium for Peace
& Ethics, Working Paper No. 2013-1, 2013).
210. Voting Guidelines, supra note 189, § 7.1.
211. Id. § 7.2.
212. Id. § 7.5.
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responsibility and diversity policies that are meant to incorporate
within the internal “law” of the corporation, a set of external
international norms and standards, 213 many of which are neither
binding nor necessarily accepted by the home states of the
corporations in which the Fund exercises shareholder power. 214
Shareholder activity is not limited to voting. The Norges Bank
uses other instruments, including “[v]oting at annual general
meetings, [s]hareholder proposals, [d]ialogue with companies, [l]egal
steps, [c]ontact with regulatory authorities, [and c]ollaboration
between investors.” 215 For example, in its 2011 Report, NBIM noted
that it had filed shareholder proposals to separate the roles of chair of
the board of directors and chief executive officer at four companies
and six proposals for expanded shareholder access to proxies in
connection with shareholder rights to nominate candidates for
election to boards of directors. 216 It has filed actions against Porsche
SE for potential ultra vires conduct in its acquisition of Volkswagen
and, along with other institutional investors, filed an action against
Countrywide Financial Corporation. 217 NBIM has joined with other
institutional investors to influence corporations’ behavior with
respect to their operations touching on children’s rights and climate
change. These discussions have sometimes produced substantive
changes in corporate behavior. 218
The effect of this shareholder activity is to provide the Fund with
another avenue for extending its governance role to the corporations
within its investment pools. More importantly, active shareholding
213. The language conflates law, policy, and economic welfare maximization:
“based on human rights and international labour standards covering a company’s
operations and supply chain . . . when the actions suggested in the proposals are
considered to be reasonable with regard to what the company can be held
accountable for and will benefit shareholders.” Id. § 8.1.
214. Id. §§ 7.3, 7.4.
215. GPFB Report, supra note 186, at 22.
216. See Government Pension Fund Global: Annual Report 2011, NORGES
BANK INV. MGMT. 46–47 (2011),
http://www.nbim.no/Global/Reports/2011/Annual%20report%202011/Arsrapport_
11_ENG_web.pdf [hereinafter Annual Report 2011].
217. See id. at 47 (noting that NBIM has received $16 million in class action
claim payouts).
218. See id. at 48 (explaining how NBIM reported in 2011 that its discussion
with five cocoa and chocolate companies resulted in concrete steps and policies
aimed at combatting child labor).
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provides a method for incorporating international law norms and
standards, whether developed publicly or privately, within the
internal law and operations of the corporation. Norway, in effect, is
both privatizing and internationalizing governance one share at a
time, effectively incorporating international standards into its own
domestic legal and policy orders and then imposing those standards
extraterritorially through its shareholding for the benefit of the
Norwegian people and the maximization of the value of the Fund
itself. This is conflation of the public and private at a very deep level.
The consequences are necessarily polycentric. The Fund can assert
governance irrespective of the policy of the states in which those
corporations are chartered, potentially creating governance
dissonance within a corporation. It can also assert governance on the
basis of the international instruments now incorporated into NSWF
management regulation that may be significantly different from that
of the home state. Again, the result is polycentric. Transparency is
also usefully deployed. The NBIM has, for example, posted its
voting record as a shareholder online and arranged its voting reports
by the substantive areas of action that it seeks to reform. 219 For the
corporation, it suggests simultaneous governance by the home state,
the application of international law and norms as specified by the
home state, and the possibility of deviance from those rules at the
instance of its shareholders who insist on the application of the law
and policy of another state, but only as a matter of private
governance effectuated through market transactions and corporate
internal governance.
The Norges Bank has the principal responsibility of effectuating
this structure in Norwegian investment. For this purpose, “[t]he Bank
shall have internal guidelines for its exercise of ownership rights that
indicate how these principles are integrated.” 220 The Norges Bank
has been deliberately aggressive in meeting its obligation in this
role. 221 The role includes lobbying as a shareholder for changes in the
219. See
Voting
Records,
NORGES
BANK
INV.
MGMT.,
http://www.nbim.no/voting-lists (last visited June 13, 2013); Annual Report 2011,
supra note 216, at 46 (noting how voting records include equal treatment of
shareholders, board accountability, well-functioning markets, children’s rights,
climate change and water management).
220. Management Mandate, supra note 65, at 7.
221. See Pension Funds Urge Chocolate Industry to End Child Labour, NORGES
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laws of host states, including the United States. 222 It also includes the
development of shareholder strategies in concert with other investors
and industry initiatives, which are then used to further governance
behavior modification objectives. 223 As a large shareholder, even
with relatively small stakes, the NSWF is able to affect corporate
governance behavior among those companies in which it has
invested. 224 While the process can be slow—one enterprise at a
time—it can contribute to long-term changes in aggregate behavior
and thus business culture (and the customary norms of business
behavior expectations).
The Management Mandate for the Government Pension Fund
Global incorporates these legislative objectives into the investment
strategies of the Norges Bank. The objectives also contribute to the
complex relationship between law and norm, between state
regulatory policy and state projections of power through active
participation in private markets, and between national legal
structures and the internationalization of behavior standards.
Responsible investing is not constructed merely to produce the
highest achievable returns, but also to bend that objective to other
Norwegian political objectives. 225 It suggests the determination by
BANK INV. MGMT. (May 31, 2010), http://www.nbim.no/en/press-andpublications/feature-articles/2010/pension-funds-urge-chocolate-industry-to-endchild-labour/ (reporting on a cocoa meeting in Utrecht that demonstrated how far
companies have to go to fulfill their 2001 pledge to eliminate child labor and the
NBIM position that the situation must be remedied).
222. See The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2011, supra note
18, at 103 (discussing Norges Bank’s decision to submit shareholder proposals in
six U.S. companies, which call for amendments to articles to enshrine a right for
shareholders to submit proposals for alternative board candidates for inclusion in
the notice of general meeting).
223. Id. at 98.
224. See id. at 100 (discussing the Norges Bank’s influence as a shareholder
despite the small absolute size of its stake in many companies; the “views of the
Bank with regard to company strategy, operations, risk, capital structure and
management are therefore solicited to an increasing extent. Companies are
particularly interested in how Norges Bank will vote in general meetings and how
the Bank reacts to special situations that might arise during the course of the
year”).
225. See, e.g., A Clear Division of Roles and Effective Controls, NORGES BANK
INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/About-us/governance-model/ (last visited
June 6, 2013) (displaying how the Norwegian government has emphasized the
close and democratically legitimate connection between fund and state policy as
reflecting the sovereign will of its people).

2013]

SOVEREIGN INVESTING

43

the Norwegian state that private power is critical to achieving global
economic objectives, and that this private power ought to be
managed through purely domestic law to be sure, but also through
domestic law that itself consciously incorporates international norms.
As such, the NSWF serves as both bridge and framework. It is a
bridge between the public and private governance efforts of the state
and a framework through which the law-state can project its power
inward into private governance across borders and outward into the
construction of governance norms at the international level. Norway
means to stand at the center of this web, and the NSWF provides the
vehicle through which such a complex and interactive system might
be constructed. Consider in this regard the role of private enterprises
in development, one of the elements of responsible investing:
Through knowledge, experience, presence and influence, the private
sector can help to address many of the challenges facing developing
countries . . . . However there is no automatic convergence of the interest
of foreign companies and the real needs of the local population . . . .
Norway is seeking to persuade developing countries to accede to
international conventions and implement and enforce them nationally . . . .
Norway is therefore actively participating in efforts to strengthen
international guidelines for [corporate social responsibility]. 226

This assessment is not to suggest judgment, but the way in which
indirect regulation can be extended extraterritorially through a well
executed strategic program implemented through projections of
financial power (and state policy) in private markets. This objective
is made directly by the Finance Ministry, who wishes the Bank to
“actively contribute to the development of good international
standards in the area of responsible investment and active
ownership.” 227 This reflects a state policy determination that
Norwegian law ought to reflect international standards, and that
international standards ought to be incorporated into the governance
framework of all entities touched by NSWF investment.
For the Ministry of Finance, of course, the notion is plain enough.
The internationalization of its policy choices through the investment
strategies of the NSWF serve as a defense of its policies—they are
not extraterritorial in the sense of advancing the parochial policy
226. Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 88, at 63.
227. Management Mandate, supra note 65, at 7.
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goals of the Norwegian people. Rather, the responsible investing and
active management principles reflect Norway’s desire to implement
international obligations that all states share. In this sense,
Norwegian extraterritorial intervention does not serve the state, but
the international community; in Norway’s view, all states should be
working toward the same ends. The materials that follow will test
these notions. And these notions will be found wanting to some
extent—both in the sense that Norway gives in too easily to national
aspirations and policy preferences in its determinations of the
meaning and form of the international rules it champions, and in the
sense that Norway’s strategic goals may sometimes trump its
economic ones. 228
The tension between state policy goals and the economic
objectives of the fund (as well as the efforts of the state to harmonize
them) is evident in the provisions for the management of the equity
and fixed income portfolios, as well as risk management and
performance valuation, articulated in conventional economic
terms. 229 On the one hand, the NSWF is free to invest in most
traditional forms of tradable securities. Approved investment
instruments include tradable debt and equity securities, derivatives,
and the securities of unlisted companies “in which the board has
expressed an intention to seek a listing on a regulated or recognised
[sic] market place.” 230 In addition, the Fund may own financial
instruments and derivatives, but only when received as a result of
corporate activity. 231 Similar rules apply to the management of the
228. See id. The Management Mandate requires the preparation of an annual
report on the Norges Bank’s work on active ownership and integration of good
corporate governance and environmental and social issues, which requires the
Norges Bank to specify the ways in which it has integrated basic corporate social
responsibility principles into its management. Id. It also requires the Bank to
specify how it has exported these corporate social responsibility issues in its role as
shareholder/investor, mandating the reporting of the Bank’s voting record as a
shareholder. Id. Lastly, the report must include a discussion of the way in which
the Bank has used its position to “contribute to the development of good
international standards” for responsible investment in the form of active
ownership. Id.
229. Id. at 10. See Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2009, supra
note 172, § 2.1.1 (conceding that the twin goals of economic performance and
responsible investment will not coincide).
230. Management Mandate, supra note 65, at 11.
231. Id.
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real estate portfolio. 232 On the other hand, policy objectives constrain
investment freedom, from a purely economic profit maximization
perspective, in important ways. This is particularly apparent with
respect to portfolio management restrictions. 233 The Norges Bank
may not acquire more than ten percent of the voting shares of an
enterprise. 234 Unlike other SWFs, the NSWF does not aspire to be a
controlling shareholder, just an influential one. Additionally, the
NSWF may not invest in domestic companies or in fixed income
instruments issued by governments. Most importantly, the economic
effects of responsible investing are carried out by a provision
prohibiting investment in companies excluded from the NSWF
investment universe, principally for failure to comply with the policy
and behavior threshold built into the macro investment strategy of
the NSWF. 235 A later part of this article will discuss the mechanics of
that exclusion, and the operationalization of the responsible investor
strategy through ethics guidelines and the adjudicatory role of the
Ethics Council. 236
Taken together, the active ownership framework presents an
interesting reconstruction of the projection of state power onto the
territories and regulatory spaces of other states and non-state
organizations. Private in form, active ownership provides a method
for the transposition of national policy onto the operations of
companies over which the Norwegian state has no legal claim to
control. Additionally, this projection of public power through
shareholding also appears to open a back channel to communication
with other states. The NSWF does not merely lobby the companies in
which it has an interest, it takes the position that its stakeholding
gives it a means of lobbying states for changes in their legal regimes
to conform to those that Norway prefers. Lastly, Norwegian
preferences themselves seek to universalize the Norwegian legal
order by seeking to incorporate (and transpose) international law and
norms onto Norwegian regulatory space, and thus onto the domestic
legal orders of foreign states (whether or not the foreign states have
embraced those international norms). If responsible investing was
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 14–18.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–21.
See discussion infra Part IV.

46

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:1

limited to active ownership, it would present a novel enough
projection of hybrid public-private power through markets. But
responsible investing includes a second component—one that is
market-regulating to some extent. It is the role of responsible
investing in shaping markets by developing a legal-juridical
architecture for limiting company access to capital markets that this
article considers next.

IV. RESPONSIBLE INVESTING: LEGALISM AND
THE JURIDIFICATION OF ACCESS TO CAPITAL
THROUGH ETHICAL INVESTMENT
The focus on responsible investing is not solely the province of the
Norges Bank in its managerial and investment functions. The NSWF
also exercises a measure of private regulatory power toward public
governance through the creation of rules under which it limits the
universe of enterprises in which it will invest. Those rules are meant
to apply Norwegian policy on corporate responsibility and its
incorporation of principles of Norwegian and international law to the
investment decisions of the NSWF itself. The object is to affect
access to capital markets by using conformity to corporate
governance and conduct norms sourced in domesticated public
international law and norms as a barrier to entry. 237 Thus, the NSWF
functionally seeks to manage markets by changing the legal
frameworks within which private markets are regulated or,
alternatively, the pricing of capital to firms based on conformity to
legal expectations that codify internationalized domestic law. For the
NSWF, the Ethics Guidelines provide that framework. The Ethics
Council, in turn, administers the Ethics Guidelines under the ultimate
authority of the Ministry of Finance.
237. As the Graver Committee put it in recommending the adoption of Ethics
Guidelines,
The Petroleum Fund can also exert influence indirectly through the market. By
explicitly communicating a decision not to buy a particular share, the Fund can send
signals to company executives, other market participants, and a company’s customers,
particularly if the decision provides the market with information it did not have
previously.

The Report from the Graver Committee, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Nov. 7,
2003), http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/tema/statens_pensjonsfond/
ansvarlige-investeringer/graverutvalget/Report-on-ethicalguidelines.html?id=420232.
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The division of authority between Ministry and Council ensures
that the Ministry of Finance makes political decisions under the
Ethics Guidelines after recommendation following a juridified
process that the Ethics Council oversees. 238 With the Council at the
nexus of public, private, national, and international governance
comes some of the juridification of the market and political economy
of governance across national and international spaces. 239 The Ethics
Council provides a quasi-judicial architecture for determining
whether the NSWF may include particular companies in its
investment universe. For that purpose, it applies the policies enacted
through its Ethics Guidelines. 240 Those policies not only reflect
Norwegian law and public policy but also domesticate international
law and norms. These policies, in turn, are used not only as a means
to exclude companies from the investment universe, but also as a
trigger for the use by the NSWF manager of its powers as a
shareholder to seek to change the behavior of targeted companies. 241
The resulting process effectively permits Norway to enforce soft law
frameworks for corporate governance as well as international law
and norms against non-state enterprises whose home states may
reject those norms. Though that effect is limited to the private market
behavior of Norway, it produces a sometimes substantial effect
functionally similar to the legislative process traditionally used for
this purpose.

A. JURIDIFICATION OF INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING THROUGH
ACCESS TO CAPITAL RULES
It is now commonplace that a trend toward juridification
238. See Council on Ethics, supra note 112; discussion supra Part III (analyzing
the role of the Ethics Council in determining whether companies conform to the
requirements of the ethical guidelines that constrain the NSWF’s economic and
investment activity).
239. See, e.g., Hans Lindhal, A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of
Legal Boundaries, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY AND EXCLUSION 117, 124–26 (Ronald
Tinnevelt & Helder De Schutter eds., 2010) (describing spatiality as a critical
concept of governance).
240. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23.
241. See, e.g., Active Ownership Pays Off, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Sept.
9, 2008), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/press-releases/2008/
active-ownership-pays-off.html?id=526029 (observing the way in which Norway’s
active ownership caused a reduction in the use of child labor by a foreign
company).
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accompanies globalization of governance bodies. Lars Bilchner and
Anders Molander suggest five dimensions of juridification:
First, constitutive juridification is a process where norms constitutive for a
political order are established or changed to the effect of adding to the
competencies of the legal system. Second, juridification is a process
through which law comes to regulate an increasing number of different
activities. Third, juridification is a process whereby conflicts increasingly
are being solved by or with reference to law. Fourth, juridification is a
process by which the legal system and the legal profession get more
power as contrasted with formal authority. Finally, juridification as legal
framing is the process by which people increasingly tend to think of
themselves and others as legal subjects. 242

What is more novel is the transposition of the forms and practices
of juridification in private markets rather than among public bodies.
Whether or not a conventionally denominated judicial body
exercises it, juridification suggests the adoption of the traditional
forms and methodologies of judicial decision-making. That is,
juridification suggests governance through determination of the
extent of regulation through a process of application of binding rules
to fully developed controversies that then serve as a basis for
extracting the character of the law through a process of deductive
reasoning. The move toward juridification is well known, if still
controversial, in the context of public governance. But the forms of
juridification have also long extended to non-judicial bodies within
states; in administrative law, the quasi-judicial function of
bureaucracies is both well known and well established. 243 The
governance functions of commercial activities have also moved
toward the adoption of judicial models and begun to shape the modes
of private governance, especially those of corporate entities. Within
governance models of hybrid public-private activities, especially
those of SWFs, the move toward regulation of the investment
242. Lars Chr. Blichner & Anders Molander, What Is Juridification? 5 (Univ. of
Oslo ARENA Ctr. for European Studies, Working Paper No. 14, 2005), available
at http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/
workingpapers/working-papers2005/wp05_14.pdf.
243. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007); EDOUARD LAMBERT,
LE GOVERNEMENT DE JUGES ET LA LUTE CONTRE LA LÉGISLATION SOCIALE AUX
ÉTATS-UNIS (1924), available at
http://archive.org/stream/legouvernementde00lamb#page/n7/mode/2up.
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decisions of the fund through the application of an ethics code by a
disinterested panel of experts provides a variant of the juridification
model applied to the commercial activities of the state.
The juridification type that the NSWF Ethics Council Project
represents is not grounded in dispute resolution, the traditional
function of the courts. Rather, its role derives from its gatekeeper
function at the center of a governance order, which blends private
and public national and international objectives within a regulatory
framework that requires application, from time to time, in the form
of contextually-based decisions. 244 It is meant to invoke the
mechanics of the judge to determine qualification for entry into the
community permitted to participate in the investment activities (the
normative universe) of the NSWF. In that process, the Ethics Council
is not merely making a decision about fitness for inclusion, but also
developing a normative foundation for the idea of fitness itself. The
process-normative construction function has marked the growth of
power of other organizations that, though they lack the formal power
of the state, have used their gatekeeper function to develop, or at
least contribute to the development of, substantive values in law and
governance. The United Nations provides an example—the
transformation of the power of the United Nations to determine
fitness for membership in accordance with the rules of the U.N.
Charter has become a source of normative framework for defining
the idea of the “state” itself. 245
NSWF juridification grounds itself in the construction of a
normative governance structure that extends the regulatory power of
the state from a traditional focus on legal norms to the extraterritorial
projection of social norms through internationalized national law.
The framework for that effort is the regulation of responsible
investment that forms a core of both the management of the NSWF’s
economic activities in the market and the basis for its engagement in
influencing governance rules of other states. 246 More importantly,
244. The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2012, supra note 38,
at 70.
245. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS,
109–83 (2006).
246. See Daniel Brooksbank, NBIM Outlines Misgivings on UK Stewardship
Code, SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT RESEARCH PLATFORM (Oct. 20, 2010), available
at
http://www.sirp.se/web/page.aspx?refid=62&newsid=104344&page=45
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perhaps, it also serves as a gateway for the projection of state policy
directly into the governance of the corporations making up the
NSWF’s investment pool, and indirectly affecting the general social
norm framework within which corporate behavior is managed
outside the state. As the Chair of the Ethics Council modestly
suggested in 2009,
Capitalism is a function of the way the world is organized and structured
financially and politically and so we are not thinking that we are civilizing
capitalism. If we are really lucky, we might civilize a couple of
companies or maybe more than a couple. And perhaps we may eventually
have a positive influence that is more far-reaching than the impact we
may have on those companies that we have dealt with concretely. 247

The Ethics Council has begun to develop a coherent system of
jurisprudence grounded in its application of the Ethical Guidelines to
the investment decisions of the NSWF.
The work of the Ethics Council has produced the beginnings of a
coherent jurisprudence of ethics for corporate investment, utilizing
public power to influence private governance among enterprises. But
that jurisprudence may contribute significantly to the development of
transnational social norm standards, to the incorporation of
international soft law standards into domestic law, to shaping the
character of shareholder engagement with corporate governance, and
to indirectly influencing both formal and informal corporate
governance norms. The Ethics Council influences indirectly through
the relationship between the development of corporate governance
policies by the Ministry of Finance and the development of corporate
behavior norms through the Ethics Council that serve as the basis for
shareholder activity by the Fund manager. This, in turn, deploys
private power toward public governance that may affect not only
individual enterprises but also corporate governance norms through
customs that may eventually be reflected in international or national
laws or norms. Therefore, Norway has provided an architecture of
governance that sits astride the borders of market and state, of public
and private, and of national and international. Its efforts to
institutionalize this border-riding governance provides a window into
how cooperative and inter-systemic governance may play a greater
(discussing NBIM’s doubt of the United Kingdom’s Stewardship Code).
247. van der Walt, supra note 114.
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role in shaping behavior in this century.
“Responsible investing,” in the form of the structures created for
shaping the investment universe of the NSWF through the Ethics
Council, may be producing a law of ethical investment that may
influence not just the legal framework for investment in Norway and
the transnational soft law framework for SWF governance generally,
but also international customary standards for ethical behavior of
corporations. These standards may become incorporated into
instruments from the developing United Nations Protect-RespectRemedy Framework, now elaborated in the U.N. Human Right’s
Council’s endorsed Guiding Principles for Business and Human
Rights, 248 to the soft law governance systems from the OECD’s
Guidelines for Multinational Corporations 249 and the ISO 26,000
standard. 250 Norway is effectively leveraging its private investment
power to project governance authority over global capital markets,
influencing the rules through which access to capital is constructed.
In this respect, the jurisprudence of the Ethics Council may play a
significant role in a multi-prong effort by the Norwegian state to
248. See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. OFFICE OF
iv (2011), available at
http://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
[hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles] (setting forth the history of the U.N. Guiding
Principles, which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General originally
imagined to address the issues of human rights and transnational corporations).
The U.N. Guiding Principles
THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

were developed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. The
Special Representative annexed the Guiding Principles to his final report to the Human
Rights Council (A/HRC/17/31), which also includes an introduction to the Guiding
Principles and an overview of the process that led to their development.

Id. at iv.
249. See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION AND DEV. 3 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/
48004323.pdf [hereinafter OECD Guidelines] (stating the purpose and substance
of the guidelines are recommendations from governments to multinational
enterprises that “provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible
business conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws and
internationally recognised [sic] standards”).
250. ISO 26000 – Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso26000.htm (last
visited June 16, 2013) (explaining that this ISO standard is unique because it does
not provide requirements, but rather guidance on social responsibility, and
therefore cannot be certified).
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advance international public and private corporate governance and
corporate social responsibility through its “responsible investment”
regulatory framework.
Responsible investment principles let a state direct the choices of
investment consistent with the general obligation of the NSWF to
achieve the highest possible returns. The direction is meant to
constrain the universe of potential investments from which the
maximization of returns can be achieved. The object is to further the
state’s advancement of its policy of corporate social responsibility,
environmental sustainability, human rights, and economic
development. For that purpose, the Norwegian state incorporates
international soft law standards, prohibits investment in companies
that engage in certain economic activity (product-based exclusion) or
whose conduct violates substantive standards incorporated into law
(conduct-based exclusion), and participates in the development of
international standards that manage the universe of investments
permitted by the NSWF. 251
Responsible investment also has a private regulatory aspect. Once
the Fund has purchased shares in an approved company, principles of
active ownership oblige the Norges Bank to use its position as a
shareholder to advance Norway’s policies through shareholder
action. The task of ensuring that only companies conforming to the
responsible investment standards are included in the investment
universe falls to the Ethics Council and the Ministry of Finance. 252
The Ethics Council makes recommendations on the exclusion of
companies whose place within the investment universe is challenged,
and forwards those recommendations to the Ministry of Finance for
final determination. The determinations may, in the aggregate,
contribute to the development of international standards, which are
then reflected in the rules of responsible investment that constrains
the Norges Bank in the choice of suitable investment.
The framework itself thus nicely evidences a self-referential
system that is both complete and self-reinforcing. It offers a window
into a possible approach to the resolution of the great issue of the
twenty-first century—how to mediate the divide between public
251. See discussion infra Part IV.B (elaborating on the work of the Ethics
Council).
252. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23.
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(law) and private (norm-contract) governance in which an integrated
domestic-international system can manage states and private actors.
Sovereign investment thus combines the private objective of
economic wealth maximization with the public objective of
promoting certain behaviors and privileging certain values. The
NSWF is organized on the basis of the principle that good economic
returns may be linked with the policy-driven structures of
responsible investing, not just with respect to the effect on
companies, but also for its role in promoting “well-functioning,
legitimate and efficient markets and sustainable development in the
broadest sense.” 253 The NSWF’s self image as a “universal owner”
reinforces this idea. Responsible investment, then, serves not only as
a vehicle for the coordination of state policy toward economic
behavior. It also serves as a means of projecting state power
indirectly in areas of foreign policy in which the Norwegian state has
not been able to play a direct role.
The Fund is not capable of safeguarding all the ethical
commitments one nation has. Other political, regulatory, or financial
instruments will often be better suited for this. The Fund has the
greatest chance of exerting a positive influence if the focus and
instruments are a natural consequence of the Fund’s role as a
financial investor. The Fund’s objective is not to act as, for example,
a development aid or foreign policy instrument. 254
In this sense, responsible investment in general and the work of
the Ethics Council in particular serves as a means of leveraging the
public power of Norway through private markets. 255
Norway, then, seeks to retain the traditional goal of wealth
maximization. The NSWF starts with an investment universe built on
traditional financial assessment measures. It then narrows that
253. Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2009, supra note 172, at
14 (noting that universal owners, or investors who are geographically diversified,
have many different types of investments, and benefit from safeguarding good
corporate governance, environmental, and social issues).
254. Id. (expressing the Fund’s objective as “ensuring a good financial return”).
255. See, e.g., Anthea Pitt, Oil Funds Give Israeli Outfits the Boot, UPSTREAM,
Aug. 23, 2010, http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article227134.ece (explaining
where Norway excluded two Israeli companies from the NSWF while citing its
reason on the grounds of public policy considerations, including its effort to
enforce, through its financial conduct, what it perceived as an Israeli breach of the
4th Geneva Convention).

54

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:1

universe by applying public policy criteria that reflect the political
preferences of the state and that derive from regulation that itself is a
product of the ethical values used to determine the universe of
investments and governance of corporations in which investment is
made. All of this forms part of a larger strategy for the projection of
Norwegian power abroad. This practice is a variant of the Chinese
model of sovereign investing—but where China constrains its
investment universe by determinations of strategic needs of the
Chinese state, Norway bases its model on its project of
internationalizing law. 256
The work of the Ethics Council plays a key role in this regulatory
system. First, the Ethics Council makes determinations of exclusion
in individual cases. For that purpose, the Ethical Guidelines serve as
the regulatory framework that the Ethics Council applies the same
way that a court applies statutes and regulations. The Ethics Council
may be required both to fill in gaps and to develop interpretive
standards that it applies uniformly to companies with similar
characteristics. These interpretations may also bridge conceptual and
implementation gaps between product cases and conduct cases.
These standards may both shape and advance the development of the
“rules” set forth in the Ethics Guidelines. In the aggregate, it may
have an effect well beyond the narrow application to the particular
company involved in a determination of exclusion. It may be
possible to understand this as the beginning of a jurisprudence of
responsible investment. Second, the aggregate of Ethics Council
decisions, when generalized into a set of interrelated standards, will
themselves contribute to the development of international standards
of corporate social responsibility and corporate governance. That
development will then make its way back into Norway in the form of
law, as the developing standards of international law are incorporated
into Norwegian domestic law and are applied by the Norges Bank to
help determine its investment choices. 257

256. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
257. Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2011, supra note 18, at
101 (describing an investor declaration supporting the U.N. Guiding Principles for
Business and Human Rights signed by the Norges Bank in 2011 and endorsed by
the U.N. Human Rights Council).

2013]

SOVEREIGN INVESTING

55

B. THE CASES AND ACCESS TO NSWF CAPITAL
We now understand the comprehensive and self-reinforcing
construction of “responsible investment” under the Norwegian
regulatory framework, which strives to follow the U.N. Principles for
Responsible Investment and “integrate considerations of good
corporate governance and environmental and social issues into more
aspects of . . . investment strategy and management.” 258 The idea
behind the U.N. Principles is to provide a principled basis for the
participation of investors in the governance of the entities in which
they invest as well as to provide a framework for valuing choices in
investment.
This section moves the analysis from its contextual base to the
operationalization of a juridified, rules-based system for constructing
a universe of responsible corporations that meet the ethical
requirements necessary to qualify for investment under Norwegian
and international law standards. The consequences are telling—such
a universe suggests not just those enterprises in which the NSWF
may invest, but also those enterprises that, by their exclusion, are
deemed to operate in violation of international law and norms. This
section’s principal purpose is to identify the decisions that form the
current jurisprudential universe of the Ethics Council. It also
identifies the categorical distinctions that the Ethics Council has
made in framing approaches to exclusion in both product and
conduct cases. The Ethics Council itself has suggested the structure
of its own jurisprudence, which this section will take as a starting
point for analysis.
This structure suggests the way in which the substantive
jurisprudence has been organized but not the evolution of procedural
mechanics that help shape the decision mechanics. Principles of
legality (all regulations must be clear, ascertainable, and nonretrospective), legal certainty (legal rules must be clear and precise),
proportionality (sanctions should be in proportion to the severity of
the act punished), margin of appreciation (range of interpretive
discretion should be a function of strength of consensus among legal
actors), and predictability (similar facts should produce similar
results) are legal concepts essential to a legitimate jurisprudence. We
258. GPFB Report, supra note 186.
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will see if these principles emerge as applied in the decisions
rendered by the Ethics Council. The sub-sections that follow will
consider these decisions in more detail, individually and collectively.
First, the decisions will be presented in summary form.
1. Products, Weapons Production, Land Mines
There are two principle determinations, one from the predecessor
body, the Petroleum Fund Advisory Commission on International
Law (“PFACIL”), 259 and the other by the Ethics Council. 260 Both
opinions focus on the liability of the Norwegian state for the
production of goods that might violate international law directly
applicable to Norway. From a jurisprudential perspective, the most
important portion of the cases was the adoption of precedent for
questions of law—in this case, that investments in companies that
produce landmines can constitute a violation of international law.
Procedurally, the Ethics Council adopted a functionally binding
precedent rule, taking the determination of the PFACIL as
authoritative for its own determination of a similar question. 261 The
critical test for the authority of a prior determination was acceptance
of the recommendation made in the prior case by the Finance
Ministry.
The determination to exclude Singapore Technologies from the
investment universe considered a number of questions of law and the
interpretation of the meaning of treaties. The focus of the
analysis was on the interpretation of the relevant treaty text, the 1997

259. See Question of Whether Investments in Singapore Technologies
Engineering Can Imply a Violation of Norway’s International Obligations,
NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY
OF
FIN.,
Mar.
22,
2002,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pensionfund/responsible-investments/Advisory-Commission-Documents/AdvisoryCommission.html?id=413581 (examining Singapore Technology Engineering’s
involvement with the production of anti-personnel landmines).
260. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation Concerning Whether the Weapons Systems Spider and
Intelligent Munition System (IMS) Might Be Contrary to International Law,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/
1662930/Tilr%C3%A5dning%20Spider%20IMS%20%20English%2020.pdf
[hereinafter IMS Contrary to International Law] (examining Spider and Intelligent
Munitions System’s involvement with the production of anti-personnel landmines).
261. Id.
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Ottawa Treaty. 262 The Ethics Council adopted a broad interpretation
of the prohibitions that it inferred from the broad language of the
treaty text. Singapore Technologies’ production of land mines was
not deemed prohibited under international law, as Singapore was not
a treaty party; however, the Ethics Council read the Treaty as
including broad complicity provisions. Applying its interpretation of
the complicity provisions to the state and its use of the NSWF, the
Ethics Council determined that Norway, as a Treaty signatory, had
distinct obligations that extended to its decisions to make
investments through private markets—investment in companies
producing such mines could render the NSWF indirectly complicit.
The determination essentially disregarded the nature of the
transactions—private market transactions in legally-operating
corporations—and treated the investment as an act of state to which
the public obligations of Norway applied. This mirrors the approach
of the European Court of Justice when interpreting the legal
obligations
of
Member
States
under
the
European
263
Union/Communities Treaties.
The Spider & Intelligent Munitions case consolidated
consideration of exclusion of three companies in similar
circumstances—General Dynamic Corp., Alliant Techsystems, and
Textron Inc. 264 The Ethics Council found no violation in investment
because only a human observer could detonate the land mines in
these cases. Typically, land mines go off due to the pressure of a
person or vehicle, but the weapon systems that General Dynamics,
Alliant, and Textron produce require an opposing force to physically
detonate from a distance. The Council noted that if this system was
modified or eliminated and detonation would no longer require the
attention of a person, then these companies would be excluded on the
grounds of anti-personnel land mines. 265 The Council also said that it
262. Stuart Casey Maslen, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW (2010),
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/cpusptam/cpusptam_e.pdf (focusing on the
history, interpretation, implementation, and influence of the Convention).
263. See Backer, The Private Law of Public Law, supra note 89 (concluding that
where a state’s assertion of rights as a private actor amount to regulation, public
law will apply).
264. IMS Contrary to International Law, supra note 260, at 1.
265. Id. at 4 (“According to the producers, both these weapons systems will be
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expects the only companies to be excluded from the fund to originate
from states that have not ratified the Ottawa Convention (e.g., the
United States) if that state constructs non-Ottawa-Conventioncompliant weapons. 266 Critical to the determination was the
responsible investor foundation of the Ethics Guidelines. In this case,
therefore, the Council interpreted international law to require
Norway to deny access to financial markets to entities and other
states that might seek to breach the Convention’s terms; complicity,
in a sense, includes a financial markets dimension, obligating
investors to complete heightened due diligence before investing and
to ensure that their funds are not used to indirectly finance proscribed
activity. 267
2. Products, Weapons Production, Cluster Munitions
There are four principle determinations in this area of the Ethics
Council’s work. 268 Exclusion from the Fund based on cluster
produced with the ‘man-in-the-loop’ feature, so that the ammunition is detonated
by an operator and not by the victim. A weapons system that can only operate in
this manner falls outside the definition of an antipersonnel landmine.”).
266. Id. at 4–5.
267. Id. at 2 (quoting the Advisory Commission on International Law, which
answered this question in the affirmative, in its memo to the Ministry of Finance
dated March 11, 2002). “Because the Mine Ban Convention goes far in prohibiting
any form of assistance, encouragement or inducement to production in violation of
the convention, it is presumed that even a modest investment could be regarded as
a violation of the article 1(1) (c) cf. (b).” Id.
268. See Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation on Exclusion of Cluster Weapons from the Government
Petroleum Fund, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Sept. 2, 2005),
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pensionfund/responsible-investments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/recommendation-on-exclusion-of-cluster-w.html?id=419583
[hereinafter Recommendation on Exclusion of Cluster Weapons]; A Further Eight
Companies Excluded from the Petroleum Fund, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.,
Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=
256695&epslanguage=EN-GB; South Korean Producer of Cluster Munitions
Excluded from the Government Pension Fund – Global, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF
FIN., Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2006/South-Korean-producer-of-cluster-munitio.html?id=437729; Mining
Company Excluded from the Investment Universe of the Norwegian Government
Pension Fund – Global, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., Apr. 11, 2007,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/press-releases/2007/Miningcompany-excluded-from-the-investm.html?id=462551;
Cluster
Weapons
Manufacturer Excluded from the Government Pension Fund – Global,
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munitions is possibly the most changed exclusion over time. The first
companies were excluded in June 2005 under the guidelines created
by the Council, followed by later assessments made in September
2009, but the Council now has a different set of criteria of exclusion
to conform to the Convention on Cluster Munitions—the Oslo
Convention. 269 Before the ratification of the Oslo Convention, the
principle source of law was the Ethics Council’s interpretation of the
Storting’s approach to the application of international law principles
with respect to violations of “fundamental humanitarian principles”
with legal effect in Norway, a vague and incomplete reasoning
process. 270 Following the ratification of the treaty, the Ethics Council
applied international law ratified directly by Norway. 271 In doing so,
it developed and applied its own reading of the Convention, its
applicability to the investments of the Fund, and the legal basis in the
Convention as grounds for exclusion. The Ethics Council also
expressly declared that it would use the Convention for examining
any future recommendations.
In the first case of exclusion based on the production of cluster
munitions from June 16, 2005, seven companies were excluded
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/
fin/press-center/press-releases/2009/cluster-weapons-manufacturer-excludedfr.html?id=543105.
269. Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature Dec. 3, 2008,
CCM/77 (entered into force Aug. 1, 2010), available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-6&chapter=26&lang=en. Not
every large state that is home to important publicly traded multinational enterprises
has acceded to this Treaty, including the United States and the People’s Republic
of China.
270. The reasoning was that “although cluster weapons are not subject to
specific restrictions under international law, it can nevertheless be seen as
unethical to use such weapons as this may constitute a violation of ‘fundamental
humanitarian principles.’” Recommendation on Exclusion of Cluster Weapons,
supra note 268.
271. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation on the Exclusion of the Company Textron, Inc.,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload
/FIN/etikk/textron.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation on the Exclusion of Textron]
(“In 2008, an international convention to ban cluster munitions has been
negotiated. The convention’s technical definition of what constitutes cluster
munitions is largely in line with the criteria the Council applied in 2005, but in
some areas it is more stringent . . . . The Council on Ethics finds it appropriate to
base future recommendations of exclusion on the definitions provided in the
cluster munitions convention.”).
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because the weapons they produced closely matched what the
Council considered to be cluster munitions. 272 The Council set
criteria for what cluster munitions are, but it was careful to note that
its recommendations are not exhaustive, are open to direct
possibilities of weapons systems, and that all systems should be
taken into account on a case-by-case basis. For the first seven
companies that were excluded, the main rationale for exclusion was
based on each system’s type of armament, including the number of
anticipated duds, the accuracy rate of hitting military versus civilian
targets, and, through their normal use, whether the weapons violate
fundamental human rights. 273
In 2008 and 2009, the Council based its determination on its
interpretation of international law binding on Norway, in this case
the Oslo Convention (2008), as grounds for exclusion. 274 The key
difference in the use of the Convention deals with the number and
size of the “bomblettes” in munitions as well as the previously
mentioned accuracy and dud rate. For example, though Thales SA
(France) was initially excluded, the exclusion determination was
revoked after the company acted just prior to France’s signature as a
party to the Convention. 275 Since the ratification of the Oslo
Convention, there have been few cases of exclusion; however, for
states that have neither ratified nor implemented the Convention into
their domestic law, like the United States, 276 the public obligations of
the state applied within its territory and the legal obligations of
corporations operating in global space are distinct. 277
272. Recommendation on Exclusion of Cluster Weapons, supra note 268.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Recommendation on the Exclusion of Textron, supra note 271 .
275. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation to Reverse the Exclusion of Thales SA, (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2236625/Thales_2009eng.pdf.
276. See, e.g., Steven Groves & Theodore R. Bromund, The United States
Should Not Join the Convention on Cluster Munitions, HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/the-united-statesshould-not-join-the-convention-on-cluster-munitions.
277. This has arisen recently in the context of applying the Guidelines for
Multinational Corporations (2’11) of the OECD. See Final Statement by the UK
National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD) (Sept. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/43884129.pdf. In that proceeding, the
corporation was faced with conflicting obligations under international law and
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3. Products, Weapons Production, Nuclear Arms
There is one principal and relatively straightforward exclusion
determination in this area of the case law. 278 Little formal law exists
directly relating to the control of nuclear weapons outside of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 279 and the International
Atomic Energy Agency architecture. 280 The Council states that all
companies involved in manufacturing weapons or articles that are
only used in nuclear weapons shall be excluded regardless of the
nation or origin. During the first group of exclusions in September
2005, the Council listed specific criteria that must be met, similar to
its method for environmental damages, which give a non-exhaustive
list and framework for the Council to reference. 281 Further, the
Council noted that while these companies operate in complete
domestic and international compliance, they are still producing
weapons that violate fundamental human rights through their
massive destruction when detonated. The Council also references the
Graver Commission Report of 2003, disseminated by the Norwegian
parliament. 282
While the standard for exclusion is relatively straightforward, its
Indian law. Id. ¶ 56.
278. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation on Exclusion, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., Jan. 5,
2006,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-governmentpension-fund/responsible-investments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-theAdvisory-Council-on-Ethics/Recommendation-on-exclusion.html?id=419589;
Exclusions from the Government Pension Fund – Global, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
OF FIN., Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2006/Exclusions-from-the-Government-Pension-F.html?id=419804.
279. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1969, 729 U.N.T.S. 10485 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970), available at
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml.
280. About Us, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/About/
(last visited June 26, 2013).
281. See Companies Excluded from the Investment Universe, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FIN., http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/RedaksjonellArtikkel.
aspx?id=447122&epslanguage=EN-GB (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (listing the
following companies, inter alia, as excluded from the investment universe: Safran
SA (Dec 31, 2005); Northrop Grumman Corp. (Dec. 31, 2005); Honeywell
International Corp. (Dec. 31, 2005); EADS Finance BV (Dec. 31, 2005); EADS
Co. (Dec. 31, 2005); and Boeing Co. (Dec. 31, 2005)).
282. See The Report from the Graver Committee, supra note 237 (laying down
the foundation for the Ethics Guidelines system).
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application by the Ethics Council suggests that the Council might use
its discretion to apply the standard selectively to “high value” targets
of Norwegian foreign policy. Thus far, the Council has only
excluded companies in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the
United States, leaving questions as to why they have not excluded
companies based in other nuclear states—Russia, China, India, or
Pakistan—or states working toward or which might have nuclear
arms capacity—Iran and Israel. Nor has the Ethics Council sought to
exclude based on participation in the supply chain of nuclear arms
production or the maintenance of nuclear weapons systems. This
political use of discretion appears to contradict a more robust
enforcement contemplated in the Norwegian Government’s
whitepaper on ethical guidelines 283 and the subsequent discussions of
the guidelines in Parliament, which decided that the Fund shall not
invest in companies that “develop and produce key components to
nuclear weapons.” 284 This contradiction suggests that, while this
determination is clothed in the language and forms of law and
produced through a quasi-judicial process, the choice of companies is
made through political discretion in the service of the foreign policy
(and perhaps even the internal political objectives) of the
government.
4. Products, Weapons Sales to States, Burma
There are two principle determinations of exclusion in this
category. 285 The Burma exclusion determinations show the Ethics
Council at its most ambiguous and inconsistent. The touchstone of
283. Id.
284. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation on Exclusion, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Sept. 19,
2005), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1661428/Tilr%C3%A5dning%20kjernev
%C3%A5pen%20engelsk%2019%20sept%202005.pdf.
285. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation of 14 November 2005, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.
(May 1, 2003), http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/tema/statens_pensjonsfond/
ansvarlige-investeringer/tilradninger-og-brev-fra-etikkradet/Recommendation-of14-November-2005.html?id=419590 [hereinafter Recommendation of 14
November 2005]; Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government
Petroleum Fund, Recommendation of Nov 14th, 2008, STYRER, RÅD OG UTVALG
[Norwegian Boards, Councils, and Committees] (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2162512/tilr%C3%A5dning%20Dongfeng%20E
nglish.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation on Exclusion of Dongfeng].
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the Ethics Council determination is the application of a high
threshold complicity standard. 286 Yet the only company to be directly
excluded from the Fund is Dongfeng, based in South Korea. 287 In this
case, the exclusion was based on the Ethics Council adopting, as part
of the Ethics Guidelines, the embargo on sale of “arms and military
equipment” to Burma imposed by the United States and the
European Union. The Ethics Council essentially translated embargo
into Norwegian regulatory standards.
On the other hand, the Ethics Council has noted that over twenty
companies from East Asia and Europe have been examined for their
participation with the Burmese government; these are mainly oil,
gas, banking, and pharmaceutical companies and they have all been
found to not be in violation with the Council.288 The Ethics Council
uses a two-part regulatory test to apply exclusion for economic
activity other than the sale of military goods and arms: “First, there
must be a connection between the company’s operations and the
relevant violations. Second, there must be an unacceptable risk for
the company, and thus also, for the Fund, of contributing to future
violations.” 289
The result is a very narrow standard for exclusion, grounded in a
high threshold for finding complicity in state action by companies
(and thus the indirect complicity of the Norwegian state through the
Fund). Certain connections are not enough to bar a company from
the NSWF, “[e]ven though it can be inferred that the presence of a
company generates revenues for the repressive regime and thereby
contributes to uphold it.” 290 Yet, an expansive application of similar
standards in other regions—for example, the Middle East—then
belies this narrowness. 291 Again, political considerations tend to
286. See Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23 (specifying that the Ethics Council is
seeking to deepen its standard that the Fund should avoid indirect complicity).
287. Recommendation on Exclusion of Dongfeng, supra note 285.
288. Advisory Council for the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund,
Assessment of Companies with Operations in Burma, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF
FIN. (Oct. 11, 2007), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2018769/
Burma%20letter%20english.pdf [hereinafter Burma Assessment].
289. Id. (emphasis removed).
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government
Petroleum Fund, Recommendation of November 16th, 2009, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FIN. (Nov. 16, 2009), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/
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distort the juridification of access to NSWF investment, or perhaps
juridification is meant to veil the use of the NSWF as an instrument
of Norwegian foreign policy.
More importantly, in these cases the Ethics Council refined its
standard by distinguishing “precedent” in the form of prior decisions
in related cases involving companies excluded as a result of
operations in states where the regime arguably violated human
rights. 292 Thus, selling arms is grounds for exclusion, but providing
petroleum for vehicles, including military vehicles, is not.293 Yet the
Ethics Council also suggested that it might use the two part standard
in the future against companies on a broader reading of its standard.
In its suggestion of broader application, the Council included
companies such as PetroChina for a “possible” construction of an oil
pipeline between China and Burma, as well as Daewoo for
establishing an arms manufacturing plant in Burma. The Council has
suggested that if “a company violates national law by illegally selling
weapon technology to a suppressive regime, this may be viewed as a
serious violation of fundamental ethical norms, and thus fall inside
the last section of the Fund’s ethical guidelines.” 294
The standard is hard to violate. One of most prominent companies
to escape exclusion was Total SA (France). The Ethics Council
allowed the company to stay included in the Fund because it found
no clear link between the company’s operations and support of the
Burmese Military, which appears to be the touchstone of the
Council’s application of its standard, a touchstone that makes
13898012/Recommendation_Africa_Israel.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation of
November 16th, 2009] (stating that the Fund’s investment in Africa Israel
Investments Ltd. constitutes an unacceptable risk “of the Fund contributing to
serious violations of individuals’ rights in situations of war or conflict” due to
Africa Israel Investments’ subsidiary, Dania Cebus Ltd.’s involvement in the
building of settlements in the West Bank).
292. See Pia Rudolfsson Goyer, Can the Norwegian Government Pensions
Fund-Global Be Used to Promote Human Rights? If So, How?, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/
dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/menneskerettigheter/etikkraadet.html?id=53516
9#_ftn3 (establishing that the council does not consider itself bound by precedent,
but by a dynamic interpretation method).
293. Aslak Skancke, Regarding Investments Connected with the Middle East,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (May 15, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/
1957953/Attachment%205%20Israel.pdf.
294. Burma Assessment, supra note 288.
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exclusion much harder. 295 Thus, on that basis, the Council has yet to
find the evidence provided by many NGOs and others that Total SA
aided the rebel government’s attacks on people who lived in the
pipeline region as a plausible basis for exclusion. While Total SA
does not manufacture arms for either side of the war, it does pay for
security of the pipeline and for what appears to be the elimination of
opposition to the construction of the pipeline.
5. Products, Tobacco Production
There is one principal determination that can be understood as the
articulation of the common position of the Norwegian demos as
developed through its representatives in the Storting. 296 The basis for
determining the meaning and character of that position can be
gleaned from the legislative actions of the Storting—in this case the
tightening of the Tobacco Control Act—and policy position. The
determination reminds us that with “government Whitepaper no. 20
(2008-2009), the Ministry of Finance proposed that tobacco
companies should be excluded from the investment universe of the
Government Pension Fund Global.” 297 This policy was then
memorialized in changes to the Ethics Guidelines themselves.
The Ethics Council effectively transformed policy positions to
regulation by construing the Ethics Guidelines as mandating the
action without the need for intervention from the Storting. But that
common position also had to be informed by developing consensus
at the international level, reflected in supra-national instruments such
as the World Health Organization Framework Convention. In this
sense, the Ethical Guidelines represent a regulatory vehicle that can
be flexibly applied on a case-by-case basis, the products of which
serve to gloss the Ethics Guidelines in ways that have effect beyond
295. Recommendation of 14 November 2005, supra note 285.
296. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation of October 22, 2009, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Oct.
22, 2009), available at www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FIN/etikk/rec_tobacco
_english.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation of October 22, 2009]; Tobacco
Producers Excluded from Government Pension Fund Global, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FIN. (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/presscenter/press-releases/2010/Tobacco-producers-excluded-from-GovernmentPension-Fund-Global.html?id=591449#.
297. New Guidelines, supra note 22 (allowing for a broader assessment before
making an exclusion).
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the specific context of a particular determination, and produce
something similar to regulation through judicial interpretation.
Because of the regulatory character of the determination, and
because the Ethics Council took the admissions in the subject
companies’ public documents to be dispositive, the Ethics Council
did not seek the participation of the companies excluded in the
process leading to their exclusion. 298 The Ethics Council also failed
to engage the companies regarding the systems it used to make an
exclusion determination, in this case the FTSE industry index for
equities and the Barclay’s Global Aggregate for bonds. 299 The
company had no opportunity to suggest alternatives.
From an efficiency perspective, this approach might well have
made sense. However, because the Council sought to translate
general regulation into a decision specific to a set of companies, the
Ethics Council’s own determination might be understood as a
violation of Norwegian sensibilities about the need for procedural
protection of people adversely affected by state action. That the
Ethics Council failed to protect the procedural rights of companies
(and failed to permit them to make statements or produce evidence
that might have furthered their obligations under the Ethics
Guidelines) puts the procedural legitimacy of this determination in
doubt.
6. Conduct—Complicity, Serious or Systemic Human Rights
Violations
There are three principle determinations that more precisely define
corporate conduct that may constitute serious or systematic human
rights violations requiring exclusion from the NSWF investment
universe. 300 Currently only two companies are excluded on the
298. Recommendation of October 22, 2009, supra note 296 (clarifying that the
Council did not confirm the companies’ manufacturing of tobacco because the
companies stated it themselves).
299. Id. at 2.
300. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation of 20 November 2006, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.
(Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2105482/Recommendation%
20Monsanto%20ENG.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation of 20 November 2006];
Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund,
Recommendation of 15 November 2005, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Nov. 15,
2005), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1661427/Tilr%C3%A5dning%20WM%
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grounds of what the Council states are human rights violations:
Monsanto and Wal-Mart (with the subsidiary Wal-Mart de Mexico);
however, the Ethics Council does refer to exclusions of other
companies for human rights factors because of their involvement
with Israel in the West Bank region. 301 The Israeli companies are
excluded under the type “other.” The most significant difference
between them and Wal-Mart and Monsanto is that the Israeli
companies were working under contract for and producing goods for
the Israeli war and territorial claims efforts, whereas Wal-Mart and
Monsanto are directly responsible for atrocities under their control—
namely, their contradiction of human rights and labor standards,
including employment of minors, tolerance of dangerous working
conditions, pay issues, gender discrimination, hostility to union
organization, and physical punishment of employees. 302 The cases
also suggest a broad reading of the notion of “company.” In the
Monsanto redetermination, the Ethics Council specifically broadened
the scope of its inquiry not merely to the company and its controlled
subsidiaries but to a larger group of entities within Monsanto’s
supply chain: “[T]he risk of the company’s complicity violations . . .
is not necessarily limited to the company’s legal entities, but may
also apply to the conditions at the company’s suppliers, licensees and
others” who the company influences. 303
In its investigation of Wal-Mart, the Ethics Council focused on
allegations of “systematic violations of human rights,” specifically
that Wal-Mart ran its business in ways that contradicted international
human rights and labor standards through its suppliers and in its own
20eng%20format.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation of 15 November 2005];
Recommendation of 14 November 2005, supra note 285.
301. Supplier of Surveillance Equipment for the Separation Barrier in the West
Bank Excluded from the Government Pension Fund – Global, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FIN. (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/presscenter/press-releases/2009/supplier-of-surveillance-equipment-fort.html?id=575444 [hereinafter Supplier for Separation Barrier in West Bank
Excluded].
302. Recommendation of 15 November 2005, supra note 300, § 4.1.1.
303. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Regarding Recommendation to Exclude the Company Monsanto Co from the
Investment Universe of the Government Pension Fund – Global, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FIN. (June 10, 2008), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2105482/Brev
_til_FIN_vedr_Monsanto%20ENG.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation to Exclude
Monsanto].
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operations. 304 The Ethics Council applied its procedural standards: a
direct link must exist between the company’s operations and the
relevant violations, the violations must serve the company’s interest,
and the company must have been aware of the violations and failed
to prevent them. 305 The Ethics Council carefully affirmed that an
enterprise was not directly liable for violations of international law,
and that an enterprise could not be deemed complicit in such
violations absent proof of state violation. But none of this mattered
for purposes of developing a standard of complicity under
Norwegian application of international law standards to guide its
own investment decisions, and thus to develop a distinctive
governance order for companies wishing to remain within the NSWF
investment universe. 306
The Ethics Council’s secretariat was tasked with developing
evidence. 307 The Ethics Council listed a large variety of allegations
derived from reports, cases, and its own assessments of the
operations of the enterprise which was also adduced from
information provided by NGOs. 308 On the basis of this evidence, the
Ethics Council determined that Monsanto’s operations violated the
Ethics Guidelines. The Council emphasized the importance of the
number of violations—not just in the company, but also within its
supply chain. 309 This effectively imports the supply chain
responsibility premises of the OECD Guidelines and U.N. Guiding
Principles. The Ethics Council specified that the “systematic and
planned practice on the part of the company [is] to operate on, or
304. Recommendation of 15 November 2005, supra note 300, § 1.
305. Id. § 3.3.
306.
However, it is entirely possible under both Norwegian and international criminal law
to sentence someone for complicity in an act without having established another party
as the main perpetrator. The Council presumes that it was hardly the intention that the
Council, as a precondition for establishing companies’ complicity in human rights
violations, should be required to determine whether states violate such rights.

Id. § 3.2. The basis for this was the sense that international law memorialized
consensus at the international level on appropriate conduct that establishes a
customary governance baseline for assessing conduct. Id.
307. Id. § 2 (stating that evidence developed from publicly available sources and
“from lawyers, various organisations and individuals. Certain parts of this source
base will, at the request of the sources involved, not be made public”).
308. Id. § 4; Recommendation to Exclude Monsanto, supra note 303.
309. Recommendation of 15 November 2005, supra note 300, § 6.3.
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below, the threshold of what are accepted standards for the work
environment.” 310 Also important were the efforts of other
shareholders, through their own active shareholding, to address the
human rights concerns raised. 311
The most commonly used international law through the
International Labour Organization regarding atrocities committed
against children is Article 32 of the U.N. Convention of the Child,
but the Ethics Council looked at other labor organizations, NGOs,
and other states’ laws for applicable customary international law.
Especially in the Wal-Mart case, the Council examined litigation in
U.S. courts against Wal-Mart for discrimination, unfair wages, child
labor, employment of illegal immigrants, and anti-union policies,
while it looked at numerous other states around the world for how
Wal-Mart conducted its business. 312 Over a dozen states had standing
accusations against the company, but many states are not taking
action due to the subordinate nature of the local government and the
sheer size of the company.
In the Monsanto case, precedent played a critical role in the
application of the Ethics Guidelines:
In previous recommendations the Council has taken as its basis that even
if States, and not companies, are obliged by international human rights
conventions, companies may be said to contribute to human rights
violations. The Council has not deemed it necessary to evaluate whether
States are responsible for possible human rights violations, even if it
accepts as a fact that companies may be complicit in such violations: “It is
sufficient to establish the presence of an unacceptable risk of companies
acting in such a way as to entail serious or systematic breaches of
internationally recognised [sic] minimum standards for the rights of
individuals.” 313

310. Id.
311. Id. (“Several investors have sought through a variety of initiatives to
improve the company’s practices in the areas addressed by this recommendation.
Nothing suggests that Wal-Mart has complied with any of these initiatives, or that
they have brought about improvements.”).
312. Id. § 4.2 (describing labor abuses perpetrated by Wal-Mart in the United
States, including allegations of labor law provisions that prohibit unpaid overtime,
employment of minors, illegal labor, discrimination, and obstruction of
unionization).
313. Recommendation of 20 November 2006, supra note 300, § 5.1 (applying the
Wal-Mart determinations).
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The unacceptable risk standard was derived from the
determination in Total SA and requires: (1) linkage between
company operations and Guidelines breaches; (2) the breaches being
carried out to advance company interests; (3) active contribution to
or knowledge by the company of violation; and (4) ongoing violation
or risk of repetition. 314
These cases suggest how the active ownership principles of Fund
investment, vested in the Norges Bank, are harmonized through the
mediating role of the Finance Ministry. The Finance Ministry’s role
is particularly evident in the saga of the Monsanto determination.
The Ministry of Finance appeared unwilling to accept the initial
determination of the Ethics Council to exclude Monsanto, deeming it
“opportune to attempt the exercise of ownership rights during a
limited period of time in order to see if this would reduce the risk of
the Fund contributing to serious violations.” 315 The Ethics Council
then gathered more evidence, resulting in a redetermination of a
narrower, quasi-judicial standard for the character of its
determinations: “The Council on Ethics’ mandate is limited to a
concrete evaluation of whether the company’s operations fall within
or without the scope of the Fund’s Ethical Guidelines.” 316 It also
noted the potential effect of the Norges Bank’s efforts to effect
change from within through its energetic use of the active ownership
principle. 317
This decision, along with other efforts at company-initiated and
industry-based changes, served as a basis for a reconsideration of the
original determination to exclude Monsanto. Though the Ethics
Council was unwilling to concede that Monsanto’s conduct did not
violate the Ethics Guidelines, it relented on its determination that
such violation should warrant exclusion. The two principal rationales
have significant potential for application to future cases. The first is

314. Id. (listing the “decisive elements in the overall assessment of whether
there is an unacceptable risk of the Fund contributing to human rights violations”).
315. Recommendation to Exclude Monsanto, supra note 303, at 1.
316. Id. at 5.
317. Id. at 6 (noting the Council’s awareness that the Norges Bank has
attempted to influence Monsanto’s use of child labor by taking advantage of its
ownership rights; “[m]oreover, Norges Bank has proposed a sector-wide
programme encompassing various companies within the industry, and Monsanto
has endorsed this initiative”).
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that an exclusion recommendation need not necessarily follow from
a violation of the Ethics Guidelines where such a determination
might undermine the Norges Bank’s application of its active
ownership procedures, as it might have in the Monsanto case. “The
role of the Norges Bank in the improvement efforts are thus even
more essential, and it seems clear that a possible exclusion of the
company may undermine the ongoing process initiated by Norges
Bank.” 318 This is an important example of how the Ethics Council
can harmonize the two prongs of responsible investing.
The second principle is the adequate system of monitoring that
Monsanto had instituted “through independent third-party audits
evaluating the occurrence of child labour in the supply chain, that the
factors leading to children’s harmful exposure to pesticides [was]
eliminated, and that the child labour rate in the company’s own
production and licence [sic] production [was] drastically reduced.” 319
This suggests a balancing of factors that tend to favor companies
who change their behavior. It emphasizes the regulatory aspects of
responsible investment as a tool to manage and change corporate
behavior.
7. Conduct—Complicity, Environmental Damage
The determination for exclusion based on environmental
degradation is based on a set of nine principles derived from
domestic law and customary international law. 320 The environmental
318. Id. at 7.
319. Id.
320. See Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation of 22 February 2010, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Feb.
22, 2010), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/13896797/Recommendation_final
_110810.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation of 22 February 2010]; Advisory
Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund,
Recommendation of 16 February 2009, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Feb, 16,
2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2267887/Recommendation%20-%20%20
Final.pdf; Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation of 13th February 2009, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.
(Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2236719/Recommendation%
20inclusion.pdf; Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government
Petroleum Fund, Recommendation of 14 August 2008, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF
FIN. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2146647/Recommendation
%20Barrick%20final.pdf; Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian
Government Petroleum Fund, Recommendation of 15 February, 2008,
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determinations represent the Ethics Council at its most quasi-judicial,
filling in gaps and extending the logic and implications of the Ethics
Guidelines to develop a set of exclusion standards. The allegations
provide the context within which the Ethics Council utilizes
customary international and domestic law to develop a jurisprudence
of environmental investment ethics. Most of the cases involve
mining and natural resource companies with the exception of
Samling in Malaysia, which was alleged to have contributed to
deforestation in violation of legal standards applied by the Ethics
Council.
In virtually all the determinations, the companies were found to
have violated the law of the host state. However, the Council
emphasized that, while many of these companies were in direct
violation of domestic law, the host state did nothing to stop the
violation of its own law and at times supported the companies in
their work. 321 In this context, the Ethics Council applied a standard
grounded in the law of the home state as well as international
consensus standards. The theories were either of the need for
projections of international norms in “weak governance zones” or the
extraterritorial application of Norwegian law (appropriately
internationalized as required by the Ethics Guidelines and including
the responsible investment strategy at the heart of the regulations). In
either case, the Ethics Council discounted both the law and the effect
of the sovereign application of the domestic legal order of the host
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/
Fin/etikk/recommendation%20rt.pdf; Advisory Council on Ethics for the
Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund, Recommendation of 15 May 2007,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (May 15, 2007), http://www.regjeringen.no/
Upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/RecommendationVedanta.pdf;
Advisory
Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund,
Recommendation of 24 August 2006, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Aug. 24,
2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1965381/DRD%20Recommendation%20
eng.pdf; Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation of 15 February 2006, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Feb.
15, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1956975/F%20Recommendation%
20Final.pdf; Annual Report 2010, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT
PENSION FUND GLOBAL (2010), http://www.spainsif.es/sites/default/files/upload/
publicaciones/AnnualReport_2010%20Fondo%20Noruego.pdf.
321. Recommendation of 15 February, 2008, supra note 320, at 3, 5 (finding
that the lack of environmental measures and transparency causes an increased risk
of damage); Recommendation of 24 August 2006, supra note 320, at 22 (finding
direct violation of environmental requirements).
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state and it privileged the law of the Fund in determining the
legitimacy of investment. The legitimacy of investment, of course,
comes from the heart of the responsible investment strategy—by
applying Norwegian law to the investment activities of the Fund, and
by aggressively moving into private markets as an influential
investment stakeholder, the Fund can affect governance decisions of
the companies even if it could not affect the regulatory climate of the
targeted host state.
To better regulate globally, the Ethics Council has created its own
regulatory standards and criteria for exclusion. The basics of this
standard were developed in the first of the environmental
determinations—Freeport McMoRan (United States). In the Freeport
determination, the Ethics Council established a seven-factor standard
where exclusion is sought on environmental grounds: the damage is
significant; the damage causes irreversible or long-term effects; the
damage has considerable negative consequences for human life and
health; the damage is the result of violations of national law or
international norms; the company has failed to act to prevent
damage; the company has not implemented adequate measures to
rectify the damage; and it is probable that the company’s
unacceptable practice will continue. 322 It appears that these factors
were created solely by the Council to legitimize its own actions and
recommendations while drawing on international customs as well as
western standards to an extent.
In its consideration of the exclusion of Lingui Developments
Berhad, 323 the Ethics Council reaffirmed and applied its earlier
reasoning from Samling. 324 The most interesting part of the
determination is the assessment of the company’s response to the
Ethics Council’s findings. It suggests both the importance of careful
company responses to inquiries from the Ethics Council, and the

322. Annual Report 2010, supra note 320, at 42.
323. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation of 15 September 2010, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2011/
recommendation_lingui.pdf (recommending the exclusion of Lingui Developments
Berhad from the Fund because the company was involved in “illegal logging and
severe environmental damage”); Annual Report 2010, supra note 320 (finding
conflict with national law).
324. Recommendation of 22 February 2010, supra note 320.
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standards used by the Ethics Council in weighing evidence and
arguments offered by companies subject to investigation. The most
significant insights in that respect are these: first, the Ethics Council
will consider arguments raising doubts about the Council’s methods
and sources, but those arguments must provide specific information
or documentation that illuminates or counters the basis for the
Council’s recommendation. Second, companies must produce
evidence to meet or contest the evidence produced by the Ethics
Council. Failure to contest the facts found or accepted by the Council
will tend to result in the Council treating those facts as dispositive.
Third, where the company offers evidence, it will have to be specific
and well substantiated.
8. Conduct—Complicity, Serious Violations of Ethical Norms
There are two principal determinations that tie notions of
corporate complicity with international norms. 325 The basis for the
exclusion of this category of cases appears to be the determination by
the Council of violations of international norms or Norwegian
national policy that is not covered elsewhere. The Council exercises
a certain amount of flexibility for broadening the scope of the
international norms incorporated into the NSWF’s regulatory
framework that was contemplated in the fashioning of the Ethics
Guidelines themselves. 326 The first company the Ethics Council
excluded was Kerr-McGee on the basis of a contract with the
government of Morocco for the exploration for minerals off the coast
of Western Sahara. 327 While exploration for minerals neither
325. KerrMcGee Corporation Is Again Included in the Government Pension
Fund – Global, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Sept. 1, 2006),
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2006/KerrMcGee-Corporation-is-again-included-.html?id=419868;
Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund,
Recommendation on Suspension of Exclusion of KerrMcGee Corporation
(“KerrMcGee”), NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Sept. 1, 2006),
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pensionfund/responsible-investments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/Recommendation-on-suspension-of-exclusion-of-KerrMcGeeCorporation-KerrMcGee.html?id=419593 [hereinafter Recommendation on
Suspension of Exclusion of KerrMcGee].
326. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, § 2(3)(e) (citing “other particularly
serious violations of fundamental ethical norms” as a cause for exclusion).
327. Company Excluded from the Government Petroleum Fund, NORWEGIAN
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breaches domestic law of Norway or Morocco nor international
norms, the issue became complicated because of the unsettled
political status of part of the territory covered, the Western Sahara
over which Morocco was asserting de facto sovereignty. 328 As a
consequence, under international law, Morocco was obligated to
respect the culture of the peoples concerned. The official position of
the Norwegian state was that no governmental agency should act in a
manner that might prejudice ongoing peace efforts. 329 That policy
applied to the NSWF as well as to the political branches of the state.
Though the Norwegian state might consider occupation invalid,
some activity might still be lawful within the particular context of
Western Sahara. Therefore, the Council referred to the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea and a contradictory opinion of the
U.N. Office of the Legal Advisor. 330 The Ethics Council developed a
standard for applying internal law through the Ethics Guidelines:
“[I]n a situation of contradictory interpretations of international law,
treaty law would prevail over a legal opinion.” 331
In this case, the Ethics Council determined that, though companies
cannot be directly responsible for serious or systematic human rights
violations, they might be complicit in or profit from such violations.
The Council recommended that the company be excluded since it
had not properly consulted with or paid any reparations to the local
people for the natural resources, but instead had business dealings
and consultation with the occupying power of Morocco. Because
such a violation did not comfortably fit within the other categories of
MINISTRY OF FIN. (June 6, 2007), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/
Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-finance/Nyheter-ogpressemeldinger/2005/company_excluded_from_the_government.html?id=256359
[hereinafter KerrMcGee Excluded from the Fund].
328. Id. (noting that Western Sahara, as a non-self-governing territory, is not
subject to Moroccan sovereignty).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation on Exclusion from the Government Petroleum Fund’s
Investment Universe of the Company Kerr-McGee Corporation, NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY OF FIN. (June 6, 2005), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/tema/
statens_pensjonsfond/ansvarlige-investeringer/tilradninger-og-brev-fraetikkradet/Recommendation-on-Exclusion-from-the-Government-PetroleumFunds-Investment-Universe-of-the-Company-Kerr-McGee-Corporation.html?
id=419582.
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conduct for exclusion, the Ethics Council assessed the conduct and
the standard for exclusion on the “catch all” provision. 332 The Ethics
Council ultimately lifted that exclusion determination only after “the
company had ceased its activities in the Boujdour field and that the
licence [sic] to conduct explorations had expired.” 333
Similarly, the Ethics Council excluded Elbit Systems Ltd. and
Africa Israel Investments Ltd. from the Fund for their role in aiding
the Israeli government in its occupation of the West Bank and for
purported violations of rights of the people of the West Bank
following the large-scale military action in 2008–09. 334 Similar to the
exclusion of companies for producing nuclear components, the items
produced by these companies are not illegal, but the Council had
concerns about the use of the items. Both Elbit Systems and Africa
Israel Investments had contracts with the Israeli government to
manufacture systems that, through their intended use, aid the Israeli
occupation, which many states and NGOs view as violating laws,
norms, or other standards that political bodies may give effect in the
form of laws or ethics. Further, the exclusion of these companies
might be on the basis that the Council is giving a warning and
applying pressure to Israeli companies without directly engaging in
politics with the government. In this case, the focus was on
complicity: the Council found that “the Fund’s investment in Elbit
represent[ed] an unacceptable risk of complicity in particularly
serious violations of ethical norms and that the company should be
excluded from the Fund’s investment universe.” 335 The Norwegian
state did not want to hold shares of a company that might have
contracts with the Israeli government, avoiding actions that the
Norwegian government objected to on political and legal bases.
The Ethics Council conceded that it had no mandate to make a
determination of international law in these cases. 336 Instead, it made a
332. KerrMcGee Excluded from the Fund, supra note 327 (reviewing the
possible ethics violation under Ethical Guideline 4.6).
333. Recommendation on Suspension of Exclusion of KerrMcGee, supra note
325.
334. Supplier for Separation Barrier in West Bank Excluded, supra note 301.
335. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation of 15 May 2009, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (May 15,
2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2236685/Elbit_engelsk.pdf.
336. Id. at 8 (stating that it would be outside the Ethics Council’s mandate to
rule on an international law issue in regard to the separate barrier).
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determination of the risk of complicity by the application of a
combination of an International Commission of Jurists (“ICJ”)
opinion (deciding that the route of the separation barrier in the West
Bank of the Palestinian Territories is illegal under international law)
and an opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court (saying that the
separation barrier cannot be used as a means of annexation). 337The
Ethics Council, though, declined a similar balancing with respect to
military decisions about the protection of civilian populations and the
harm caused to others by the methods chosen, and weighed most
heavily its determination of the nationality of the land on which the
separation barrier was built.
A state’s construction of fences or other control mechanisms on its
own territory cannot, in principle, be considered illegal or unethical.
Neither does the ICJ’s advisory opinion concern the sections of the
separation barrier that are located inside Israeli territory. Israel,
however, has chosen to build a separation barrier, and nearly ninety
percent of the barrier’s extension is located in areas occupied by
Israel. This, and the humanitarian problems that the route causes,
constitute the problematic aspects of the separation barrier. 338 The
Ethics Council thus fashions a determination by blending the legal
opinions of the highest court of a domestic legal order within the
state where the actions occurred with a judicial determination of
international bodies that produces something functioning like
jurisprudence. To these it adds its own interpretative application of
the Ethics Guidelines to produce a standard for exclusion on the
basis of complicity that is broader than prior ethics specific to Israel
(and Norwegian foreign policy goals in that relationship) or whether
Elbit stands for a broader principle of applying the Ethics Guidelines.
9. Conduct—Complicity, Serious Violations of Individual Rights in
War or Conflict
The one determination of this subject 339 is one of the most
interesting of the cases in terms of the refinement of the Ethics
337. Id. (discussing the Council’s awareness that the government of Israel sees
the wall as a “necessary and temporary measure to prevent terror attacks and that
the considerations regarding the necessity of the barrier must carry more weight
than the considerations vis-à-vis the disadvantages it entails”).
338. Id.
339. Recommendation of November 16th, 2009, supra note 291.
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Council’s jurisprudential approach and in terms of the focus of the
Norwegians on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On its face, the case is
fairly straightforward: the Israeli government’s building of
settlements for Jews violates international consensus on the
application of international conventional law; the company
participates in the building of settlements, and therefore the company
is complicit. To that extent, investment in the company would be
prohibited by the Ethics Guidelines that bar investment where the
Fund contributes to serious violation of individual rights in situations
of war or conflict. The company did not respond to requests for
information from the Ethics Council.
The Ethics Council tended to read the relevant law broadly. For
purposes of determining the existence of a broad consensus that
Israeli (Jewish) settlements are “illegal,” the Ethics Council pointed
to the views of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
resolutions of the U.N. Security Council, and an advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice, the principal focus of which had
been the legality of the separation barrier crossing between Israel and
Palestine. Israeli claims were not found credible. 340 The Ethics
Council applied its evidentiary standard—that past activity creates a
presumption of the possibility of similar future activity—to
determine that the company’s complicity would be ongoing. 341 Yet
the Ethics Council was careful to limit the scope of the complicity
formula to “construction activities related to the building of real
estate in the settlements” because they were “the most significant
contribution to the further expansion of West Bank settlements.” 342
But given the force of the Council’s argument, the basis for this
limitation is unclear other than as grounded in political
considerations.
10. Conduct—Complicity, Corruption
This is one of the most interesting of the cases, and one in which
the tension between the juridification within the Ethics Council and
the political agenda of the Ministry of Finance is most clearly
340. Id. (indicating that the Ethics Council failed to give credence to Israeli
claims, relying on the Government White Paper (NOU 2003:22)).
341. Id. at 8 (asserting that past activity created an unacceptable risk of future
violations).
342. Id.
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illustrated. The one determination involved one of the most
prominent companies in Europe and touched on the sort of
corruption that appeared to threaten the integrity of global markets in
the goods involved. 343 The Ethics Council recommended the
company for exclusion on November 15th, 2007. 344
The Ethics Council did not use the exclusion on the grounds of
gross corruption until the 2007 allegations of widespread and public
corruption against the Germany multinational enterprise, Siemens.
The touchstone of the decision was finding an unacceptable risk of
continuing gross corruption. The Ethics Council standard for gross
corruption requires a finding that a company, through its
representatives,
a) gives or offers an advantage – or attempts to do so – in order to unduly
influence: i) a public official in the performance of public duties or in
decisions that may confer an advantage on the company; or ii) a person in
the private sector who makes decisions or exerts influence over decisions
that may confer an advantage on the company, and b) the corrupt
practices as mentioned under letter a) are carried out in a systematic or
extensive way. 345

Following an analysis similar to that used against Wal-Mart, the
Ethics Council considered court trials in Italy, the United States,
Singapore, Germany, and Norway as well as accusations in over
twenty-five states as evidence of gross corruption for the basis of
recommending exclusion. 346 This is one of the few cases where direct
court cases were used and cited for violations of domestic law. The
Council based much of its decision on the standing laws that were
allegedly broken in each nation. The Council also integrated
Norwegian and international customary law where applicable. 347

343. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation 15 November 2007, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Nov.
15, 2007), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2162791/Recommendation%20on%20
Siemens%20Final.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation 15 November 2007].
344. Id.; The Council on Ethics’ Recommendation to Exclude Siemens AG,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Sept. 3, 2008), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/
2162791/Svarbrev%20til%20Finansdepartementet_ENG.pdf
[hereinafter
Recommendation to Exclude Siemens AG].
345. Recommendation 15 November 2007, supra note 343, at 3–4.
346. Id. at 5–6.
347. Id. at 3, 4, 6.
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The Ethics Council was asked to re-evaluate its original exclusion
determination. In a letter, the Ethics Council refused to change its
determination despite substantial evidence of efforts by Siemens to
change its practices and deal directly with the underlying issues of
corruption. 348 This action is inconsistent with the position the Ethics
Council took regarding the mitigation that proved an important
consideration in the decision not to exclude Monsanto against
charges of systematic violation of human rights. 349
However, the Ethics Council applied its evidentiary rule that
evidence of past conduct creates a presumption of future conduct that
the company (e.g., Africa Israel Investments) must overcome. 350
Importantly, the Council gave the changes undertaken by Siemens
little weight because they were partially forced on the company.
Effectively fashioning a standard of care, the Council faulted the
company for the failure of its internal monitoring 351 and the failure to
take corruption seriously. 352 It concluded: “It seems to be a
characteristic trend that Siemens only starts the clean-up once it is
forced to, and not on its own initiative.” 353As such, the Council stood
by its earlier determination. 354
The Finance Ministry disagreed, electing to put the company on
observation status. 355 This was the first time that the Ministry of
Finance came to a conclusion that was contrary to that of the
Council. Minister of Finance Kristin Halvorsen stated,
I agree with the Council on Ethics that Siemens has been involved in
gross corruption. That I, nevertheless, want to see how things develop is a
348. Recommendation to Exclude Siemens AG, supra note 344, at 4–5.
349. Recommendation to Exclude Monsanto, supra note 303, at 7.
350. Cf. Recommendation to Exclude Siemens AG, supra note 344, at 5
(comparing Siemens’ anti-corruption measures with the extensive anti-corruption
measures implemented in the 1990s and deciding whether the new measures would
be more effective).
351. Id. (noting that the new corruption revelations occurred only because of a
public prosecutor’s raid at Siemens’ Munich headquarters).
352. Id. (finding that Siemens had a passive attitude because it only acted after
the Securities and Exchange Commission initiated formal investigations).
353. Id. at 6.
354. Id.
355. Siemens Under Observation in Corruption Case, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF
FIN. (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2009/siemens-under-observation-in-corruption-.html?id=549155
[hereinafter Siemens Under Observation].
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result of the developments in Siemens and the measures the company has
introduced to fight corruption, particularly over the last year. By placing
the company under observation we, as an investor, can signal that we
expect the measures to be implemented as intended. 356

The Minister additionally suggested that governmental scrutiny in
the wake of the corruption allegations would make it harder for
Siemens to continue to engage in the sort of poor practices that led to
the Ethics Council investigation. 357
11. Non-Exclusion Actions, Observation of Companies
The purpose of the observation status is to warn companies that
they are possibly in violation of the Fund’s guidelines, but preserve
the NSWF’s ability to continue to influence the company through
active shareholding. “In some cases there may be doubt as to whether
the conditions for exclusion have been fulfilled or how the
company’s behaviour will develop in the future. In such cases, the
Ministry may put the company under observation” on the advice of
the Ethics Council.358 To date, the only companies to be placed on
observation status are Siemens AG and Alstom SA. 359 However, at
the time it was recommended for Siemens, observation status was
not explicitly available as a remedial option in the Ethics Guidelines.
The Ethics Guidelines 360 then provided only for negative screening
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Observation of Companies from the Funds’s Investment Universe,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (May 31, 2013), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/
fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/companies-excluded-from-the-investment-u/Observation-ofcompanies.html?id=601811 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
359. See Government Pension Fund Global: Company Placed on Observation
List, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/presscenter/press-releases/2011/statens-pensjonsfond-utland-nye-beslutni/governmentpension-fund-global-company-p.html?id=665635 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). On
November 15, 2007, the Council recommended that Siemens AG be excluded from
the Fund, and on September 3, 2008, it reevaluated its recommendation and
recommended to the Ministry of Finance that the company remain excluded. On
March 13, 2009, the Ministery of Finance chose to put the company under
observation status, citing that the company had made significant changes in
fighting corruption and was on its way to reforming its corporate structure to deal
with the systemic corruption. Recommendation to Exclude Siemens AG, supra note
344, at 1.
360. The reference here is to the Guidelines issued on December 22, 2005,
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and exclusion of companies on the basis of producing or selling
certain products or engaging in certain identified conduct. 361 There
was no provision for placing a company under observation. The
Ministry of Finance ordered observation under its general regulatory
power, 362 though it is not clear how the regulations creating the status
of “observation” were enacted. The Ministry of Finance announced
this action in the 2009 Annual Report of the Ethics Council to create
a watch list of companies to determine whether they ought to be
excluded. 363
Within a short time after the Ministry of Finance put Siemens
under observation, the Ethics Guidelines were amended. 364 The
amendments included a new provision on observation that
substantially mirrored the form of observation contained in the
Ethics Council’s 2009 Annual Report. 365 What had been unclear at
the time of Siemens’ observation became part of the regulatory
scheme thereafter. Ironically, had the Ministry of Finance acted
under the revised Ethics Guidelines in putting Siemens under
pursuant to regulation on the management of the Government pension Fund –
Global.
361. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23, §§ 2, 4.
362. The Government Pension Fund Act of 2005, no. 123 (Dec. 21, 2005) § 7,
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1719656/
governmentPensionFundact.pdf.
363. Annual Report 2009, supra note 83, at 14. The Ministry noted,
The Ministry of Finance has decided to introduce a watch-list for companies where
there is uncertainty as to whether the conditions for exclusion have been met or
uncertainty about future developments. The Ministry of Finance can put a company
under observation on the basis of recommendations of exclusion or observation from
the Council on Ethics. In these cases, assessments will be made regularly to determine
whether the company should remain on the watch-list. If the risk of norm violations is
reduced over time, the company can be taken off the watch-list. If the required
improvements are not observed, companies on the watch-list may be recommended for
exclusion from the Fund.

Id.
364. Ethics Guidelines, supra note 23.
365. The Ethics Guidelines now provide that the Ministry of Finance may put a
company under observation on the basis of a recommendation of the Ethics
Council. Observation is appropriate “if there is doubt as to whether the conditions
for exclusion have been fulfilled, uncertainty about how the situation will develop,
or if it is deemed appropriate for other reasons.” Id. Once under observation, the
Guidelines specify a regimen of regular monitoring and assessment. Id.
Observation decisions are made public absent “special circumstances [that]
warrant that the decision be known only to Norges Bank and the Council on
Ethics.” Id.
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observation, it would have violated the Guidelines themselves. Here
it is clear that the Ministry of Finance would have overstepped its
authority where the Ethics Council had recommended excluding
Siemens twice. The Ministry could have chosen to reject the Ethics
Council recommendation, but it could not have chosen to adopt
observation in lieu of exclusion in the absence of advice to that effect
from the Ethics Council. Observation would have required a third
consultation of the Ethics Council, in which the issue of observation
would have had to be considered.
The move to incorporate observation suggests the extent of the
connection, within responsible investing, of active ownership and
exclusion from the NSWF investment universe. This was made clear
at the time by Finance Minister, who noted, “the assessment made
when considering exclusion of a company shall be forward-looking.
Siemens is now in the spotlight and it is important that pressure to
bring the corruption to an end is kept high. By keeping the company
under observation we can contribute to this.” 366 Rather than exclude
Siemens, the Finance Minister sought to bring Siemens under greater
observation to ensure conformity with expectations, in return for
which NSWF capital would remain available to Siemens (and the
announcement of exclusion would not otherwise affect Siemens’
access to capital markets on the most advantageous terms possible
given its operations). But the threat of exclusion continued to be
offered as the stick to the carrot of observation. The Minister asked
the “Council on Ethics and the Norges Bank to keep Siemens under
close scrutiny with regard to the general anticorruption efforts, and in
case new cases of gross corruption are uncovered. We will have a
low threshold for excluding Siemens if new cases of gross corruption
are discovered.” 367
Indeed, the size of the NSWF’s investment in Siemens may have
also contributed to this decision. The first time that the Ethics
Council recommended Siemens be excluded, the NSWF held almost
one percent of Siemens’ shares, a sizeable investment that might
have contributed to the decision to use its influence under its active
shareholder policy than to divest under its Ethics Guidelines. Indeed,
between 2007 and December 2008, the NSWF increased its stake in
366. Siemens Under Observation, supra note 355.
367. Id.
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Siemens to about 1.34%.
The Ministry’s actions also highlighted the potential for
differences in interpreting the legal framework within which
exclusion decisions would be made; they further highlighted the
relationship between use of active ownership and exclusion as
instruments of corporate behavior management. The Chair of the
Ethics Council, Gro Nystuen, suggested this in an interview he gave
at the time of the Ministry’s action, noting the importance of
emphasizing “that we are giving advice, and the Ministry of
Finance makes the decisions. It is therefore quite natural that it will
sometimes differ from us in its assessment.” 368 But she also noted
that this difference might also suggest differences in governance
standards, saying that the Ministry “has to consider other aspects as
well. We have different rules and have different mandates. In my
opinion, this case only shows that the system works as it is supposed
to work.” 369 Nystuen also dismissed concerns about observation
status as unwarranted. 370 Yet, the critics have a point that subjecting a
company to endless observation is similar to the way a state
endlessly observes its citizens. This is hardly troubling when a
private investment firm engages in active shareholding, but it
assumes a different character when the state assumes the shareholder
role.
After four years of observations, the Ministry of Finance, on a

368. Larry Catá Backer, Part XVI: Developing a Coherent Transnational
Jurisprudence of Ethical Investing: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund Ethics
Council Model, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 16, 2011, 10:41 PM),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/developing-coherenttransnational_16.html (quoting from an interview with the Chair of the Ethics
Council Gro Nystuen conducted and published on June 15, 2009).
369. Id.
370. Id. Gro Nystuen explained:
Critics have voiced concerns that the introduction of the observation list may lead to
non-transparent, ‘endless engagement’, that will allow continued investment in
companies whose behaviour could, and should, be improved. Is that a fair criticism? I
don’t see this as the beginning of a trend, because that would mean having to
reconsider the entirety of the guidelines. While we don’t have strong views on it, I
think it makes sense that the ministry decided what it wanted to achieve and this is a
way of telling the company, and any other companies that may be in the same
situation, that they are being watched. If other examples of corruption at Siemens
emerge, we may still move towards excluding them.

Id.
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recommendation from the Ethics Council,371 ended the observation
status of Siemens in early 2013. 372 The basis of the recommendation
was the Council’s determination that Siemens had implemented and
was effectively operating systems of monitoring and surveillance
throughout its operations that effectively reduced the likelihood of
corruption within the organization. 373 That the behavior was
grounded in compliance with standards of internal corporate
management was sufficient to satisfy the active shareholding criteria
of the NSWF. 374
Observation of Siemens produced a curious result, at least as
measured by traditional markers of corporate regulation. Observation
status effectively required Siemens to meet with representatives of
the NSWF to describe efforts to minimize the likelihood of
corruption within corporate operations. The Ethics Council
monitored Siemens by observing the progress of the various
corruption cases in which Siemens was a defendant and attending
annual meetings with Siemens representatives. 375
In effect, Siemens permitted the Norwegian state to become an
important monitor and standard-setter for the scope, content, and
operation of its monitoring and surveillance regimes. This marks a
substantial departure from the traditional arrangement in which
corporations were subject to the legal constraints of the state of
incorporation, at least with respect to its internal organization,
operation, and management. What was once the province of the state
through law has now become the province of the state through
371. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Recommendation to Remove Siemens AG from the Watch List of the
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.
(June 15, 2012), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2013/
siemens_eng.pdf [hereinafter Remove Siemens AG from the Watch List].
372. Observation of Siemens Concluded, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. (Jan.
11, 2013), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/news/news/2013/observation-ofsiemens-concluded.html?id=711933.
373. Remove Siemens AG from the Watch List, supra note 371, § 5 (finding that
Siemens had shown its willingness and ability to improve the company’s culture
through a new compliance system consisting of a monitoring unit and clear
communication of the company’s intolerance for corruption).
374. Id. § 4.3 (describing Siemens’ stance that it has “developed and
strengthened its compliance system so that compliance is now an integral part of
the company’s standard business processes”).
375. Id.
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market interactions producing governance principals with the
functional effect of law. 376
The Finance Ministry Announcement emphasized the critical
effect of the implementation of monitoring and surveillance
architectures that met its basic standards of sufficiency. 377 The Ethics
Council Recommendation went into substantially more detail. Its
most interesting part focused on the evaluation of Siemens’
monitoring system and its sufficiency for the purposes of meeting
minimum corporate governance standards for avoiding observation
(and thus the instrumental effects of the NSWF’s active shareholding
activities).
12. Non-Exclusion Actions, Other Forms of Interventions by the
Ethics Council
The advisory role of the Ethics Council is most clearly evidenced
through other actions, principally its formal letters of explanation for
determinations not to act or in response to criticism. 378 The move
376. See generally Backer, Governance Without Government, supra note 31,
87–123.
377. Observation of Siemens Concluded, supra note 372.
378. See Gro Nystuen, Exclusion of the Company Poongsan Corp., COUNCIL ON
ETHICS NORWEGIAN GOV’T PENSION FUND GLOBAL (Sept. 7, 2009),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2290596/Letter_Poongsan.pdf; Advisory Council
on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund, On the Council on
Ethics’ Assessment of Investments in Companies with Activities in Israel,
NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY
OF
FIN.
(Mar.
19,
2009),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2181162/Letter_to_Ministry_March_2009.pdf;
Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund,
Council on Ethics’ Assessment on Investments in Israel Electric Corporation,
NORWEGIAN
MINISTRY
OF
FIN.
(Apr.
18,
2008),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2099548/IEC_letter_English.pdf; Gro Nystuen,
Council on Ethics’ Assessment of Companies with Operations in Burma, COUNCIL
ON ETHICS NORWEGIAN GOV’T PENSION FUND GLOBAL (Oct. 11, 2009),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2018769/Burma%20letter%20english.pdf
[hereinafter Nystuen, Companies with Operations in Burma]; Gro Nystuen,
Response to Criticism Concerning the Exclusion of Companies from the
Norwegian Government Pension Fund, COUNCIL ON ETHICS NORWEGIAN GOV’T
PENSION FUND GLOBAL (Sept. 11, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/
1958695/Eng%20versjon%20kronikk%20DN.pdf; Skancke, supra note 293; Gro
Nystuen, Aracruz, COUNCIL ON ETHICS NORWEGIAN GOV’T PENSION FUND
GLOBAL (Mar. 22, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957949/engelsk%
20oversettelse%20av%20svarbrev%20til%20FIN.pdf
[hereinafter
Nystuen,
Aracruz].
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from exclusion to observation, described in the last section, suggests
a pattern of governance that is replicated here. The Ethics Council
has, like the Ministry of Finance, sought to fill in the spaces within
the regulatory scheme with additional processes and standards that,
while not explicit in the Ethics Guidelines, are not prohibited. This
section explores some of the non-exclusion, non-observation
measures that the Ethics Council has taken. The first involves
Aracruz Celulose SA, in which five Brazilian NGOs asked the
Council to evaluate the Fund’s holdings in the company for
complicity in helping the company violate land and personal rights
against indigenous people in Brazil. 379 After evaluating the company,
the Council decided to increase scrutiny of the company but retain
investment, allowing for the Brazilian courts and other bodies to
form a solution. 380
The Ethics Council has also devoted much work to the issue of
investment in Israel from an early date. 381 It is unclear whether the
action requested was part of a coordinated global effort, popular at
the time among some religious and non-governmental organizations,
to seek divestment in Israeli companies and companies that provided
assistance to Israel. 382 The Ethics Council declined to move forward
with exclusion proceedings on the basis of information it had then. 383
The letter is important as an expression of the Ethics Council’s
efforts to focus specifically on company action rather than on the
political situation, but is also important as an application of
precedent. In 2007, the Ethics Council considered a request to
exclude the Israel Electric Corporation for reducing the electricity
supply to Gaza. This consideration is important for a number of
reasons. First, it evidences the growing importance of Ethics Council
determinations—the investigation included the participation of
governmental officials from Israel and Palestine and the growing use
379. Nystuen, Aracruz, supra note 378.
380. Id. (qualifying the conflict as primarily between Indians and Aracruz with
certain elements of environmental issues and workers’ rights).
381. See, e.g., Skancke, supra note 293.
382. Advisory Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Petroleum
Fund, Council on Ethics’ Assessment on Investments in Israel Electric
Corporation,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN.
(Apr.
18,
2008),
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2099548/IEC_letter_English.pdf.
383. Id. (failing to recommend exclusion of the Israeli Electric Corporation but
retaining the ability to do so in the future).
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of the Fund as an important source of Norwegian foreign policy
projection.
Another action from 2006 comes from Ethics Council Chair Gro
Nystuen and was written in response to allegations that the Council
was not doing enough to fully implement the Guidelines. 384 Similar
to the Aracruz cases, and with some of the same characteristics as the
recommendation on Israel, the Council appeared to be responding
directly to pressure from outside stakeholders (i.e. media, NGOs,
Norwegian press, and public). 385 In October 2007, the Council made
a formal assessment of investments in Burma, 386 following the 2005
recommendation of Total SA in which the company was not
excluded for aiding the government in atrocities. The stance of the
Council was to not exclude companies that deal in or with Burma,
but only those that had directly contributed money, resources,
weapons, or other items that the government of Burma used to
commit human rights violations against the population. Additionally,
the Council distinguished that companies aiding the government
solely through commerce and tax revenues are not excludable. The
only company that was excluded for involvement with the Burmese
government was Dongfeng Motors in 2008 for supplying the
government with armored trucks and other military equipment.
Together, these cases form the construction of a legal-juridical
framework for managing corporate governance and standards of
economic behavior by seeking to affect access to capital markets.
Though the NSWF can only affect its own investment decisions, its
invocation of law and the legitimacy-producing effects of a quasijudicial administrative process is meant to influence other market
stakeholders and ultimately state regulators themselves. Its
immediate effect, though, is to seek to raise the targeted companies’
cost of capital. Though it is not clear that exclusion has only longterm impact on corporate behavior, it might have a greater influence
on public international bodies responsible for maintaining the

384. Gro Nystuen, Response to Criticism Concerning the Exclusion of
Companies from the Norwegian Government Pension Fund DAGENS NÆRINGSLIV
[Today’s Market] (Sept. 11, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1958695/
Eng%20versjon%20kronikk%20DN.pdf.
385. Nystuen, Companies with Operations in Burma, supra note 378.
386. See generally id.
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integrity of markets. 387 That is the hope.
This case law produced a number of generalizations. First, the
Ethics Council is not constrained by the jurisdictional limitations of
national courts. This is most apparent in the scope of law and norm
that the Ethics Council invoked in reaching its decisions. While the
Ethics Council uses the Ethics Guidelines, and Norwegian law
generally, when the Council engaged in gap-filling, it was
unconstrained in its choice of sources. These included Norwegian
national law, the decisions of courts of other states, international law,
and international norms with no legal effect. This use of these
sources of law produced an internationalized governance framework
in which the traditional hierarchies of law were effectively
abandoned in favor of a more global approach. 388
Second, the Ethics Council feels unconstrained by traditionally
applicable procedural protections, principally among the right of the
subjects of adverse governmental action to appear and defend
themselves. Though the Ethics Council adopts some of the forms of
the judicial function, it by no means seeks to act like a traditional
court. Thus, while one may speak to the juridification of economic
decision making and investment under the Ethics Council
framework, one cannot speak of it as a traditional court. Of course,
part of the reason for this shift is provided by changes in the way
information is available. The Ethics Council feels free to use
corporate communications as both evidence and admissions against
interest. On the other hand, juridification produced a body of
decisions that increasingly have come to be seen as precedent
(though not formally constraining).
Third, the Ethics Council has, like a common law court, been
active in gap-filling and extending the regulatory framework to novel
situations that might not have been contemplated at the time of the
enactment of the Ethics Guidelines. The standards of liability for
corruption and human rights violations are particularly significant

387. See Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance, supra note 8, at 755
(discussing the linking of international public organizations, private standardsetting bodies, and states in the management and control of global finance
markets).
388. Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law, supra note 14, at
181 (explaining how international law builds upon domestic law).
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examples discussed above. But so are the rules adopted relating to
causation, intent, and remediation that have been developed as
factors to consider in excluding companies.
Fourth, for all of its juridified character, the process of exclusion
remains embedded in political considerations. To some extent, the
legal governance-based agenda of the NSWF also incorporates very
specific foreign policy objectives of the Norwegian state. In this
sense, the NSWF remains an instrument of state power and a means
of projecting that power abroad through private markets. Most telling
here is the focus on Israeli companies. Complicity also serves as an
elastic principle developed by the Ethics Council and applied in ways
that balance the normative principles of governance but also the
political objectives of the state. Politics, of course, is sieved through
the language of complicity in violations of human rights norms, but
the choices for emphasis are essentially political choices. 389
Fifth, the political objectives of the NSWF are not merely
grounded in the narrow national political interests of Norway. The
Ethics Council also aggressively seeks to transpose international
policy objectives, whether or not in binding international law, into
the rules governing corporate governance and corporate behavior.
This provides an example not of classic extraterritorialism but of a
new form through which states conceive of themselves as equally
bound to apply international law and norms to all activities within
their control. 390
Sixth, the willingness to invoke weak governance zone rules
contributes to global movements vesting corporations and other
389. In its 2012 Annual Report, the Ethics Council noted that it
will continue to monitor companies that operate in areas where there is a heightened
risk of the company contributing to conflicts or being complicit in human rights
violations. Examples of such areas include mineral extraction in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, investments in infrastructure in Myanmar, the building of
settlements in the West Bank, and the extraction of mineral resources in Western
Sahara and Eritrea.

Annual Report 2012, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND
GLOBAL 10 (2012), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957930/aarsmelding_
2012_engelsk.pdf.
390. See generally Sara Seck, Conceptualizing the Home State Duty to Protect
Human Rights, in CORPORATE SOCIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES:
GLOBAL LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES (Karin Buhmann, Lynn
Roseberry, Mette Morsing eds., 2010).
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economic enterprises with direct responsibility for complying with
international law. 391 In effect, the Ethics Council contributes to the
development of an autonomous set of corporate regulatory structures
that are both distinct from national law and bind corporation and
state simultaneously but in different ways. This is especially the case
where, for example, international law impositions embraced by the
Ethics Council include either international norms without legal effect
or international law that has been explicitly rejected by the state
regulating the corporate actor. More generally, the Ethics Guidelines
framework appears to have some effect on the willingness of
companies to incorporate international norms. 392 Together, these
suggest broader insights that this article considers next.

V. A FIRST STEP TOWARD IMPLICATIONS—
COOPERATIVE AND INTER-SYSTEMIC
GOVERNANCE
Roscoe Pound famously noted that “the habit of obedience rests to
no small extent upon the consciousness of intelligent persons that
force will be applied to them if they persistently adhere to the antisocial residuum.” 393 But the character of force and the identification
of the anti-social have changed dramatically since 1942. Yet, even as
the nature of force changes, Norway has shown how the basic insight
still has power.
We have seen how the regulatory aspects of NSWF policy are
quite consciously undertaken with “a responsibility for and an
interest in promoting good corporate governance and safeguarding
environmental and social concerns.” 394 At the center of the
391. Cf. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 248, at 13–16 (identifying the
standards and obligations with which businesses are expected to comply); OECD
Guidelines, supra note 249, at 3, 8, 19 (stating that enterprises must follow
international law and protect human rights).
392. Gurneeta Vasudeva, Weaving Together the Normative and Regulative
Roles of Government: How the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund’s Responsible
Conduct Is Shaping Firms’ Cross-Border Investments, 24 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
(2013),
available
at
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/2013paulrlawrence/Documents/OS_Gurneeta_%20SWF_Final_Jan2_2013.pdf.
393. ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 33 (1942).
394. Kristin Halvorsen, Foreword – UN-Report for Promoting the Integration of
Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. ( July 15, 2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/
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construction of this inter-systemic project is a curious mix of
instrumentalities and techniques of private and public power,
effectuated through market investments outside the territorial borders
of the Norwegian state, and designed to incorporate Norwegian law
and policy within global markets. These instrumentalities and
techniques actively participate in the shaping of international law and
custom on the one hand, and the domestic governance regimes of
other states on the other.
Social control, a significant obligation of the state through law, has
now entered the global age—where a state can no longer control
directly through its organs within its territory, it can now seek to
control through its investment organs beyond its territory. The state
becomes another institution in which social control is a matter of
market power. The Norwegian Finance Minister Kristen Halvorsen
nicely summarized the Norwegian premise underlying the operations
of the NSWF and the development of its structures: “In a global
economy, ownership of companies is the most important way to have
influence.” 395
Norway is pioneering a form of inter-systemic harmonization, or
harmonization “of public and private governance systems and by
public and private actors.” 396 These new harmonizations “both
augment the power of states (with respect to the expansion of the
palette of legitimate governance tools) and shrink the scope of its
control (as other governance communities emerge with authority
over actors operating within the territory of states).” 397
We have considered the administration system of the Ethics
Guidelines. We have posited that the Ethics Guidelines system is an
essential element of Norway’s efforts to construct what will
eventually serve as an international standard for responsible

fin/News/Speeches-and-articles/minister-2/finansminister_kristin_halvorsen/2009/
foreword-for-the-report-fiduciary-respon.html?id=571262
(expressing
the
Ministry’s desire to integrate “environmental, social and governance issues, such
as the risks and opportunities associated with climate change, into different parts of
the management of the Fund”).
395. Mark Landler, Norway Keeps Nest Egg from Some U.S. Companies, N.Y.
TIMES (May 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/business/
worldbusiness/04norway.html?pagewanted=all.
396. Backer, Inter-Systemic Harmonization, supra note 21, at 427.
397. Id. at 430.
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investment. We have come to understand responsible investment as a
three-pronged program consisting of the following elements: (1) a
political-regulatory element derived from the Norwegian state
apparatus (Storting and Ministry); (2) an economic-private element
derived from the position of the Norwegian state as a shareholderinvestor in publicly traded companies; and (3) a quasi-judicial
element derived from the Ethics Guidelines and implemented
through the Ethics Council. Together, the three prongs apply national
and international law in the public sphere and private markets. In the
process, they seek to contribute to the development of international
law and domesticate that law and regulatory framework into the
operations of corporations (and the regulatory programs of corporate
home states) through shareholder action.
The Ethics Council plays a critical role in that process by standing
between the state and the private sector. It transforms politics into a
set of predictable standards of conduct that are then applied on a
case-by-case basis to the investment universe of the NSWF. The role
of the Norges Bank and its use of “active ownership” principles
cannot be underestimated. Together, the public and private
interventions in governance utilize the levers of private market
transactions beyond the territorial borders of the state and point to a
new, complex, and cooperative structure of rule-making. As I have
noted before, “Just as law-making might have become unmoored
from the state, the state has itself become unmoored. And so the
issue of corporate citizenship serves as a proxy for the equally
important converse issues—that of the private rights of states as
participants in global markets.” 398
The NSWF’s goal of responsible investing is central to the
operation of the Fund. We understand that the centrality of the
responsible investment goal is memorialized in the management
regulation for the NSWF, enacted by the Ministry of Finance.
Responsible investing is a cluster of concepts. First, the ultimate goal
of Fund investing is to achieve the highest possible return. Second, a
good return is grounded in a long-term time horizon and is, in part,
dependent on the contribution of the investment to sustainable
development in economic, environmental, and social terms, as well
as to functioning, legitimate, and effective markets. To achieve the
398. Id. at 431.
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highest possible good return, the Norges Bank must develop
guidelines for integrating good corporate governance and
environmental and social issues in investment activities. These
guidelines are to be based on internationally recognized principles
for responsible investment.
Within this framework, the state controls corporate behavior
through direct regulation and investment standards. Those standards
in turn incorporate international soft law and require the state to
participate in internal corporate governance through active
ownership. Simultaneously, the state actively participates in the
development of international standards that are then incorporated
into domestic law and used as a basis for determining the character
of shareholder activism with respect to companies within the Fund’s
investment universe; “[t]his reflects international developments,”
according to the Minister of Finance. 399
The Ethics Guidelines present the regulatory function of the
NSWF responsible investment framework. Through the development
of a set of approaches to determine the application of the Ethical
Guidelines, or rules for determining conformity to those Guidelines,
the Ethics Council begins to develop jurisprudence. This
jurisprudence sets behavior standards for corporate governance and
for contributing to the development of international standards (which
will then be memorialized as law within the Norwegian domestic
legal order). The jurisprudential framework substantially augments
the principles embedded in the Ethics Guidelines and provides an
international law-based framework for distinguishing which business
activities conform to the Norwegian interpretation of international
norms.
As a result, Norway has begun to import the obligations of
international law once limited to states into private investment
markets. But this application of international norms directly to
corporations has two significant differences from its application to
states. First, Norway applies international law to enterprises in its
investment decisions irrespective of the willingness of the home
states to accede to these international law instruments. Second,
Norway imposes a requirement for complying with international

399. New Guidelines, supra note 22.
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norms without the force of law—that is, to norms that are soft law
and not binding on states. Effectively, through its private market
activities, Norway seeks to legislate a set of obligations that would
neither bind all states nor would be altogether recognized as law
directly onto corporations. This is a remarkable extension of
international law in ways that are novel and polycentric, 400 though
not necessarily cooperative.
The exclusion of Wal-Mart provides a case in point. 401 The Ethics
Council used the Guidelines as a gateway to introduce a particular
interpretation of international norms. But it did not apply
international law; instead, it used international law norms to develop
a normative governance structure grounded in international law
through which it could assess a corporation’s liability as an
autonomous actor. In other words, Norway used its own law to
extract international law and refashion it into a governance
framework for assessing corporate compliance with law. As the
Council stated, “international standards and norms can be indicative
of which acts or omissions are deemed unacceptable, without
asserting that companies are legally responsible for violations of
international conventions.” 402 The effects of this statement were
powerfully felt, drawing a sharp protest from the U.S. Ambassador to
Norway, Benson K. Whitney, who accused the government of a
sloppy screening process that unfairly singled out American
companies: “An accusation of bad ethics is not an abstract thing . . . .
They’re alleging serious misconduct. It is essentially a national
judgment of the ethics of these companies.” 403 But the criticism
400. See generally Bruce L. Benson, Polycentric Law Versus Monopolized Law:
Implications from International Trade for the Potential Success of Emerging
Markets, 15 J. OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 36, 36–66 (1999) (explaining
polycentricity in efforts to impose international law obligations directly on
corporate actors through soft law frameworks); Larry Catá Backer, The United
Nations’ “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Human Rights Project: On
Operationalizing a Global Framework for the Regulation of Transnational
Corporations, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 37 (2011); John K. Palchak & Stanley T.
Leung, No State Required? A Critical Review of the Polycentric Legal Order, 38
GONZ. L. REV. 289 (2002) (critiquing state-based polycentrism).
401. Recommendation of 15 November 2005, supra note 300.
402. Id.
403. Mark Landler, Norway Backs Its Ethics with Cash, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2007), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01E1DB113EF937A35
756C0A9619C8B63&sec=&spon.
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highlights the novelty of the approach. The national judgment is
based on national interests but applied in private markets. The
Ambassador missed the irony of his assessment: “I’m not sure the
Norway government understands the power of being one of the
largest investors in the world.” 404 Indeed, the Norwegians understood
this power precisely. And they understood that such power could be
used to develop not merely an investment strategy but a governance
strategy, one that would come to the attention of even the most
powerful enterprises and states.
Yet, particularly in the case of developing a jurisprudence of
complicity, the Ethics Council has demonstrated the difficulty of
harmonizing its ethical and wealth-maximizing objectives. The ICJ
produced an excellent three-volume study of complicity by economic
enterprises in human rights violations and judicial recourse. 405 One of
the report’s important insights concerned the broadening of the
meaning of complicity, which has acquired a double meaning. One
meaning is grounded in the governance framework of the law-state.
The other is tied to the social-norm systems of non-state governance
regimes—the market, the consumer society, multinational
corporations, and other governance communities. 406
In a recently released report, 407 the civil society organization
EarthRights International began to argue that SWFs also have the
obligation to avoid complicity in human rights violations of the
corporations in which they invest or the states in which these
corporations operate. Its report found the Norwegian government
complicit in human rights abuses in Burma through investments held
404. Id.
405. The ICJ is an organization dedicated to the primacy, coherence, and
implementation of international law and principles that advance human rights.
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, http://www.icj.org/ (last visited Sept. 8,
2013); Report of the ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in
International Crimes, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS (Jan. 1, 2008),
http://www.icj.org/report-of-the-international-commission-of-jurists-expert-legalpanel-on-corporate-complicity-in-international-crimes/ [hereinafter Complicity in
International Crimes].
406. Complicity in International Crimes, supra note 405 (comparing the
sophistication of the definition of human rights with the emerging complexity of
the concept of complicity).
407. Broken Ethics: The Norwegian Government’s Investment in Oil and Gas
Companies Operating in Burma (Myanmar), EARTHRIGHTS INT’L 9 (Dec. 2010),
http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Broken-Ethics.pdf.

2013]

SOVEREIGN INVESTING

97

by the Norwegian Pension Fund-Global, including 4.7 billion USD
invested in fifteen oil and gas companies operating in Burma. 408 The
report documents human rights conditions associated with these
fifteen companies’ projects, finding ongoing abuses including forced
labor, killings, land confiscation, and the high likelihood that other
projects will result in additional abuses in the coming years. 409 These
continued investments put Norway in violation of its own Ethical
Guidelines for responsible investment. 410
But EarthRights is doing more than seeking to impose soft law
standards on the NSWF. Rather, it suggests that, because the state is
the owner of the investment vehicle, the hard law obligations that
bind Norway also bind its actions as a shareholder of companies and
as the owner of an investment business. 411 In this case, the character
of the shareholder affects the character of the rules that bind it. 412 As
a state actor, even in private form, the Kingdom of Norway might
find that soft law is quite hard. In Norway’s case, moreover,
EarthRights appears to suggest that the internal operating rules of the
SWF, articulated through the remedial structures of the Ethics
Council, have binding effects, not merely as soft law, but as binding
as the domestic law of Norway. 413
There is a suggestion of political motivation for the Ethics
Council’s reticence.
Norway is particularly afraid to single out Total, one of Europe’s biggest
companies, a multibillion-dollar giant known to have the backing of the
French government in everything it does. If Norway acknowledged the
truth about Total, they would then have to examine many other European
firms they’ve invested in. Companies like BP, Shell and BAE that have
all engaged in extremely unethical behaviour both at home and abroad. 414

408. Id. at 6.
409. Id. at 14, 18.
410. Id. at 38.
411. Id. at 10, 29.
412. Id. at 10, 31.
413. See id. at 10, 38.
414. Thomas Maung Shwe, Report Condemns Norway Fund’s Burma
Investments, MIZZIMA (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.mizzima.com/opinion/analysis/
4687-report-condemns-norway-funds-burma-investments
(quoting
Matthew
Morgan, York University doctoral candidate and scholar of Western foreign policy
towards Burma).
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But EarthRights International seeks to hold the Ethics Council to its
own rules, its own prior determinations, and the norms that it has
created. Effectively, EarthRights International suggests that the
Ethics Council is impermissibly acting like a political institution
when its obligation is a judicial one.
The EarthRights International Report is important for several other
reasons. 415 First, the Report demonstrates how civil society has begun
to understand the Ethics Council aspects of NSWF operations as
quasi-judicial in character, with a binding jurisprudence. EarthRights
International identifies the Council’s standard for complicity in
investment in quasi-judicial terms and speaks of its prior
determinations as having some effect of a jurisprudential character. 416
It also speaks of the need for the Ethics Council to “reform and build
upon its approach to the ethics of investment in Burma.” 417 The
Report describes approving the adoption of a “strict standard of
immediate exclusion for companies involved in new onshore pipeline
construction in Burma.” 418 The judicialization of standards for
determining complicity are described as well, noting the reliance on
judicial opinions of other jurisdictions. 419
Second, it suggests that the idea of complicity as a prudential
standard for responsible investing might extend to second-level
participants in markets, especially if those second-level actors are
states or their instrumentalities. While mere investment has not
generally been accepted as a legally sufficient trigger for such
liability, the affirmative act of investment by a state or by a
commercial enterprise owned or controlled by a state may be an
exception to this limitation. 420 The reason for the exception is
415. Larry Catá Backer, Complicity in Human Rights Violations and Sovereign
Wealth Funds – the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund and Myanmar Investments,
LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Dec. 23, 2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2010/12/complicity-in-human-rights-violations.html.
416. Broken Ethics, supra note 407, at 9.
417. Id. at 37.
418. Id. at 39.
419. Id. at 11–13.
420. The recently endorsed Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights
may support the position of EarthRights International. U.N. Special Representative
of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, ¶¶ 4,
8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://www.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar2011.pdf. Guiding Principle 4 provides that the state “should take additional steps
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grounded in the independent obligation of states to comply with
international law and legal obligations, including human rights and
humanitarian law, beyond a connection with the object of
investment. SWFs are especially likely to be bound by human rights
obligations, even ones that flow from the secondary consequences of
their investment activities. The NSWF Ethics Council has suggested
embracing this reading of complicity as a guiding principle for its
screening decisions. 421
Responsible investing is not limited to the use of international
standards as a touchstone for national governance of the Fund’s
activities. Rather, responsible investing extends to the use of the
Fund’s power as an investor under principles of active ownership.
That role is proving important in the construction of cultures of
corporate governance at the transnational level. 422 Active ownership
to protect against human rights abuses.” Id. ¶ 4. These steps might include
“requiring human rights due diligence”—steps that would otherwise have a more
compelling character in cases where enterprises are not state-owned. Id. Thus, state
commercial instrumentalities might be understood to acquire both the duties
binding states and the responsibilities attached to corporate enterprises
simultaneously. The Commentary to Guiding Principle 4 provides,
Where these agencies do not explicitly consider the actual and potential adverse
impacts on human rights of beneficiary enterprises, they put themselves at risk—in
reputational, financial, political and potentially legal terms—for supporting any such
harm, and they may add to the human rights challenges faced by the recipient State.

Id. ¶ 4, commentary. The complicity provisions also suggest the double role of the
state. The Commentary to Principle 17 notes,
Questions of complicity may arise when a business enterprise contributes to, or is seen
as contributing to, adverse human rights impacts caused by other parties. Complicity
has both non-legal and legal meanings. As a non-legal matter, business enterprises
may be perceived as being “complicit” in the acts of another party where, for example,
they are seen to benefit from an abuse committed by that party.

Id. ¶ 17, commentary. It seems clear that the Ethics Council might well breach its
obligations in this respect. See generally, Larry Catá Backer, From Institutional
Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: the Guiding Principles for the
Implementation of the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the
Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69, 121 (2012) (noting that principles guiding Principle 8 apply
externally to relationships between the state and other states or businesses).
421. Annual Report 2008, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION
FUND GLOBAL (2010), http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957930/etikkradet_
engelsk08.pdf (establishing that companies shall be excluded from the Government
Pension Fund to prevent the Fund’s complicity in grave violations).
422. New Guidelines, supra note 22 (“Norges Bank participates in a variety of
formal and informal initiatives in collaboration with other investors. The new
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conflates governance, law, and economic welfare maximization in
ways that undermine the traditional distinction between public and
private activity. The NSWF engages in active ownership not merely
to maximize the value of its investment—it believes that the
maximization of the value of its investment is dependent on its
ability to change the internal and external governance structures of
the enterprises in which it owns shares. Lawmaking, governance, and
regulation are thus inexorably integrated with economic decisionmaking.
The result can only be understood as a polycentric exercise. That
is, active ownership provides Norway the power to engage in
governance beyond its borders by participating in systems in which
those borders are not relevant for stakeholding. That, in turn, has an
important effect on governance regimes of the states within which
these non-state governance roles are significant. Recent
commentators have suggested the potential importance of minority
government stakes in corporate securities on the development of
corporate governance cultures and corporate governance law in the
home states of enterprises. 423
While the Norges Bank operates in a regulatory capacity—
operationalizing a regulatory standard under which the Ethics
Council can measure the lawfulness of Fund investment—it is also
obligated to exercise its ownership rights, or its rights as a
shareholder, for the purposes specified by statute and regulation.
Specifically, the Fund is obligated to make decisions about the nature
of its participation and the exercise of its shareholder rights in a
corporation on the basis of a set of international soft law frameworks.
guidelines emphasize the importance of this by stipulating that the bank actively
contribute to development of good international standards within responsible
investment practice and exercise of ownership rights. New requirements have also
been defined regarding transparency and reporting in Norges Bank.”).
423. See Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2917 (2012) (“If the government is indeed a minority
shareholder and is otherwise unable to exercise informal control over management
and obtain private benefits of control—and this is a big ‘if’—the cases analyzed
throughout this Article suggest that minority state ownership could be more
conducive to the adoption of legal investor protections than a system in which the
government is the controlling shareholder . . . . Future research is needed to
elucidate the precise dynamics and political implications of state minority
holdings, a subject that will be particularly useful for guiding public policy on
domestic and international sovereign wealth funds.”).
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These include the U.N. Global Compact, the OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Corporations. The effect is profound as the regulations compel the
Fund to govern its conduct as a shareholder (thus determining the
character of its interests in the corporation) on a set of international
soft law standards. Soft law is thus hardened, indirectly, by
compelling a public entity to incorporate these standards in its
private self-interested conduct.
In his work on framing of the law of SWFs, 424 Fabio Bassan
rejects the prior conventional analysis premised on the notion that
states and economic enterprises are necessarily distinct—he rejects
the twentieth-century convention of a distinction between law and
politics. But, unlike those who then suggest that economics is
absorbed within politics,425 he suggests the opposite; under the logic
of globalization, economics may absorb politics: “[O]ne should
admit that there are not separate political and economic playing
fields where states and companies operate respectively . . . . They
both make a political use of financial power trying to influence the
market they operate in.” 426 He uses this insight both to distinguish
between state (political government) and company (economic
government), in three respects—influence, purpose, and
relationship 427—and to suggest its integration in the form of SWFs. 428
With that insight, Bassan criticizes the view of SWFs as reducible to
one of state capitalism, which would limit the analysis of this
sovereign enterprise in economic terms. 429
Thus understood, responsible investment does not merely compel
the incorporation of international standards in national norms for
investment. It also requires the Norges Bank to actively contribute to
the development of the standards under which it is to be governed:
424. BASSAN, supra note 10.
425. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Globalization and the Socialist
Multinational: Cuba at the Intersection of Business and Human Rights, in
HANDBOOK ON CONTEMPORARY CUBA: ECONOMY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND
GLOBALIZATION (Mauricio A. Font & Carlos Riobó, eds., 2013), available at
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/Handbook%20of%20contemporary
%20Cuba%20-%20Table%20of%20Contents.pdf.
426. BASSAN, supra note 10, at 3.
427. Id. at 4.
428. Id. at 4–5.
429. Id. at 5–14.
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“The Government will play an active role in international processes
aimed at further developing the [corporate social responsibility]
framework.” 430 As such, investing is both participation in markets
and development of the rules under which such private market
participation is organized and its companies are regulated. Norway’s
critical support for the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary
General John Ruggie in his work to develop a framework for
business and human rights is an important example of that outward
projection of Norwegian state power in the construction of
international norms that it internalizes in its domestic legal order.
The extraterritoriality and polycentric approaches of the NSWF
are not developed in isolation. Roberta Karmel recently noted,
In addition to concerns about hedge funds, regulators have also focused
on two other alternative investment vehicles: private equity funds and
sovereign wealth funds . . . . Sovereign wealth funds also are alternative
investment vehicles, but regulatory concerns and prohibitions have
generally not focused on their systemic threats, but rather on the political
implications of their investment activities. 431

Home states, particularly the United States, have sought to match
the extraterritorial potential of the NSWF approach with
extraterritoriality of their own. For example, the United States
recently sought to expand the reach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act 432 to foreign SWFs, wherever they operate. 433 The focus on
bribery, of course, is also grounded in recent efforts to create an
international framework for its suppression 434 that followed but also
430. Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 88, at 6.
431. Roberta Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP. L.
849, 857–58 (2012).
432. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988), and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302-04 (1998)).
433. Michael J. Gilbert & Joshua W.B. Richards, Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: The SEC’s Investigation of FCPA Violations and Sovereign Wealth Funds –
Implications for Hedge Funds, 4 HEDGE FUND L. REP. 2–3 (Feb. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/9d66f31d-f613-40c6-9d0a8c120bd1c901/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2ea4c494-79a4-4151-8c7018a904d3c01a/HFLR%20Reprint%202_3_11%20FCPA.pdf (explaining that SWF
employees qualify as foreign officials under the FCPA due to the fact that SWFs
are government entities).
434. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
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built an international governance architecture around the initial U.S.
effort.
This suggests perhaps the most fundamental insight from this
national effort: Norway is not seeking to use its SWF as an
instrument of nationalist power projection. Extraterritoriality,
whether in the form of active shareholding or the investment
universe management of the Ethics Council, is not meant to project
any peculiar Norwegian national law or policy abroad. Rather, the
NSWF is evidence of a new form of complex and cooperative
regulation, one in which the state itself serves as a nexus for the
domestication of international norms, its internationalization of
governance power through projections in private markets, and twoway engagement with international public and private law and norm
making, one in which economic wealth maximization and
governance objectives are conflated. Professor Sara Seck has
captured this new and emerging form of public stake holding in
global governance, one in which the state is an important but not
necessarily the only stakeholder. 435 Professor Seck develops a strong
argument for extraterritoriality, one that promotes a harmonizing
internationalism rather than furthering a conventional understanding
grounded in the assertion of a power to project the idiosyncrasies of
states’ domestic legal orders onto or within other states. 436 The
governance agendas of the NSWF provide a striking example of this
second generation extraterritoriality, one that is deployed in the
service of international norms but remains grounded in domestication
and projection through states. States thus remain significant to
regulatory internationalization but neither central to that process nor
necessarily in control of the venues through which
International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf (last visited June 26, 2013) (explaining
recent efforts to eliminate international corruption).
435. Seck, supra note 390.
436. Larry Catá Backer, Sara Seck on the Possibilities and Limits of
Extraterritoriality in a Corporate Social Responsibility and Human Rights
Context, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/sara-seck-on-possibilities-andlimits.html (“But, greater irony still, by recasting extraterritoriality as itself
legitimate only as an instrument of internationalism, it effectively contributes to
the reduction of the authority of states beyond the confines of their own territory
for any action other than those that might further international law and the norms
of the emerging international order.”).
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internationalization now occurs.
Yet it is possible that in this effort to construct a regulating
investment vehicle in the form of the NSWF, the Norwegians have
ultimately sacrificed efficiency for political aims. That is the
argument that Gordon Clark and Ashby Monk have made.
Democratic societies may value their role in shaping institutions, but
when it comes to financial management, policies that privilege
participation over expertise tend to have efficiency costs . . . .
Undoubtedly, many view these costs as worth paying, in particular with
the Norwegian fund, where the ethics policies applied to GPFG are of
moral, not financial, value. 437

If the object of the NSWF regulatory edifice is to represent public
values, whether or not this representation has effects on the targeted
companies, the costs in terms of reduced financial returns “are
visible in the substandard performance of GPFG against the Clark
and Urwin best practice framework for investment management.” 438
The value of this foregone or lost financial return might then be
understood as the price or value of the public and political legitimacy
of the NSWF. 439 Clark and Monk are correct when the NSWF is
judged by its investment portfolio. Yet, when the NSWF is
understood as a mechanism for positive regulation at the national and
international level and as a means of extraterritorial application of
transnational standards—rather than merely as a special sort of
pension fund with a need to develop internal public and political
legitimacy—what appears to be a sacrifice of market fundamentals in
the operation of the fund 440 actually reflects the regulatory value of
the Fund to Norway. The principle objective of the NSWF is not
merely to maximize value understood in historically conventional
terms, 441 but to maximize the value of the fund to the Norwegian
people by generating income over the long term and contributing to
the ordering of globalization and corporate behaviors. In this case,
437. Gordon L. Clark & Ashby Monk, The Norwegian Government Pension
Fund: Ethics Over Efficiency, 3 ROTMAN INT’L J. OF PENSION MGMT. 14, 17
(2010).
438. Id.
439. Id. at 17–18.
440. See id. at 18.
441. Alexander Dyck & Adair Morse, Sovereign Wealth Fund Portfolios (MFI,
Working Paper Series No. 2011–003, 2011).
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then, regulation through markets has positive value that is not
captured solely by looking at conventional measures of fund
performance.
Benjamin Richardson echoes this idea in his comparative study of
the NSWF and similar efforts in New Zealand. 442 In considering how
the NSWF and the New Zealand variant reconcile their ethical and
financial aspirations, he concludes that such reconciliation requires a
narrow and focused view of ethical obligation, one centered on
“avoiding complicity in unethical conduct or social and
environmental harm.” 443 But even with respect to complicity, the
NSWF has been subject to sometimes substantial criticism. 444
Legislation, Professor Richardson argues, is likely required to
broaden the ethical obligation, even one made more compatible with
the business case for sustainable investing. 445 But more than that,
both would be required to become more active promoters of
sustainable development. 446 Still, any tension between public and
private obligation ultimately disappears over the very long term. 447
To some extent, this is all well taken. Yet it is clear that the NSWF’s
objectives are more complex and nuanced than one might expect of a
similarly constituted private fund. As such, it is unclear that the same
metrics are as useful. Norway is a state with substantial ambitions
within the marketplace of policy. States compete for influence within
global structures to develop transnational rules, parameters, customs,
and expectations. That is of great value to Norway—and ultimately
to Norway’s people. It has a value that is not measured by the
financial performance of one of its instruments. To limit assessment
of the value of an instrumentality of state action to one of its uses
(albeit an important one) misses the fundamental point of the

442. Richardson, supra note 17, at 6.
443. Id. at 5 (redefining ethical investment as allowing and promoting long-term
financial returns). However, “neither the NGPF- G nor the NZSF is mandated to
actively promote sustainable development or to seek improvements in
corporations’ sustainability performance.” Id.
444. See, e.g., Broken Ethics, supra note 407, at 5, 6 (noting that the Norwegian
population has invested through the NSWF “USD $4.7 billion . . . in 15 companies
– hailing from eight countries – involved in the oil and gas sector in Burma”).
445. Richardson, supra note 17, at 25.
446. Id. (“[T]hey would need to rely mainly on a mix of corporate engagement
and positive investment in environmental programs.”).
447. Id. at 23.
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operation of the NSWF. Professor Richardson nicely illustrates the
need for a new set of metrics for the assessment of SWFs as multipurpose politico-economic enterprises.
Joel Slawotsky was right to suggest that
SWFs demonstrate convincingly that states are involved in traditionally
private sector roles. States also own private sector businesses through
state owned enterprises (SOEs). Thus, the role of the private sector is no
longer relegated exclusively to corporations. Given the blurring of the
distinctions, there is no reason to treat corporations differently than
states. 448

But the NSWF has also convincingly suggested that the opposite is
true: there is no reason to treat states differently than corporations.
Within the logic of globalization, the distinctions may increasingly
carry a smaller difference. 449

VI. CONCLUSION
Through the NSWF, the dynamics of power and politics have
assumed a new alignment. Power is no longer necessarily based
solely on the ability to command technology or vast armies of
people; power is now available to any enterprise that can assert it
through global markets which even the conventionally strongest state
is bound to protect if for no other reason than self-interest. Norway
has become a more influential power in the world precisely because
it can influence global investment markets and, through its
ownership, influence the development of law and custom. This the
Norwegians have done quite consciously. 450 Norway is not alone; the
mix of finance and politics has now become quite pronounced. 451 The
448. Joel Slawotsky, The Global Corporation as International Law Actor, 52
VA. J. INT’L L. DIGEST 79, 86 (2012).
449. Id. at 88.
450. See, e.g., Anita M. Halvorssen, Addressing Climate Change Through the
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) – Using Responsible Investments to
Encourage Corporations to Take ESG Issues into Account in Their DecisionMaking 13-14, (Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper Series No. 2010–06,
2010).
451. At the end of 2008, Former President Mohamed Nasheed announced that
the Maldives was establishing an SWF to purchase a new island for the country.
He stated, “This trust fund will act as a national insurance policy to help pay for a
new homeland, should future generations have to evacuate a country disappearing
under the waves.” Mostafa Mahmud Naser, Climate Change, Environmental
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ways in which SWFs are used to govern are now as important as the
ways in which the global community might seek to regulate, or at
least manage, the behaviors of SWFs.
Despite these complicating elements, in the aggregate, the
NSWF’s two-fold set of techniques for state intervention in private
markets—as a participant and as a public enterprise, with the object
of securing economic and regulatory “returns”—represents the most
innovative part of the NSWF framework. 452 Norway’s SWF project
may provide a window into governance frameworks for the coming
century because it embraces a set of governing parameters
incompatible with traditional assumptions of the operation of the
law-state system from the last century. Neither the state nor the law
occupies the central position in this system. The NSWF governance
regime acknowledges three simultaneously operating governance
regimes—the law-state system, the social-norm system of private
actors, and the international law-custom system of the community of
states (and their partner-constructs). It seeks to both mediate between
these governance systems and to actively participate within them.
The NSWF is created and operated as an instrumentality of the state,
a fund controlled through the Norse Ministry of Finance. As a state
instrumentality it is used to generate income for Norway; yet its
income production also affects governance through the use of
shareholder power to influence Norwegian public policy in the
enterprises in which the NSWF owns shares. Public policy that is
reflected in the NSWF investment activity as a shareholder and
investor in turn reflects the internalization of international law and
governance within the Norwegian domestic legal order. This then
contributes to the development of international law and custom that
are applied to the law or social-norm systems of the other two
governance regimes.
The NSWF experiment reminds us of the importance of public
policy in the operation of the private investment activities. It also
Degradation, and Migration: A Complex Nexus, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 713, 745 n.265 (2012) (citing Christine Russell, First Wave, SCI.
NEWS, 27 (Feb. 28, 2009)).
452. See GRALF-PATER CALLIESS & PEWER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS
AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2011)
(theorizing the way the NSWF serves as a variant on the emerging mechanics of
law).
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serves as a reminder of the substantial irrelevance of international
efforts, like the Santiago Principles, to draw a strong connection
between public and private investment in private markets. 453 More
importantly, it suggests the implausibility of the distinction between
public and private when states enter global markets as participants. 454
Yet it is all for a good cause, as the Norwegian people see it through
their governmental representatives. It is thus interesting to witness
the way the actions of great SWF actors rewrite the rules of SWF
operations—Norway in this case, China and Singapore in others. Its
shape will not be the product of convergence of the interests of host
states, but more likely the policies of SWF home states and the needs
of host states. In the meantime, there will be plenty of dialogue for
the press to follow. 455
Norway has risen to the challenge that globalization set for
states—to find a way in which they might more actively engage in
the processes of inter-systemic and vertical harmonization without
losing their fundamental character and democratic connection with
their citizens. To that end, Norway has begun to develop a domestic
legal order that incorporates evolving international standards that are
themselves a product of the active participation of states and other
relevant stakeholders. It has sought to leverage its political power by
operationalizing this system through its participation in global
markets rather than through its legislature and inter-governmental
relations. SWFs, then, are not merely publicly-owned private actors

453. Thus, for example, the Norwegians appear to formally comply with its
provisions, especially GAAP 19, but in a way that substantially evades the spirit of
that provision. Santiago Principles, supra note 181, at 8; The Norwegian
Government Pension Fund Global’s Adherence with the Santiago Principles,
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN. 18 (Apr. 2011), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/
FIN/brosjyre/2011/GapSurvey_Global.pdf [hereinafter Norwegian Government’s
Adherence With the Santiago Principles]. Indeed the essence of both responsible
investing and active shareholding runs counter to the economic objectives focus of
GAAP 19.
454. Santiago Principles, supra note 181, at 19; Norwegian Government’s
Adherence With the Santiago Principles, supra note 453 (making no distinction
between public and private actors for investment purposes).
455. See, e.g., Working Group Announces Creation of International Forum of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
(Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr0901.htm (establishing a forum to
discuss common interests and facilitate greater understanding of the Santiago
Principles).
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in global financial markets. In Norway’s case, they are also a means
by which a state can engage in the process of international law
making, regulate corporate culture through market activities, and
politicize shareholder power. The NSWF system embodies the ways
in which the market can serve as a substitute for a parliament, and an
ethics council can construct an interpretive jurisprudence, which
together can produce the glimmering of a governance system that is
personal to the NSWF but which has significant effects on the
development of global standards of conduct for companies and
markets. More importantly, the NSWF system points to the ways in
which the terrain on which the global human rights protection project
has changed—no longer solely the province of states (through their
constitutions) or international organizations (through their treaties or
standard setting bodies), human rights is being woven into more
tightly intermeshed relationships between states, investors, markets,
and international organizations. The NSWF evidences the emerging
international notions of a state duty to protect and a corporate
responsibility to respect human rights, as well as the ways in which
the form and scope of corporate governance are being fashioned
across old jurisdictional barriers in new ways.
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APPENDIX A
I. COMPANIES EXCLUDED FROM THE INVESTMENT UNIVERSE
A. Production of weapons that through their normal use may
violate fundamental humanitarian principles
Anti-personnel land mines
Singapore Technologies Engineering (26 April 2002)
Production of cluster munitions
Textron Inc. (Dec. 31, 2008)
Hanwha Corporation (Dec. 31, 2007)
Poongsan Corporation (Nov. 30, 2006)
Raytheon Co. (Aug. 31, 2005)
Lockheed Martin Corp. (Aug. 31, 2005)
General Dynamics Corp. (Aug. 31, 2005)
Alliant Techsystems Inc. (Aug. 31, 2005)
Production of nuclear arms
The Babcock & Wilcox Co. (Jan. 11, 2013)
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. (Jan. 11, 2013)
Serco Group Plc. (Dec. 31, 2007)
Gen Corp. Inc. (Dec. 31, 2007)
Safran SA. (Dec. 31, 2005)
Northrop Grumman Corp. (Dec. 31, 2005)
Honeywell International Corp. (Dec. 31, 2005)
EADS Finance BV (Dec. 31, 2005)
EADS Co. (Dec. 31, 2005)
Boeing Co. (Dec. 31, 2005)
B. Sale of weapons and military material to Burma
Dongfeng Motor Group Co. Ltd. (Feb. 28, 2009)
C. Production of tobacco
Grupo Carso SAB de CV (Aug. 24, 2011)
Shanghai Industrial Holdings Ltd. (Mar. 15, 2011)
Alliance One International Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Altria Group Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
British American Tobacco BHD (Dec. 31, 2009)
British American Tobacco Plc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Gudang Garam tbk pt. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Imperial Tobacco Group Plc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
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ITC Ltd. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Japan Tobacco Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
KT&G Corp. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Lorillard Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Philip Morris International Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Philip Morris Cr AS. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Reynolds American Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
Souza Cruz SA (Dec. 31, 2009)
Swedish Match AB (Dec. 31, 2009)
Universal Corp VA (Dec. 31, 2009)
Vector Group Ltd. (Dec. 31, 2009)
D. Actions or omissions that constitute an unacceptable risk of the
Fund contributing to:
Serious or systematic human rights violations
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (May 31, 2006)
Wal-Mart de Mexico SA de CV (May 31, 2006)
Severe environmental damages
Lingui Development Berhad Ltd. (Feb. 16, 2011)
Samling Global Ltd. (Aug. 23, 2010)
Norilsk Nickel (Oct. 31, 2009)
Barrick Gold Corp. (Nov. 30, 2008)
Rio Tinto Plc. (June 30, 2008)
Rio Tinto Ltd. (June 30, 2008)
Madras Aluminium Company (Oct. 31, 2007)
Sterlite Industries Ltd. (Oct. 31, 2007)
Vedanta Resources Plc. (Oct. 31, 2007)
Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. (May 31, 2006)
E. Other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical
norms
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (Dec. 6, 2011)
Elbit Systems Ltd. (Aug. 31, 2009)
F. Serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of
war or conflict
Shikun & Binui Ltd.
Africa Israel Investments Ltd. and Danya Cebus Ltd. (Aug. 23, 2010)
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Companies that have been excluded, but where the decision to
exclude has later been revoked are listed separately. All
recommendations for exclusion and decisions to exclude or to revoke
previous decisions to exclude, are listed here (latest first).
Jan. 11, 2013
Observation of Siemens AG concluded
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2013/observationof-siemens-concluded.html?id=711933.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2013/siemens_eng.pdf.
Jan. 11, 2013
Exclusion of following companies reversed:
Finmeccanica Sp. A.
BAE Systems Plc.
FMC Corp.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2013/newdecisions-about-the-government-pensi.html?id=711932.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics on BAE Systems Plc.
and Finmeccanica Sp. A., available at http://www.regjeringen.no/
upload/FIN/etikk/2013/bae_finmec_eng.pdf.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics on FMC Corporation,
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2013/
fmc_eng.pdf.
Jan. 11, 2013
The Babcock & Wilcox Co.
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2013/newdecisions-about-the-government-pensi.html?id=711932.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2013/babcock_wilcox_j
acobs_eng.pdf.
June 15, 2012
Shikun & Binui Ltd.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
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http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2012/exclusion-ofa-company-from-the-governme.html?id=685898.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1930865/Shikun_Binui_eng.pdf.
Dec. 6, 2011
FMC Corporation
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2011/statens-pensjonsfond-utland-nye-beslutni/governmentpension-fund-global-two-compa.html?id=665637.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at http://
www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2011/Rec_phospahte.pdf.
Aug. 24, 2011
Grupo Carso SAB de CV
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2011/tobaccoproducer-excluded-from-the-gover.html?id=652773.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FIN/Statens
pensjonsfond/2011/spu/carso_2011e.pdf.
Mar. 15, 2011
Shanghai Industrial Holdings Ltd.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2011/onecompany-excluded-from-the-government.html?id=635913.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2011/shanghai_eng.pdf.
Feb. 16, 2011
Lingui Development Berhad Ltd.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2011/LinguiDevelopment-Berhad-Ltd-excluded-from-theGPFG.html?id=633660.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2011/recommendation_l
ingui.pdf.
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Aug. 23, 2010
Africa Israel Investments Ltd.
Danya Cebus Ltd.
Samling Global Ltd.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2010/three-companies-excluded-from-thegovern.html?id=612790.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics (Africa Israel
Investments Ltd. and Danya Cebus Ltd.), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/Recommendation_Afric
a_Israel.pdf.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics (Samling Global Ltd.),
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/
Recommendation_Samling.pdf.
Mar. 2, 2010
Exclusion of United Technologies Corp. reversed
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2010/Decision-onexclusion-reversed.html?id=594307.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/united_technologies_en
glish_nov09.pdf.
Jan. 20, 2010
Seventeen Tobacco Producers Excluded
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2010/Tobacco-producers-excluded-from-GovernmentPension-Fund-Global.html?id=591449.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/rec_tobacco_english.pd
f.
Nov. 19, 2009
Norilsk Nickel
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/news/2009/exclusion-ofmetallurgical-and-mining-co.html?id=586655.
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Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/reco
mmendation_norilsk.pdf.
Sept. 3, 2009
Elbit Systems Ltd.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2009/supplier-of-surveillance-equipment-fort.html?id=575444.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/thegovernment-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/the-council-on-ethics-recommends-thatth.html?id=575451.
Mar. 13, 2009
Dongfeng Motor Group Co. Ltd.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2
009/leverandor-av-militart-materiell-til-bur.html?id=549152.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/Don
gfeng_english.pdf.
Jan. 30, 2009
Textron Inc.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2009/cluster-weapons-manufacturer-excludedfr.html?id=543105.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/textron.pdf.
Jan. 30, 2009
Barrick Gold Corporation
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2009/mining-company-excluded-from-thegovernm.html?id=543107
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Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/recommendation_barric
k.pdf.
Sept. 9, 2008
Rio Tinto Ltd.
Rio Tinto Plc.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2008/the-government-pension-fund-divests-its.html?id=526030.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/Recommendation%20R
T.pdf.
Jan. 11, 2008
Hanwha Corporation
Serco Group Plc.
GenCorp Inc.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2008/One-producer-of-cluster-munitions-andtw.html?id=496485.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics (Hanwha Corporation),
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selectedtopics/the-government-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/Recommendation-on-exclusion-of-the-compa2.html?id=496492.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics (Serco Group Plc),
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selectedtopics/the-government-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/Recommendation-on-the-exclusion-of-thec.html?id=496487.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics(GenCorp Inc),
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selectedtopics/the-government-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/Recommendation-on-exclusion-of-the-
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compa.html?id=496494.
Nov. 9, 2007
Vedanta Resources Plc.
Sterlite Industries Ltd.
Madras Aluminium Company Ltd.
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2007/Metals-and-mining-company-excluded-from.html?id=488626.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/thegovernment-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/Recommendation—-Vedanta-ResourcesPlc.html?id=488630.
Sept. 3, 2009
Exclusion of DRD Gold Limited reversed
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2009/thales-sa-and-drd-gold-limited-to-berei.html?id=575442.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/thegovernment-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/recommendation-to-reverse-a-decision-to.html?id=575438.
Apr. 11, 2007
DRD Gold Limited
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=462551
&epslanguage=EN-GB.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/reco
mmendation_drd.pdf.
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Dec. 6, 2006
Poongsan Corporation
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=437729
&epslanguage=EN-GB.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Brev.aspx?id=449053&epslang
uage=EN-GB.
June 6, 2006
Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
Wal-Mart de Mexico SA de CV
Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=104396
&epslanguage=EN-GB.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics (Wal-Mart), available
at http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Brev.aspx?id=450120&
epslanguage=EN-GB.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics (Freeport), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/Rec
ommendation%20_15_February_2006.pdf.
Jan. 5, 2006
BAE Systems Plc.
Boeing Co.
Finmeccanica Sp.A.
Honeywell International Inc.
Northrop Grumman Corp.
United Technologies Corp.
Safran SA
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=419804
&epslanguage=EN-GB.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Brev.aspx?id=419589&epslang
uage=EN-GB.
Sept. 3, 2009
Exclusion of Thales SA reversed
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Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/pressreleases/2009/thales-sa-and-drd-gold-limited-to-berei.html?id=575442.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/thegovernment-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/recommendation-to-reverse-the-exclusion.html?id=575446.
Aug. 31, 2005
Alliant Techsystems Inc.
EADS Co (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company)
EADS Finance BV
General Dynamics Corporation
Lockheed Martin Corp.
Raytheon Co.
Thales SA
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=256695
&epslanguage=EN-GB.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Brev.aspx?id=419583&epslang
uage=EN-GB.
Sept. 1, 2006
Exclusion of Kerr-McGee reversed
Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=419868
&epslanguage=EN-GB.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/thegovernment-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/Recommendations-and-Letters-from-the-AdvisoryCouncil-on-Ethics/Recommendation-on-suspension-of-exclusion-ofKerrMcGee-Corporation-KerrMcGee.html?id=419593.
June 6, 2005
Kerr-McGee Corporation
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Press Release from the Ministry of Finance, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Pressemelding.aspx?id=256359
&epslanguage=EN-GB.
Recommendation from the Council on Ethics, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/tema/andre/Etiskeretningslinjer/Tilradninger-og-brev-fra-Etikkradet/Recommendationon-Exclusion-from-the-Government-Petroleum-Funds-InvestmentUniverse-of-the-Company-Kerr-McGeeCorporation.html?id=419582.
Mar. 22, 2002
Singapore Technologies Engineering
Recommendation from the Advisory Commission on International
Law, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/Redaksjonell
Artikkel.aspx?id=413581&epslanguage=EN-GB.
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APPENDIX B
COMPANIES THAT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, BUT WHERE THE DECISION
TO EXCLUDE HAS LATER BEEN REVOKED
PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS THAT THROUGH THEIR NORMAL USE MAY
VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES
Production of cluster munitions
Thales S.A. (Aug. 31, 2009)
Production of nuclear arms
United Technologies Corp (Feb. 28, 2010)
ACTIONS OR OMISSIONS THAT CONSTITUTE AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK OF
THE FUND CONTRIBUTING TO:
Severe environmental damages
DRD Gold Limited (Aug. 31, 2009)
OTHER PARTICULARLY SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL
ETHICAL NORMS

KerrMcGee Corporation (Aug. 31, 2006)
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APPENDIX C
OBSERVATION OF COMPANIES FROM THE FUNDS’ INVESTMENT
UNIVERSE
In some cases there may be doubt as to whether the conditions for
exclusion have been fulfilled or how the company’s behaviour will
develop in the future. In such cases, the Ministry may put the
company under observation on the advice of the Council of ethics.
Currently under observation
Siemens AG is under observation due to the gross and systematic
corruption the group has been involved in over many years. Press
release 24/2009; Observation status concluded Jan. 11, 2013.

